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I wish to express my deep appreciation to Orville “Bud” Hay, former Director of
Advanced Concepts, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College. He not only
advised, read, and commented on this paper, but he provided me with access to the re-
sources I needed to write it. Bud has been the guiding genius of the Global Games,
which the London Times of 13 February 2003 referred to as “a series long seen as the
apogee of military war gaming.” It is my distinct pleasure to have been associated with
him since 1983, to have worked with him in eighteen Globals, and to have collaborated
with him in writing the first volume of Global history.
Fundamentally, this type of worldwide tabletop game has obvious potential for further
development. Such a summer project could evolve into a popular and productive an-
nual exercise.
–Hugh Nott, with reference to the 1979 Global War Game
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Foreword
The Naval War College, at Newport, Rhode Island, is justifiably famous in national se-
curity and naval circles across the globe for being on the cutting edge of war gaming,
and it has been for over a century. From the famous games that helped set the stage for
the island-hopping campaign across the Pacific in World War II to a recent series ex-
ploring military options for U.S. homeland defense, the College’s war games have kept
it among the ranks of the world’s premier gaming facilities. The history of the Naval
War College’s war-gaming efforts for the past two decades, a particularly critical pe-
riod, is only now being acknowledged and analyzed.
Captain Robert H. Gile (U.S. Navy, Ret.) has in this Newport Paper provided a service
for the Naval War College, the U.S. Navy, and indeed, practitioners and historians of
gaming around the world. This is the second in a series of monographs synthesizing
the primary sources to provide a concise, chronological summary and analysis of the
prestigious Global War Games, hosted in Newport from 1984 until after the fall of the
Soviet Union. The first monograph (coauthored with Bud Hay) was Global War Game:
The First Five Years, published as Newport Paper 4 in 1993; it is available electronically in
Adobe Acrobat and in limited paper copies. Planning and research is under way to com-
plete the history of the Global series. Captain Gile’s invaluable effort captures the meth-
ods, techniques, assumptions, analysis, results, and the all-important “take-aways” of this
widely known game series, important today for the history of war gaming but even more
so at the time, as a vital contribution to the thinking and strategy of the U.S. Navy, the
other U.S. services, and its alliance counterparts in the later stages of the Cold War.
This Newport Paper, Global War Game: Second Series, 1984-1988, recounts a uniquely
interesting and challenging period in the Naval War College’s engagement with naval
and national strategies through the war-gaming process. The games examined the abil-
ity of the United States to sustain conventional warfare with the Soviet Union until full
mobilization of the nation’s resources could be achieved. Through a sustained set of se-
quential and interlocking games, the Global process identified a number of important
and controversial findings. For instance, as the following pages will show, these games
pointed to the importance of offensive action, including maritime operations; the abil-
ity of “Blue” (the West, broadly speaking) to win without resorting to nuclear weapons;
and the extensive planning necessary to conduct high-intensity combat over a lengthy
period.
Fortunately for the United States and the world, the 1984–88 era was the penultimate
period during which Global games would take place in the shadow of superpower con-
flict. As we look forward to the third and final installation of Captain Gile’s narrative
we can already see, in the present work, the first signs of the impact of the changing
geopolitical environment on the Global series and the Naval War College’s dynamic ap-
proach to war gaming.
P E T E R D O M B R O W S K I
Editor, Naval War College Press
August 2004
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Note to the Reader
This report deals with practical issues and major themes identified during the second
Global War Game (GWG) Series. Its focus is on various general topics, specific force
employment issues, and discrete game events. Because of the interplay of themes and
issues among several theaters, some repetition is necessary to provide a more complete
discussion.
The Global War Game was conceived in 1978 to build a structure to explore war-
fighting issues in a larger perspective than the tactical view prevalent in the Navy at
that time. These games constitute a research project that ranges from policy through
strategy to operations (campaigns). It was and is an opportunity to investigate ideas
and concepts that may vary from current policy or strategic “wisdom.” With the under-
standing that game simulations were but an approximation of the behavior of govern-
ments in global war, the scenarios should be considered as a context for issues to be
explored.
The first game (1979) had a distinctly naval focus, but the series quickly evolved, by ob-
vious necessity, into a much broader military and political forum. Throughout the first
series, GWG was utilized as a test bed or crucible for an emerging maritime strategy. A
brief summary of these initial games and an overview of some of the major issues ex-
amined in them is included in this volume for those who do not have access to Global
War Game: The First Five Years (Newport Paper Number 4.) While the first series in-
volved several different geographical areas to confront current, real-world events or to
test a specific concept, the second series picked up where the first terminated, with a
major war between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw
Pact (WP). It was a natural extension of the first series, designed for the purpose of ex-
ploring issues that would arise in waging protracted warfare in the decade of the 1990s.
Effort has been made throughout this paper to preserve the terminology that was in
use when the games were conducted and to relate faithfully actual strategies pursued
and campaigns implemented as well as the rationale behind them. Thus, while some of
the terminology may seem archaic and some of the operations ill-advised, it is neces-
sary to look at these efforts as a learning experience that reflects how our thinking
about global war, our concepts, and our practices matured during the series.

Executive Summary
The second Global War Game Series was played at the Naval War College for three
weeks each summer of the years 1984–1988. The issues that were pervasive throughout
can be summarized as follows:
What are the political, war fighting, logistical, and mobilization factors that determine
the United States/NATO capability to sustain conventional against the Soviet Union/
Warsaw Pact until the full military, industrial and personnel resources of the “free
world” can be mobilized to secure victory? and
How best can US/NATO maritime superiority be translated into strategic leverage
useful in bringing the conflict to a successful conclusion?
The first game of the series, GWG ’84, was a stand-alone game designed to test new
gaming concepts and to ensure realistic orders of battle. The 1985, 1986, and 1987
games consisted of one continuous game, with the two latter games picking up where
its predecessor had terminated. In game play, war broke out on 10 November 1990, and
hostilities were played out to D+65, or 14 January 1991. As one of the purposes of the
series was to ascertain the contours of protracted conventional war, use of nuclear
weapons was not permitted, although “off line” excursions into the possible results and
ramifications of such use did take place. The final game of the series, in 1988, was de-
signed to study war termination. This was a planning, seminar-type game in format,
without any actual moves occurring.
The games of the series involved about 600 participants (at any given time) from over
100 government departments, agencies, military commands, educational and research
facilities, and business and industry. Foreign military and civilian representatives from
Canada and the United Kingdom played.
Principal findings of the series can be summarized as follows:
• A NATO/Warsaw Pact war would be difficult to start but virtually impossible to
conclude on a negotiated basis.
• What constitutes “victory” and “defeat” can be perceived very differently by Blue and
by Red.
• Although contemplation of nuclear use tends to change for both sides with time and
circumstance, early escalation by Blue is probably unnecessary and unwise.
• The huge material expenditures involved in waging modern, conventional war
require pre-planning of resource management and industrial mobilization.
• Offensive use of military forces is critical in throwing Red off timeline and, at sea,
creating strategic options and protecting SLOCs.
• Although maritime success is critical to Blue conduct of the war, translation of that
success into negotiating leverage is elusive.
• Regardless of Blue policy preference/strategy, a NATO/Warsaw Pact war in which
alliances remain firm and nuclear weapons are not used will probably become
protracted.
Assuming continued domestic support and alliance cohesion, the validity of the Blue
strategy of protracted, conventional war rested on two conditions that these games
called into question:
• The ability of Blue to generate or to accure from other sources the equipment
necessary to sustain the conflict until industrial mobilization occurred was
problematic,
• There was a distinct possibility that the very success of the Blue strategy would drive
Red to some form of nuclear escalation.
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Review of the First Global War Game Series
(1979–1983)
A Review of War Gaming
One common distinction made among war games is between educational (or training)
and research games.1 In educational games, the concern is with simulating warfare situ-
ations in which players can exercise decision-making skills. Research games, in con-
trast, though they frequently have instructional value, are designed to generate insights
into military problems; designers and controllers attempt to inject as much realism as
possible, given the inherent limitations of the medium. The Global War Game series
was of the research category, and one of the premier examples of that type.
Educational war games are typically “one-sided”—that is, only one side comprises
players, acting freely. In such games the control cell “plays” the opposition, usually in a
scripted fashion, at least at the outset. The bounds of scenario probability commonly
become elastic in such games, as control cells—gaming-center staff members who reg-
ulate game flow, devise and issue “intelligence” disclosures, and respond to the game’s
sponsor, the entity that requested that the game be played and set its objectives—tailor
move-outcome assessments so as to confront confront with the desired challenges.
Other games are “two-sided,” in which both opposing sides are staffed by players, act-
ing autonomously and mediated by the control cell, which analyzes the interaction of
the opposing decisions for each “move” (below) of the two sides and chooses among
the plausible outcomes those that best serve the game’s objectives. A variant, of which
the Global Game was a highly elaborated exemplar, is the “multisided” game, in which
some of the player cells may act as “neutrals.”
War games can also classified in terms of time—that is, of how “real” time (months, in
the case of the Global game) is compressed into the actual, physical period available to
the players (two or three weeks in the Global series). Conventional games (such as the
Global games of the its first and second series) proceed in discrete stages, known as
“moves.” In each of these steps, players (or groups of players, in the Global case)
privately assess the presented situation as they perceive it—on the basis of “intelli-
gence” provided by the control cell, and within the scenario framework—and then re-
port to the controllers their intentions (political initiatives, diplomatic announcements
and démarches, force movements and dispositions, combat orders, etc.) for the next
specified period of time. Generally, moves cover short periods of time for tactical-level
games and much longer increments for operational and strategic-level ones (the Global
case). There are also games that employ “moving game clocks” and confront players
with continuously changing situations to which they must respond. Operational games
tend to be limited to the tactical level, due to the necessarily limited spans of time they
can accommodate.
All war games, of whatever kind or technological sophistication, share a basic concep-
tual hierarchy, of which the most fundamental dimension relates to physical location
and movement.
Even complex operations, including their logistical flows, can be simulated in with
physical markers or computer symbols. The value of the outcomes at higher dimen-
sions of any war game depends on how realistically forces are played. If tactics or capa-
bilities are used that would be impossible in the real world, any resulting assessments
will be invalid. The next dimension is assessment of outcomes—what “happens” as
forces (or political enties) confront or otherwise deal with each other. Some outcomes
can be reduced to a roll of the dice, others to complex software algorithms, and yet oth-
ers (certainly at the strategic level) the judgment of human umpires. Here again, fidel-
ity to real-world phenomena is necessary in order to prevent distortions at the
dimension of player decisions. Skewed assessments can lead to faulty analysis and to
decisions that yield no useful insights.
The topmost dimension is the analysis of player decisions. Frequently it is not the deci-
sions themselves that are of most interest to a sponsor but, for example, the courses of
action that seemed possible to the players, the constraints they perceived, or the effect
of the “fog of war” or uncertainty—induced by deliberate ambiguity or lacunae in the
information disclosed by the control cell. Typically players are typically provided not
actual, precise, and complete outcome assessments—the “ground truth,” known only to
the control cell—but only those elements (or indications of them) that might realisti-
cally be observable, given the capabilities being gamed. Research games do not often
deal with this dimension, because of its indeterminate and unpredictable nature; the
Global War Game series, for which such indeterminacy was of the essence, was a nota-
ble exception.
The annual Global War Game (GWG) in Newport, Rhode Island, was, until its final it-
erations early in the present century, a multisided, conventionally organized, research
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game. Initiated in 1978, it soon became one of the preeminent analytic resources of the
U.S. national security community. Throughout its history it represented “an opportu-
nity to investigate ideas and concepts that may vary from current strategy or policy
wisdom.” From its inception in 1978, the game series confronted defining issues. As
seen in the previous study of which the present work is a continuation, the Global se-
ries constituted a “test bed or crucible for an emerging maritime strategy,” a strategy
that was to be the U.S. Navy’s fundamental concept of global warfare until the dissolu-
tion of the Soviet Union.2
Series Development
The 1979 Global War Game was the first of a five-year series that reintroduced a con-
cept largely neglected since the 1930s, when the Orange War Plans were gamed at the
Naval War College. These first five games played out five Blue/Red scenarios with force
levels postulated for the respective sides in the year 1985. Each game was a separate en-
tity with no direct tie-in to the previous or succeeding game. Although scenarios did
not necessarily relate to each other, issues identified in one game were incorporated
into those that followed. This, in effect, created a “series” through the establishment of
a longitudinal approach that promoted the examination of problems over time, in dif-
ferent circumstances, and permitted detailed study in the intervals between games.
This game-study-game cycle, which evolved during the first GWG series, was to be-
come a most important aspect of the second series. Issues raised in one year’s game
could be researched during the intervening eleven months and the results incorporated
into the next game. This process was greatly facilitated by the presence of Army and Air
Force officers at the Naval War College. Their work, along with that of their Navy and
Marine Corps contemporaries, often in inter-service combinations, contributed im-
portantly to both game development and the attainment of game objectives.
The first game was held in the summer of 1979 at the Naval War College under the
sponsorship of the Center for Advanced Research. It was structured as an experimental
concept with limited personnel and material resources. Scenarios and strategies appro-
priate to worldwide conflict were developed, and, because of the experimental nature
of the undertaking, a manual, chart-type game format was selected. Some 50 officers
(mostly NWC students) and a half-dozen senior defense officials played. Initially, there
was concern as to whether this level of participation was sufficient to properly execute
a simulation that was global in scope. GWG ’79 was in fact more successful than ex-
pected. It was also evident, however, that a more thorough examination of global con-
flict was required and that the effort needed to be populated by more senior players
and experts.
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From these modest beginnings, the Global War Game experienced substantial growth
both in terms of personnel and the level of sophistication. Midway through the first se-
ries, the GWG had become a complex operation involving over two hundred partici-
pants from all the military services, several intelligence organizations, numerous
government departments and agencies as well as representatives from academia and in-
dustry. Experts were employed to ensure game fidelity in such areas as logistics, ad-
vanced technology and command, control and communications (C3).
Each game of the first series stressed strategy and maneuver. Standard data values and
models for weapons systems and sensors were utilized to determine the outcome of
specific force interactions.
As is suggested by its name, the Global War Game is a large operation, and by 1983 re-
quired many players and controllers. These participants were organized into six pri-
mary teams and several supporting tables. Primary cells were:
Blue and Red National Command Authority (NCA)/Supreme High Command (VGK)
Blue and Red Commanders in Chief (CINCs)/Theater Commanders (TVD)
Blue and Red players on the game floor.
Supporting tables covered such subjects as logistics, weather, intelligence and political/
military decisions by nations not allied with Blue or Red.
The Global War Game is a hybrid. It includes aspects of a research game, a logistics
game and an operational game. Both manual and automated gaming systems have
been employed. As later games grew larger and more complex, there was a shift toward
increasing reliance on computer-based systems. Whereas GWG 1979 was essentially a
manual game, GWG ’83 incorporated the new Naval Warfare Gaming System (NWGS),
the U.S. Army War College’s Theater and Corps Operations and Planning Simulation
(TACOPS) and number of smaller models used to perform functions such as battle
damage assessment (BDA). Some inputs for the game itself, such as logistics plans,
were generated by computer runs made prior to the start on the game.
Game Scenarios 1979–1983
1979
The scenario for the first Global War Game was set in 1985. Consistent with concerns
over the security of oil supplies that were prevalent in 1979, the area of initial conflict
between Blue and Red was Southwest Asia. An insurgency was in progress in Saudi
Arabia, and international tension was high along that nation’s northern border. Blue
supported Saudi Arabia by sending a brigade of the 82nd Airborne Division along with
a contingent of airborne warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft and an F-15
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squadron. Two aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBGs) were transferred from the Indian
Ocean to proceed around Africa and join the Atlantic Fleet. Worldwide defensive mea-
sures included the forward positioning of additional maritime patrol (VP) squadrons
and the movement of two CVBGs from the East Coast to positions in the North Atlan-
tic. As the crisis mounted, Red mobilized on 11 July and Blue did the same a week later.
Red increased naval deployments in the Norwegian Sea and the Mediterranean. Con-
cerns over the survivability of CVBGs led Blue to withdraw them from the Mediterra-
nean to join with the two CVBGs that had recently left the East Coast and were then
located north of the Azores.
Hostilities began with the invasion of Saudi Arabia by four Iraqi divisions and one Red
airborne division. Simultaneously, an attack was launched by the Warsaw Pact on the
Central Front (map 1). Worldwide, Blue and Red naval forces engaged in a series of in-
tense battles. Red sought to isolate Blue and its allies with a diplomatic offensive. France,
Japan, Pakistan, and Algeria were offered incentives to remain neutral. Israel was guaran-
teed security from her Arab neighbors and an uninterrupted supply of oil in return for
neutrality. The Red invasion of Saudi Arabia could not be contained by indigenous forces
and by in-theater Blue reinforcements. Therefore, Blue was compelled to withdraw to Israel.
Withdrawal of the CVBGs from the Mediterranean proved to be a political and mili-
tary disaster. Red was able to overwhelm the remaining regional Blue forces. Deployed
Red Soviet naval aviation/long range aviation (SNA/LRA) aircraft struck Blue and al-
lied bases throughout the area with deadly effectiveness. The Naval Air Station,
Sigonella, shelled by Red surface units and bombed by Red aircraft, was rendered to-
tally unusable. Malta fell by the evening of the war’s first day. Red land-based air supe-
riority turned the central and eastern Mediterranean into a veritable Red lake.
Politically, the NATO southern flank unraveled as Greece and Turkey were forced out
of the war and Italy lay open to attack.
In the Atlantic, convoy operations were implemented, and two French CVBGs aug-
mented the Blue forces that escorted shipping to Europe. A two CVBG force gained
control of the Norwegian Sea, although the effort resulted in the loss of the USS
Vinson.
An anti-SSBN campaign grew out of an overall Blue ASW effort. Red felt the need to
respond to the depletion of part of its strategic nuclear reserve caused by this
anti-SSBN campaign and did so by launching tactical nuclear weapons strikes against
the Blue CVBGs. An SNA/LRA raid was launched from Luanda against Blue forces in
the Atlantic and a second attack, out of Vladivostok, was directed against the two Blue
CVBGs in the Pacific. These resulted in the loss of the USS Kitty Hawk battle group
(BG) in the South Atlantic and the USS Nimitz BG in the Pacific. Blue had some
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difficulty in selecting a suitable Red target for retaliation, finally settled on a Red
anti-carrier warfare (ACW) group in the Norwegian Sea. No other use of nuclear
weapons occurred.
Due to the heavy commitment of Red forces to the Mediterranean theater, Blue elected
to divert the four-carrier battle force (CVBF) from a planned re-entry into the Medi-
terranean to support of the Central Front. The land war in Europe was nationalized
(pre-scripted) rather than played out in detail, and this allowed the players to extend
their timelines beyond the first few days of war. The script postulated that NATO had
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Central Region
managed to halt, at least temporarily, the Red advance, and, by game end, was conduct-
ing successful counterattacks.
As GWG ’79 ended, Red sought a cease-fire that would recognize the gains made in
Southwest Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean. Blue, while also seeking a cease-fire,
refused to recognize Red gains and believed it held the advantage due to favorable mo-
mentum on the Central Front.
1980
The 1980 game delved into a broad range of unexplored topics. Blue was hard pressed
throughout, because of the Red objective and aggressive employment of forces. How-
ever, as one game participant stated: “If the object of the game was to try out strategies,
identify key issues, undergo concentrated learning experience, and, in the end, to come
away with a much sharper focus on what global war might be like, then GWG ’80 was a
resounding success.”
Largely because Red set domination of Eurasia as its objective and discriminately used
nuclear and chemical weapons at the outset, this game was fundamentally about escala-
tion control rather than ships at sea. By its demonstrated will to use nuclear weapons
coupled with Blue pessimism about the strategic balance, Red was able to force Blue to
choose between surrender and major escalation at succeeding levels.
The 1980 game was based on elaborate, detailed scenarios which covered multiple
problem areas, worldwide. Once again the setting was the year 1985, and the scenario
postulated serious unrest in Eastern Europe, with the loyalty of both East Germany and
Poland to the Warsaw Pact increasingly in doubt.
Oil was a major factor in this game, which cast Red as a net importer. The combination
of increased demand and the escalating crisis in Europe drove the price of gasoline in
Blue to $4 per gallon. Further impacting the fuel situation was a coup in Nigeria, which
then aligned itself with Red.
In the Far East, the People’s Republic of China and Vietnam were at war, while in South
Asia, Red, still involved in Afghanistan, was mounting sharp border attacks against Pa-
kistan in reprisal for that nation’s provision of sanctuary for Afghan “rebels.” India had
also begun to mobilize against Pakistan. Blue responded by sending five tactical air
(TACAIR) squadrons, the 82nd airborne division, and a Marine amphibious brigade
(MAB) to Pakistan. During this game, a bright spot for Blue was that relations with Is-
rael, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq had improved to the point that Blue could establish
a major air base in the Sinai without adverse political consequences.
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As the crisis became more acute, Blue withdrew the forces previously dispatched to Pa-
kistan and repositioned them in Southern Iran and Northern Saudi Arabia with the
aim of reducing the threat of confrontation with India and improving Blue ability to
protect the Gulf oil fields.
In this scenario, war resulted from a deliberate, planned decision on the part of Red.
Red leaders felt they were in a favorable military position vis-à-vis Blue, and this, cou-
pled with increasing Warsaw Pact dissidence on the one hand and the growing need for
oil on the other was sufficient motivation for the seizure of Eurasia. As in all these
games, a primary tenet of Red strategy was to avoid risking the homelands. Therefore,
Red did not open with nuclear weapons against Blue. Instead, the war began with a
massive conventional attack on the Central Front, against Thrace, and through Austria.
Smaller attacks were mounted in Norway and Iran. Red also planned to intimidate Ja-
pan and France into neutrality, while applying enough pressure in Southwest Asia to
divert Blue. After victory in Europe, Red could then turn to the Persian Gulf and the
Far East.
The Blue/NATO political objective was the restoration of the “status quo ante bellum,”
and Blue strategy was essentially reactive. The preservation of peace was attempted,
and, once the war broke out, Blue moves were mainly in response to Red initiatives. Be-
cause Blue was not confident of success on the Central Front, the minimum Blue mili-
tary objective was to hold on the northern and southern flanks, the GIUK
(Greenland-Iceland–United Kingdom) gap and in the eastern Mediterranean and Per-
sian Gulf.
Red launched the offensive only two days after Blue had begun to mobilize. In addition
to extensive conventional attacks, Red used chemical weapons against Iceland, Guam,
and the Azores. In an unusual but very effective move, Red detonated three nuclear air
bursts off the east coast of Japan in an effort to intimidate that nation into neutrality.
Once nuclear weapons were used, the Blue National Command Authority (NCA) focus
shifted from the tactical level to nuclear linkage. In the process, details such as the sen-
sitivities of third parties, mobility problems, and even outcomes in specific theaters
quickly became secondary.
Consequently, GWG 1980 became, almost immediately, an exercise in the control of
nuclear escalation. Blue, in response to an SNA/LRA strike from Aden that destroyed a
convoy of SL-7s (high-speed container ships) in the Indian Ocean and also to the Red
nuclear salvo east of Japan, elected to launch a nuclear attack on Aden with B-52s. This
decision was partially influenced by an erroneous report that Blue units had been de-
stroyed in the Red nuclear demonstration off Japan. The Red response was immediate
and devastating. Red aircraft utilized nuclear weapons to destroy three CVBGs in the
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Indian Ocean and a fourth CVBG was lost to nuclear attack in the Pacific. After consid-
erable thought about a suitable target for retaliation, Blue attempted to sink two Kiev-
centered surface action groups (SAGs) in the Sea of Japan, with nuclear weapons.
However, all the attacking aircraft were shot down prior to weapons release. Meanwhile,
Blue eliminated all forward deployed Yankees by conventional means.
In Europe, the war on the Central Front was not going well for Blue. Cracks had begun
to show in the battle line of the northern sector and France had not transferred full
control of its army to Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR). Arrival of Blue
reinforcements was slowed as forces could not be flown directly to the Federal Republic
of Germany (FRG). Damage to many NATO airfields further hampered the airlift as
well as the ability of TACAIR to support the battle.
Blue sought a “second front” to take the pressure off the central region, but lacking any
readily available forces with which to mount a challenge in other areas, Blue recognized
that it would only be “robbing Peter to pay Paul.” Even aggressive PRC military opera-
tions, it appeared, would not put enough pressure on Red soon enough to make any
difference.
The nuclear escalatory process attained a new dimension as the PRC, involved in a con-
ventional war with Vietnam, sided with Blue and ordered Vietnam to cease assisting
Red. Vietnam refused, and the PRC responded by exploding a nuclear weapon over
Haiphong harbor. Vietnam replied with an attack using Red-supplied nuclear weapons
against four targets in the PRC. In retaliation, the PRC struck Red sites with nuclear
weapons, which precipitated a major nuclear strike against the PRC by Red.
The game reached temporary termination when Blue, desperately short of options, uti-
lized the “hot line” to threaten an attack on Red at the SIOP (Single Integrated Opera-
tions Plan) level. This induced Red to cease hostilities, although Red calculated this was
but a temporary pause. The game had reached D+5.
1981
Probably the most intriguing aspect of GWG ’81 was the absence of combat on the
Central Front. The primary Red objective was the historic goal of seizing the Turkish
Straits. Secondly, Red sought control of the Persian Gulf and mid-east oil. While NATO
and the Warsaw Pact were intact, their enthusiasm for joining this superpower conflict
was minimal.
As with the two previous games, the scenario was set in 1985. The principal crisis gov-
erning events was a dispute between Red and Turkey over the interpretation of terms
of the Montreux Convention, which regulates maritime passage through the Bosporus
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and the Dardanelles. A specific game objective was to study factors involved in nuclear
escalation.
In Turkey, Red and its surrogates conducted a coordinated campaign to weaken and
disrupt the Turkish government. This took the form of a propaganda campaign and
demonstrations aimed at separating Turkey from NATO. In addition, Syria attempted
to arouse Turkey’s Sunni Moslem population. The Turkish government retaliated by
threatening strict interpretation of the terms of the Montreux Convention. Red “esca-
lated” with over-flights of Turkey, amphibious exercises in Libya, and Warsaw Pact
force movements in the Black Sea, Bulgaria, and Romania.,
Southwest Asia was important in this scenario. Iraq moved toward the Red camp, lead-
ing to Blue concerns for the security of both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. As the crisis
deepened, tensions were raised by the discovery of a plan for a joint invasion of both
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia by Iraq and Red.
Red commenced the war with an offensive against the secondary objective, Iran.
Long-range aviation also struck targets in Saudi Arabia. Only when this campaign was
well advanced did Red attempt to capture the Turkish Straits with an advance through
Thrace, supported by an invasion of eastern Turkey.
Blue struck back against Red facilities in the Balkans and the Crimea with conventional
air strikes from bases at Cairo and Izmir, and with carrier air. Red retaliation, while still
at the conventional level, was effective, as two CVs in the Mediterranean were sunk.
Blue, perceiving that the military situation was deteriorating and its options reduced to
strategic withdrawal or nuclear escalation, chose the latter and launched Tomahawk
land attack missiles-nuclear (TLAM-N) attacks on Red bases in the Trans-Caucasus,
Vladivostok, Alexandrovsk, and Petropavlovsk. Red responded immediately, firing
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) at Diego Garcia and Guam, and the Nimitz
battle group was lost, also to nuclear attack. The Blue NCA released nuclear weapons to
Turkey, which promptly used them against the advancing Red forces. Red responded
with nuclear attacks on Turkish positions.
Shortly thereafter, a nuclear cease-fire was agreed to, although a conventional war con-
tinued in Turkey. All this occurred in five days.
The situation on the Central Front, though tense, never escalated to hostilities. Blue
and Turkey were essentially alone in fighting Red. Indeed, there was a degree of resent-
ment by other NATO members over the military forces committed to this crisis by Blue
when a Red offensive into Western Europe threatened.
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1982
GWG 1982 saw two major modifications from previous games. First, this game com-
menced with the war already in progress. The pre-hostilities phase, transition to war
and initial fighting were gamed at the National Defense University (NDU) in Globex-82.
This permitted GWG ’82 to examine the contours of superpower conflict further into
war than would have been possible otherwise.
Second, 1982 was the first year in which Army and Air Force participation was fully in-
tegrated into the game. This adjustment to joint play provided a richer context for the
conduct of military play and the development of issues.
Again set in 1985, the scenario now shifted decisively to a European focus. As in previ-
ous games, unrest among the satellites was a problem for Red, particularly in Poland,
where food shortages, increased food prices, and a slowdown by Solidarity precipitated
a crisis. Further, Red concerns about the Blue relationship with Norway emerged as an
important factor. Among points at issue in this relationship were pre-positioning of
Blue rapid deployment force (RDF) equipment, fishing rights and territorial claims in
the Barents Sea, mineral rights on the Svalbard continental shelf, and joint Blue, Cana-
dian, Norwegian, and United Kingdom exercises in northern Norway.
Southwest Asia remained unsettled and a potential problem area for both Blue and
Red. Relations between Israel and Syria had continued to deteriorate, resulting in open
warfare in 1985. Red forces had intervened in Iran at the request of the post-Khomeini
government (that leader having been assassinated) to put down civil strife. Red re-
tained a presence in Iran through a subsequent grant of port facilities in the southern
part of that nation. Saudi Arabia felt threatened by these developments, particularly so
following an Iranian attack on a section of an Iraqi oil pipeline. A Saudi request for de-
ployment of the RDF was granted.
Events in the Far East centered upon an agreement between the People’s Republic of
China and Japan for joint development of a large oil field in the Bohai Bay area. North
Korea remained a threat that tended to divert Blue from other objectives.
The primary Red objective was the elimination of Blue political and military influence
in Europe through a successful invasion of the Federal Republic of Germany and the
consequent dismantling of NATO. The Red military strategy in support of this goal was
a conventional offensive across the north German plain to cut off the Benelux coun-
tries (Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) and seize the Channel ports. Red
forces would hold in the center and south, while diplomatic initiatives were made to se-
cure French neutrality. Red also planned to advance into northern Norway to gain a se-
cure flank and to improve the tactical position in the event of a Blue naval initiative in
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the Norwegian Sea. A subsidiary ground thrust by Red into Thrace had similar objec-
tives: to anchor the southern flank while increasing options for operations in the east-
ern and central Mediterranean.
The initial Red offensive in Europe commenced as planned but was stalemated at the
Rhine. Similarly, the attack in Norway was checked at the Skibotn line by Norwegian
units reinforced by a USMC MAB. Red, rather than violate Swedish or Finnish neutral-
ity to outflank this position, struck the airfields at Bodo, Evenes, and Andoya with
chemical munitions.
On the southern flank, Red did succeed in driving a corridor between Greece and Tur-
key. Initially, Blue had withdrawn the CVBGs from the eastern Mediterranean, but re-
turned them as the front was stabilized to support an amphibious landing conducted
to provide reinforcements to the NATO defenders in Thrace. While Blue naval forces
suffered some loses, the exchange ratio was in their favor.
In the Atlantic, Blue established and maintained submarines in barriers from Green-
land to Norway for the purpose of SLOC protection. Red sought to secure the SSBNs
by placing them in “havens” at sea or under the ice in the north Norwegian and
Barents. These Seas became an area of intense ASW conflict, with Blue doing well
against Red. Two CVBGs were sent into the North Sea to help slow the Red advance in
the FRG.
In the Far East and the Pacific, Red was on the political and military defensive. Red
SSBNs were hidden in the northern Sea of Japan and in the Sea of Okhotsk. Blue con-
centrated on finding and destroying them as well as major Red surface combatants.
While somewhat successful, Blue did incur heavy losses, particularly in the Sea of
Okhotsk. Blue CVBGs initially moved back into the central Pacific, a maneuver similar
to that undertaken in the Mediterranean. They subsequently were moved forward to
engage Red surface units. In the Indian Ocean, a Red combined forces attack severely
damaged both Blue carriers.
Blue adopted a forward, offensive strategy to sink the Red navy, and, though not with-
out losses, it was successful. Red surface forces were virtually eliminated and the sub-
marine component substantially depleted. However, the extent to which the Blue
anti-SSBN campaign altered the strategic nuclear balance was unknown and did not
play a significant role in respective NCA/VGK discussions on nuclear weapons use. Re-
garding the ground war on the Central Front, while Blue was able to upset the Red
timeline and deny Red a quick victory, Red was still able to occupy substantial portions
of the FRG.
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No nuclear weapons were used in the 1982 game, though Red did make extensive use
of chemicals, especially in north Norway and against Iceland. Heavy use of chemicals
and the absence of any nuclear use was a factor that set this game apart from its prede-
cessors, and was significant because of contemporary “real world” discussions on this
very subject.
As the game progressed, Red sought to negotiate a cease-fire and to terminate the war.
However, as in previous games, Blue maintained the position that the territorial “status
quo ante bellum” in Europe was prerequisite to any cease-fire. Red refused to negotiate
on this basis, and, at game’s end, it appeared that a long war was in prospect.
1983
The scenario for the 1983 Global War Game postulated a series of crises in geographi-
cally separated parts of the world. As in 1982, however, the focus remained central Eu-
rope and the deteriorating relationships between Red and the satellites.
One of the major Red problems lay in East Germany and Poland. Worker unrest esca-
lated due to government crackdowns. Riots occurred, mobs attacked police headquar-
ters and indigenous troops sent to suppress the incipient rebellion mutinied.
Red, confused and taken by surprise, pulled troops back, leaving a power vacuum on
the eastern side of the Inter German Border (IGB). With the insurrectionists in control
in this area, talk of reunification became rampant and rumors of FRG military move-
ment toward the east circulated.
Trends in the Middle East and Southwest Asia remained little changed from previous
games of this series. Israel, nearly isolated politically due to continuing occupation of
Lebanon, faced a possible invasion from Arab states led by Syria. Red had been in-
volved in a massive military buildup in Syria and had stationed combat troops there.
Although hostilities between Iran and Iraq had been terminated, the potential for in-
stability in the Gulf remained high, as Iran maintained its policy of fostering Shiite agi-
tation throughout the region.
In the Far East, major war was in progress in Southeast Asia. Vietnam had invaded
Thailand, with success. In response, and after warning Hanoi of the consequences of
continuing, the PRC launched an invasion of Laos and Vietnam. Although resistance
was stiff, PRC troops were at the gates of Hanoi and Haiphong when GWG ’83
commenced.
Central Europe was the focus of Red concern, as events in the German Democratic Re-
public (GDR) and Poland posed a threat to the Red “empire” and the Warsaw Pact that
Red could not tolerate. Circumstances, however, forced Red to initiate hostilities before
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full mobilization had been achieved. Red military objectives, therefore, were the most
limited of any game thus far. The goal, essentially, was to capture a significant amount
of FRG territory and thereby lessen Blue influence on the Continent by demonstrating
NATO’s inability to defend a powerful member of that alliance, and then to negotiate a
permanent solution to the “German Problem.” While an offensive in North Norway
was integral to the plan, Red had no other offensive aspirations on D-Day. As in the
previous year, Red was anxious to avoid involvement in the Far East.
Blue sought to defend conventionally on the Central Front, to gain options from naval
superiority gained through forward, aggressive attacks against all Red naval assets, and
to shift the nuclear balance through an anti-SSBN campaign. The Blue strategy to
achieve maritime supremacy was more coordinated than in previous games, and a part
of it involved amphibious landings in the Kuriles.
The Red offensive on the Central Front was hampered by the short time that had been
allowed for mobilization. Once launched, progress was relatively slow and a stalemate
developed. Red sought negotiations almost from the outset, but Blue conditioned
agreement to a cease-fire on restoration of the territorial “status quo ante-bellum” in
Europe-terms unacceptable to Red.
Red, for a variety of reasons, decided to escalate the war horizontally. One means was
to induce North Korea to move south, an endeavor in which Red was finally successful.
Blue responded by supporting the ROK with forces previously detailed to the Kuriles
invasion.
In Southwest Asia, Red mounted an attack into Iran and toward the Gulf. This decision
resulted from a number of complex factors, including failure to succeed with several
political initiatives with Arab governments. Red also reasoned that control of the re-
gion’s oil supplies could be used as leverage against Blue. Blue had no effective counter
in Southwest Asia, as the CVBG in the eastern Mediterranean had been moved west to
augment Blue TACAIR on the Central Front.
For the first time in the global series, Red responded to Blue strikes on airfields in the
homeland with attacks on North America. Red lost over 20 bombers while knocking
out two distant early warning (DEW) line sites and damaging an SSBN installation in
Washington State. Red also employed anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons to destroy Blue
navigational space-based assets. Blue replied with Tomahawk land attack missile-
conventional (TLAM-C) strikes against Red launch facilities.
Consistent with previous games, Blue launched an offensive against the Red SSBN
force. The effort was relatively successful, sinking about half of that force by game end.
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Neither nuclear nor chemical weapons were used in GWG-83. Although nuclear use
was discussed by both NCA/VGK, Red saw no need for them and Blue could not find
any employment that would be beneficial.
The 1983 Global War Game saw further development of the concept of prolonged,
conventional war. When the game ended at D+30, the prospect was for continued hos-
tilities as the stalemate on the Central Front had the potential to continue well into the
future. In this connection, GWG-83 incorporated, for the first time, an economics
panel to evaluate industrial/mobilization issues pertinent to general war. There was
considerable activity on the diplomatic level, but negotiations foundered over Red de-
mands to retain its Central Front gains and Blue insistence on return to the territorial
“status quo ante.”
Overview
The first five-year Global War Game series explored a broad range of significant issues.
A number of new concepts and ideas evolved, many of which influenced the theater
strategies for Blue and NATO forces. Others were re-examined or modified based on
the lessons learned in the games.
Fully understanding the key issues requires that the reader be aware of how game dy-
namics interacted with scenario events and game analysis. This overview discusses the
interplay among these aspects of the game and their impact on strategy development.
While this section does provide a capsule examination of the games, the emphasis is on
highlighting a selected number of the most significant themes and how they were
analyzed.
The first year, the major emphasis was on naval play, and the roles of the Army and Air
Force were essentially pre-scripted. Very early in the series, however, it became evident
that events, particularly in Europe, could not be adequately gamed or the issues raised
assessed properly without the full integration of Army and Air Force representatives,
both in the play of the game and in the “study” part of the “game-study-game” cycle al-
luded to above. The use of both personnel and models these services developed to rep-
licate outcomes of combat were critical to the realism of the game and the validity of
the analytical process.
As the sister services became more involved in the game, Blue forces became more ef-
fective. Efforts to improve inter-service cooperation were continually emphasized, and
a number of experiments were conducted to see how the forces of each service could
work together to achieve common objectives. At the same time, the number of game
participants, military and civilian, increased. Both these factors combined to raise both
the quality and sophistication of game play.
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Blue began with a strong, defensive mentality. The ability of forward deployed operat-
ing forces to survive in the face of intense Red air and naval attacks was a major con-
cern. However, as the series progressed, Blue found not only that naval forces could
operate in those forward positions, but that a more aggressive posture tended to pro-
duce greater success. True to the charter of the games, Blue experimented with a num-
ber of concepts in the deployment and use of naval forces. Throughout the series, these
forces were employed innovatively and naval strategy was characterized by a willing-
ness to explore different ideas.
The Red gaming approach also evolved significantly. Initially, Red operated tactically in
a rigid, deterministic style, while at the levels of policy and strategy, several operations
of questionable merit were attempted. This was due in part to a combination of the
small number of players on the Red side and a limited amount of background and
knowledge for realistically representing Red. An accurate simulation of the Red strate-
gic thought process was also hampered by the use of U.S. military personnel who
tended to “worst case” by concentrating known Blue weaknesses and ignoring the limi-
tations of Red.
In order to better simulate Red, members of the intelligence and diplomatic commu-
nities were brought into the game to replicate Red thought processes and world out-
look more accurately. These new participants defined Red objectives and strategy in
terms of actual intelligence estimates rather than in terms of worst-case fears. Addi-
tionally, as the contingent of Red players expanded, sufficient numbers became avail-
able to allow the cell to interact fully with the game organization as opposed to being
the more traditional, limited, opposition force cell. As a result, Red play became less
dogmatic. These factors led to the formulation of Red goals that were less ambitious
but probably more representative of “real world” Red policy. For example, the scope
of Red military objectives diminished from “control of Western Europe” to a more
attainable “neutralization of the Federal Republic of Germany,” and the tendency too
escalate across the nuclear threshold diminished.
This change in the Red cell also caused a shift in the way hostilities were initiated. Dur-
ing the first games, Red purposefully embarked on a planned war of conquest. Red be-
gan and used conflict as a tool to gain predetermined political objectives. This, in the
1980 and 1981 games, contributed to the rapid intensification of the crisis and a swift
transition to war. While both these games involved relatively brief periods of diplo-
matic and military activity, Blue endeavored to negotiate its way out of crisis, on the
one hand, while trying to position forces to gain advantage should war break out, on
the other. Blue, in addition to trying to manage the confrontation with Red, had other
problems. Blue tried to give direction to a NATO alliance whose members did not
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always concur on the proper response to a developing situation. Allies in other parts of
the world had totally separate concerns. While participants found these problems diffi-
cult and occasionally frustrating, many insights were gained into factors that led to war.
Both Blue and Red learned it was most unlikely that one of the two superpowers would
simply decide to go to war against the other. Both arrived at the conclusion that war
was difficult to start, and would most likely occur as a result of a number of events
largely outside the control of the eventual belligerents. Therefore, in later games, the
“road to war” changed. Red, though still initiating hostilities, did so as the result of a
chain of events that pushed Red beyond the ability to avoid war. In the ’82 and ’83
games, Red faced the prospect of a rebellious Eastern Europe and felt the need to act
before things got totally out of control. This supports the premise that few rational
leaders would intentionally start World War III.
Nevertheless, Red, as the aggressor gained substantial benefit. It allowed Red to choose
the theater or region that fit its plans and then mass the required units. Elsewhere, Red
generally practiced economy of force. Blue, in turn, had to concentrate forces in the
geographic area of Red attack and found it difficult with what remained to build a force
package strong enough to seriously distract Red from the main axis of attack.
Europe acted as a magnet for both Blue and Red. To Red, as a continental power, West-
ern Europe was perceived as a threat and, therefore, a logical area for expansion of po-
litical and territorial influence. A successful Red offensive in this theater would weaken
or destroy Red’s primary global foe, the Blue/NATO coalition. Even the early attacks
into Southwest Asia supported this goal, as control of Middle East oil would give Red
enormous bargaining power.
Blue focus was also on Europe. The NATO alliance was the most important political/
military link and the maintenance of the coalition was paramount in Blue strategy.
Therefore, a Red offensive in Western Europe had to be countered at all costs.
The requirements of NATO decision-making had an impact on Blue policy. NATO was
a defensive alliance with the goal of maintaining the political and territorial integrity
of its members. It did not seek to seize territory from, or to overthrow the national
governments of, the Warsaw Pact. Blue, as a member of NATO, adhered to that posi-
tion, of necessity. This led to the articulation of war aims in terms of “restoration of
the territorial status quo ante bellum.”
The alliance relationship affected Blue in another aspect. As a maritime power, Blue
was allied with what was, essentially, a continental coalition facing a continental foe. As
Blue forces sought to support the European battle, they experienced the traditional
problems a maritime nation encounters fighting a continental power. Most notably,
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Blue had to find the most effective way to employ its naval power. Commanders real-
ized that to use this strength placed Blue in a classic predicament; naval forces might
not be able to win the war but a major naval defeat would significantly reduce Blue
strategic flexibility. This situation was to profoundly affect Blue strategy and was
largely responsible for the conservative mode of naval force employment in the early
games of the series. Once Blue found that its forces could successfully defend them-
selves, its naval deployments became increasingly aggressive.
Although more aggressive force utilization produced increased success, the fundamen-
tal problem of how best to exploit maritime advantage against a continental opponent
remained. While no definitive answers emerged from this series, the participants did gain
a far better understanding of the role and value of maritime power in a global conflict.
The maritime/continental relationship presented Blue with yet another dilemma. Blue,
as a maritime power, had to operate globally, if only to protect its interests. This caused
substantial dispersal of forces, which tended to work to Red advantage. Thus, not only
was Red able, as noted above, to mass at the point of offensive; the very orientation of
Blue power worked to disperse its force even further.
Red was actually conducting two distinctly different wars in one. Within the Blue/Red
context, Red was fighting a limited war. Red did not seek to destroy Blue. Within the
context of the European theater—the Western Theater of Military Operation (TVD)—
however, Red was waging an absolute war with the object of total victory. If it could
achieve the neutralization of the FRG, this would, by Red estimation, lead to the emas-
culation and eventual dissolution of NATO and the concomitant reduction, if not
elimination of Blue influence on the continent.
Escalation, both vertical and horizontal, was a topic that received considerable atten-
tion during the First Global War Game Series. Although theoretical issues regarding es-
calation had been studied in great detail elsewhere, these games explored the process
within a global environment and utilized interactive techniques. As the sophistication
of the games grew, year by year, knowledge and lessons learned increased proportion-
ately. By the end of the five year series, a number of valuable insights into the range of
complexities associated with the escalation process had been developed.
During the series, vertical escalation passed through the conventional war dimension
and into the chemical and nuclear arenas. The nuclear aspect, as one might expect, at-
tracted the most attention. Invariably, the players found that nuclear weapons’ use over-
shadowed all other events and turned the game into an exercise in escalation control.
Through experience in the games, both sides came to the conclusion that nuclear weap-
ons produced little tactical advantage. Blue, while essentially equal at the strategic level,
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suffered from a perceived inferiority at the theater and tactical levels. (Note: Both Blue
and Red’s view of the nuclear situation were based on estimated 1985 force balances.)
Red also came to this conclusion, though for different reasons. Use of nuclear weapons,
in spite of Red theater/tactical advantages, proved to be counterproductive. Red had
gone to considerable effort to build superiority in conventional arms. That advantage
could be negated if the conflict escalated to the theater nuclear level, which could de-
stroy the value of the territories gained as well as major Red forces. Additionally, nu-
clear use could put the homeland at risk, an outcome contrary to Red objectives.
Blue, however, faced a further disadvantage when contemplating nuclear escalation,
and this was targeting. The vast majority of worthwhile targets for Blue were located
within the Red continental homeland. A nuclear strike on the Red homeland was per-
ceived to make escalation to the strategic nuclear level much more likely. Thus Blue
found it difficult to select an isolated target that did not run the risk of precipitating
nuclear disaster. An attack on the homeland with conventional weapons also had po-
tential strategic implications, especially when the Red paranoia regarding homeland
defense was taken into consideration. The inability to determine the nature—
conventional or nuclear—of an inbound raid increased the risk of triggering a Red
“launch on warning.” All of these factors combined to make a Blue “graduated re-
sponse” difficult.
In contrast, Blue, as a maritime power, offered Red a number of attractive and isolated
targets, such as CVBGs and various island bases. Because Red believed that Blue had no
symmetrical response to such attacks and that, in any event, the theater nuclear balance
was in its favor, Red endeavored to use nuclear weapons to gain advantage in the first
three games. Red was not without difficulties, however. Throughout the series, Red
found it difficult to formulate a counter to the Blue anti-SSBN campaign. After several
less successful efforts, Red accepted the losses as inevitable.
Chemical warfare was an area were Red was perceived to enjoy a distinct advantage.
Red resources were thought to be superior, outnumbering those of Blue. When Red
chose to employ chemicals, Blue again felt it lacked an adequate, symmetrical response.
In fact, despite an avowed policy of nuclear retaliation for chemical attacks, Blue chose
to do this on only one occasion.
The “theory” of horizontal escalation was that Blue initiatives away from the Central
Front could either divert Red or lead to opportunities for offensive operations. Blue ex-
perimented with a number of approaches, but seemed unable to influence Red or to
discover any significant Warsaw Pact vulnerability. Red remained wedded to a Central
Front focus and refused to be diverted. For Blue, not only were areas of potential Red
weakness difficult to reach geographically, efforts to do so could dilute valuable
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resources that were often needed elsewhere. If Blue chose to mass sufficient forces to be
effective off the main axis of action, the availability of troops to support the primary
theater could be adversely affected. Conversely, if Blue mounted an attack with a less
favorable force ratio, effects were marginal.
While Blue did not achieve major success employing horizontal escalation strategies,
analysis did show useful trends not readily apparent at first. Blue, hoping for a response
that would produce immediate advantage, either looked in the wrong area or missed
the initial indications of what could be significant, long-term benefits. Some of the
more important results of horizontal escalation lay in actions that Red did not take.
Blue, by positioning forces that had potential to harm Red, caused Red to maintain
higher force levels in defensive positions. This was seen frequently in the maritime and
air arenas, where Red maintained sizable forces in regions away from the primary area
of combat to counter possible Blue offensive actions. As these forces were tied down,
value for Blue ensued from their commitment for defensive purposes and their result-
ing non-availability for offensive efforts. Of equal significance were the instances where
Red began a redeployment of forces to counter Blue. These actions showed the poten-
tial of achieving the desired dispersion of Red forces. However, many such redeploy-
ments were still in their initial stages at game end and did not become evident due to
the short time span of the game. As the long war issue emerged, a link to horizontal es-
calation appeared to offer some attractive prospects.
Red found opportunities to use this same strategy. By lunching attacks into Southwest
Asia, Red caused Blue to divert sizable forces away from other theaters. Additionally,
through the use or threatened use of surrogates, such as North Korea, Red was also able
to tie down Blue resources.
Initially, both sides envisioned a conflict of relatively short duration. However, over the
course of the series, a number of factors became evident to indicate that Blue gained
certain advantages from a long-war policy. Most notable was the opportunity to redi-
rect superior Blue industrial, economic, technical, and agricultural resources to the
battle. Once mobilized, these sectors placed Blue in a much more favorable position. By
contrast, Red, with a larger portion of similar resources from a smaller economy al-
ready oriented to the defense sector, could achieve less, with Blue, therefore, gaining a
relative advantage.
A key issue for Blue, then, was the ability to sustain itself and its allies through the early
and intermediate stages of conflict to permit the benefits of full mobilization to accrue.
Blue must, therefore, fight a potentially stronger Red force during these stages using
only “on hand” resources. Red not only had a larger standing military force but also
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enjoyed a considerable advantage due to its greater arms stockpiles and “warm” pro-
duction base.
From another aspect, Blue policy made a long war almost certain. Blue doggedly main-
tained a position that accepted no compromise from the negotiating condition that re-
quired restoration of the territorial “status quo ante bellum.” However, the strong,
initial Red conventional superiority made sizeable territorial gains virtually inevitable.
Relinquishing these gains was clearly unpalatable for Red, and tactical/theater nuclear
options did not appear to solve the impasse for either side. Red might achieve its politi-
cal objective, but could not force Blue to agree to a cessation of hostilities on Red
terms. Thus, a long war seemed in prospect.
For Blue, linking a long war strategy with horizontal escalation appeared to offer tangi-
ble benefits. Over a longer period, many Red vulnerabilities could be exploited effec-
tively. For example, the Red ability to produce and distribute food, even during good
times, was marginal at best. During wartime, much of the agricultural sector, man-
power and equipment especially, would be mobilized. As he war lengthened, food avail-
ability would eventually drop. Food imports to augment suppies would not be an option.
The extensive fishing fleet was vulnerable and would lose the freedom to operate. Block-
ade, combined with selective attacks against agricultural production and distribution sys-
tems and the commercial fishing fleet would exacerbate the problems. These actions,
coupled with efforts to exploit the latent Red nationalities problem, had the potential to
be an effective weapon. Much of the Red industrial complex was also exposed, and the ef-
fects of its attrition would be cumulative with the agricultural shortages.
A longer war would also provide Blue the opportunity to exploit fissures in the cohe-
siveness of the Red/Warsaw Pact coalition. Red ability to maintain alliance support ap-
peared to vary with the military situation. A strong campaign with the objective of
splintering the Warsaw Pact nations could produce favorable results.
The war termination issue presented a difficult problem that was never completely re-
solved. Neither side was willing to budge from their respective positions in order to end
hostilities. As noted above, Blue insisted on the return to a territorial “status quo ante
bellum” as a pre-condition to further moves. Red, on the other hand, offered a
cease-fire in place with negotiations to follow.
Blue would not accept such art offer, believing that once a cease-fire occurred, Red
would achieve a de facto legitimization of military gains, as NATO might find it ex-
tremely difficult to recommence hostilities if negotiations collapsed. Red, perceiving
the military situation to be clearly in its favor, found it difficult to believe that Blue re-
fused to enter into negotiations. The result was deadlock, as neither side was willing to
budge from its position.
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Introduction to the Second Global War Game Series
The Second Global War Game Series was conducted at the Naval War College from
1984 through 1988 to examine the nature and issues of a superpower conflict in a 1990s
time frame. The second series built upon and extended the foundations laid by the first
series (1979–1983), and the broad purposes were similar. The overarching objective
was to gain insights into how naval campaigns might be conducted on a global scale in
the event of war between the United States (Blue) and its allies and the Soviet Union
(Red) and its allies. Specific objectives included the assessment of:
• The priorities of sequential operations.
• The adequacy and form of logistics systems to support extended, prolonged, and
diverse naval operations.
• The impact of strategy and maneuver on force effectiveness.
• The impact of political and economic factors in developing strategies and the
vulnerability of such strategies to international and regional constraints.
• The loci of nuclear thresholds in various theaters and concepts for escalation/
de-escalation.
• The pattern and processes for control of military forces at national, headquarters,
and tactical levels when combat activity is intensive and widespread.
A hypothesis that emerged from the first series and tended to shape Blue thinking
about global war can be stated as follows:
• Due to Red holding the initiative, Blue seems unlikely to achieve a favorable position
to successfully terminate a short, conventional war.
• Nuclear use tends to escalate and appears counter-productive for both Blue and Red.
• Therefore, Blue/NATO should plan to fight a protracted, conventional war.
Several other findings that emerged from the first series had substantial implications
for the second game series. Among the most important was that while the Blue/NATO
Alliance had a defensive political orientation, offensive campaign options within the
strategic defensive posture could be very effective in disrupting Red timelines and thus
cause Red to revise original military objectives. Contrary to the belief then prevalent in
some quarters, a Red offensive into Western Europe would not necessarily require a
Blue/NATO nuclear response to halt that offensive short of the Channel.
The first series experience indicated that Blue/NATO naval forces would achieve domi-
nance at sea. Indeed, as the series proceeded, it appeared that geographic areas, such as
the north Norwegian Sea and the eastern Mediterranean, previously considered fraught
with risk for surface units, could in fact serve as vital operating areas, given proper se-
quence of operations and tactics. Most important, maritime dominance permitted
Blue/NATO to extend the war in time and expand the war in geographic scope.
A third point of interest dealt with war initiation and war termination. A conclusion of
the first series was not only that a set of circumstances that would precipitate a NATO/WP
war was very difficult to devise, but a negotiated settlement to such a war was virtually
impossible to attain. A basic and necessary precondition for Blue/NATO to commence
negotiations was a return to the territorial status quo ante, a position that Red rejected
out of hand. Further, Blue was generally unwilling to enter substantive negotiations
from a position of perceived military inferiority; Red, lacking any semblance of sea
control, could not force a Blue capitulation. Consequently, war termination negotia-
tions generally stalemated.
These factors and issues from the first series led to two questions that were pervasive in
the games of the second series:
• What are the political, war-fighting, logistical, and mobilization issues that define
the Blue/NATO capability to sustain a conventional war until the full military
industrial and personnel resources of the free world can be mobilized to secure
victory?
• How best can the maritime superiority of Blue/NATO be translated into strategic
leverage useful in bringing the war to a successful conclusion?
Game Architecture
The games of the second global series were large both in terms of scope and number of
participants. Generally, over 600 players were involved at any given time. All of the
branches of the armed services were represented, as was the Coast Guard. Canada and
the United Kingdom sent military and civilian players. The breadth of the game was
also demonstrated by the numerous government departments and agencies involved.
They ranged from those one might expect, such as the Departments of State and De-
fense, the Central Intelligence, and the Federal Emergency Management Agencies to
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some that one might not anticipate, such as the Bureau of Mines. Further, as the study
of protracted conventional war was a major game objective, a large delegation of eco-
nomic experts and specialists in manufacturing and industrial mobilization were in-
cluded. Finally, the role in the game of nations other than Blue and Red required
players with broad knowledge of the world in general as well as detailed experience in
various specific geographical areas.
The game itself might be described as “three-sided,” with a “Blue” team representing the
United States, a “Red” team playing the Soviet Union, and a “Green” team for all other
countries. The Blue and Red teams played on three levels: The National Command Au-
thority (NCA) and the Supreme High Command (VGK), the Commanders-in-Chief
(CINC), and Commanders of Theaters of Military Operations (TVD), and various
corps and fleet levels for each side.
Considerable effort was devoted to ensuring the fidelity of game play. To this end, the
Red team was composed of individuals thoroughly familiar with Soviet politics, mili-
tary doctrine, and capabilities—selected from applicable government departments and
agencies, the intelligence community, and the armed services. They were tasked to fight
the Red order of battle as (to the best of their knowledge) the Soviet Union would, not
as an American officer might.
Similarly, the Green team, composed mainly of retired State Department personnel, in-
cluding some of ambassadorial rank, played both the respective allies of Blue and Red
and all other nations as well. The following pages reflect not only diplomatic initiatives
by individual states, nonaligned blocs, and nongovernmental agencies, but also demon-
strate that allies did not always respond in the manner that Blue and Red expected.
Another important aspect of the game involved the mobilization of the Blue economy
for a long, conventional war. Among the considerations that had to be addressed were
the cost of the war and how it would be paid for, the potential need for rationing, and
the control of anticipated inflation. Of prime importance was the conversion of facto-
ries to meet the needs of the battlefield and the concomitant problem of finding and
training the workers to operate the expanded industrial base. A group working ad-
vanced technology issues considered means to ameliorate the shortfall in end items
with long lead times and also considered several “Manhattan Project”–type proposals.
All of this required substantial support. Computers were used extensively for force
movement and battle damage assessment, although the land table remained a manual
operation. Models already in existence, such as the Naval Warfare Gaming System
(NWGS) and the Army’s Theater and Corps Operations and Training Simulation
(TACOPS) continued to be utilized, augmented by new programs where required. For
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example, inability to assess some air combat interactions led to the creation of the
Navy War College Air Model (NWCAM).
Logistics play was computer-supported, detailed, and of critical importance because of
the concern over what was referred to as the “bathtub” effect. Consumption rates for
munitions and major equipment such as aircraft and battle tanks in the intensity of
modern war were not really known. However, because the validity of the concept of
protracted conventional war depended on Blue/NATO sustainability, a large staff was
necessary to track usage at the front with a high degree of accuracy.
There were a number of other tasks requisite to the proper functioning of the game.
Battle damage assessment (BDA) was an involved process requiring separate teams to
adjudicate the results of combat in the air, on land, and at sea. An intelligence cell
monitored movements and engagements to determine what information would be
available to Blue and Red based on game events; they then provided that information.
A special weapons cell determined the effects of chemical weapons employment and was
involved in off-line deliberations when one side or the other required an appraisal of the
likely result of contemplated nuclear weapons use. A meteorological component was
on hand to brief weather, worldwide, for every day of the war. A strong effort was made
to create an environment that would, as realistically as possible, reflect some of the do-
mestic pressures in the conduct of the war. A congressional cell was created with retired
members of the U.S. House of Representatives reprising their former roles. They held
hearings, offered policy suggestions, and were, on occasion, critical of the administra-
tion. An innovation introduced in this series was the Global News Network (GNN).
The War College Public Affairs Office produced a morning TV show, Good Morning
Global, in network format, as well as a daily newspaper. The televised news broadcast
was delivered every morning and provided, in network format, interviews and descrip-
tions of selected events from the previous game day. Normally, two game days were
played in one real-time day, and this medium not only kept all players informed of the
overall course of events but also became a well-used forum for the president of Blue and
the general secretary of Red to set forth their views on the war and to try to sway “global”
opinion.
Move Convention
The format of the first Global War Game was relatively simple and straightforward, but
as the series progressed, the games became quite complex. The purpose of this section
is to lay out some aspects regarding the structure and play of the series from 1984
through 1987 that may not be familiar to all readers. While there tended to be slight
variations from game to game, the following descriptions are representative of what
took place. The 1988 game will be considered separately. This section is not intended to
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be an all-inclusive, detailed explanation of game mechanics, but it should provide a ba-
sic guide to the “flow” of the game.
Once the organizational framework of the game had been established in broad outline, a
billet structure was required. For example, how would the Blue National Command Au-
thority and Red Supreme High Command be staffed? (While by convention “Red” indi-
cated specifically the Soviet Union and “Blue” the United States, in common usage the
reference was usually to the Warsaw Pact and NATO more broadly. The color convention
in this monograph is generally in the latter, broader sense; context makes clear when the
more restrictive meaning is intended.) As has been noted above, the number of positions
required expanded as the game progressed. Typically, the NCA had the following posi-
tions: President, Vice President, Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of State (NATO
Permanent Representative), Assistant Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Director,
Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Advisor, Deputy National Security Advi-
sor, Director of Mobilization, and, when required, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
(JCS), and a Press Secretary. Members of the VGK included the General Secretary of
the Communist Party, Minister of Defense, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (Ruling
Communist Parties), Chairman, Council of Ministers, Chairman, State Security (KGB),
Deputy Minister of Defense for Rear Services, and, when required, the Chief of the
General Staff. It was then a process of selecting specific individuals to fill key positions
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Blue
(the President of the United States was most often played by a retired U.S. congressman).
Other organizations and military commands would be requested to select individuals to
serve in various positions. The national laboratories, for example, were requested to send
experts to staff the nuclear cell. A number of the organizations involved in providing
players to the game also took part in the financial sponsorship of the game, and these
dual contributions of manpower and money were both critically important in making
the game as successful and important as it was.
The games of the second series all ran for three weeks, although not all players were in
attendance for the entire game. Each participant “checked in” either on Sunday after-
noon or early Monday morning and received an information packet that provided un-
classified background information (the games were played at the SECRET level) and
their specific cell assignment. The rest of Monday morning consisted of a briefings on
general game information, such as scenario events, followed by adjournment to the as-
signed player cells for purposes of organization and additional briefings.
Tuesday morning saw game play begin in earnest. Players received situational briefs, in-
cluding current intelligence estimates tailored to each side, Blue or Red. Because the fo-
cus on the games was on planning, the perspective at various levels of command was
different. The NCA and JCS were looking out beyond 30 days and the theater CINCS,
concerned with strategic decisions, focused on the seven to 30 day timeframe.
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Red
Campaign decisions at the fleet or regional command level were based on a three to
seven day view, and the tactical level concerned itself with the next twenty-four to
forty-eight hours. Therefore, CINCs (CINCPAC, SACEUR, etc.) and TVD command-
ers were provided with long-range guidance by the NCA or VGK. These theater com-
manders forwarded their strategic intentions to the various major command cells
(CINCLANT, AFCENT, etc.) where campaign plans were drawn up, then detailed or-
ders, or, in game parlance, “moves” were generated (6th Fleet, CENTAG, etc., level) for
a two day planning cycle. These specified what units were to be moved and where, what
targets were to be attacked, by which forces, with what weapons and when. Provisions
for decoys, feints, or other special tactical procedures were included. These “moves”
were in written form and presented to the umpires/controllers at 1100 and at 1530
each day to be assesseds on what was called the “game floor.” The game floor was actu-
ally located in two places, in that the Army had a separate space for its “land table.”
A war game can be described as a “manual” game or a “computer” game, depending on
how the game is run. A manual game is one where virtually all operations are per-
formed by hand. Maps of the geographic area of conflict would provide the basis for
the game, and symbols representing the various forces would be moved from place to
place in accordance with the “moves” ordered by the players. Battle damage assessment
was done by rolling dice. Some of the complications of this method can be seen by
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Control Group
considering a launch of surface-to-surface missiles. The umpire would roll the dice
once to determine the number of missiles that were actually launched successfully,
once again to determine how many of those flew properly, again to ascertain the effect
of enemy counter-measures, and once more to come up with the number which actu-
ally hit targets. This procedure was clearly unsuited to a game as complex as global.
A computer game relied substantially on those devices for all phases of the game. It had
obvious advantages in the above example for determining battle damage assessment and
was invaluable for keeping track of logistics consumption in general and ordinance ex-
penditure in particular. (Sonobuoys were a case in point, as early games saw them uti-
lized as if the supply was infinite.) Valuable as computers are, however, they could not
replace totally the functions performed by a human umpire or eliminate the need for
maps. For these reasons, the global game was a hybrid, incorporating features of both
the manual and computer type games.
The “game floor” consisted of a number of “tables” to resolve the engagements that oc-
curred because of the “moves” generated in the player cells. (Figure 4 shows the game
floor schematic for the 1986 GWG) The personnel assigned to these tables, called “um-
pires” or “controllers,” varied considerably in number, depending on the theater and
command. All of the relevant services would be represented, so the “Pacific Strike” ta-
ble would, of necessity, require several people. The “AFSOUTH Ground” and
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Game Floor/Table Layout
“AFNORTH Ground” parts of the game, on the other hand, were played manually by a
single individual. Further, controllers from Red were present at the major tables as well.
The duties of the “umpires/controllers” were a key part of the game. They functioned
as all of the personnel, sensors, and weapons of the command that they represented.
They maintained frequent liaison with other controllers to ensure the most accurate
simulation of interactions considering the commander’s directives, force disposition,
EMCON policy, and environmental factors. They were also charged with defending
their command’s forces, if attacked, with all available assets, within the existing Rules
of Engagement (ROE.)
Combat was initiated by a Blue or Red player through the game floor controller who
received the written move ordering an attack. The defending controller would then re-
spond. The attack plan and target defenses were then passed to the BDA table for adju-
dication. Naval engagements were generally assessed by the NWAGS, which took into
consideration all of the variables involved in attack and defense, determined the ships
that had been hit, how serious the damage was, and what had been sunk. NWAGS
worked on a stochastic model, which was based on probabilities, random number
draw, and single iteration. This process did not result in the most probable outcome,
but one of any number of possible outcomes. Consequently, while a narrow band of
the most probable outcomes would emerge from a number of iterations over time, the
uncertainty inherent in war was preserved. The battle damage assessment process,
therefore, provided random results within the realm on possibility, based on the best
estimate of real world conditions. After review by the Game Director or his represen-
tative, the BDA results were forwarded to the appropriate controllers so that they could
brief the players on the outcome of the engagements.
After combat resolution results had been approved, the Blue and Red umpires/control-
lers briefed their respective sides on the outcomes. These briefs were not 100% truth
but presented to the players the information that would actually have been obtainable.
These briefs took place both in the morning and afternoon immediately following the
submission of the two-day move. The reason for briefing after move submission was
to maintain focus on the planning purpose of the game as opposed to a continual reac-
tion to the results of battle damage assessment. Events of particular significance that
would affect the planning process, such as the loss of an aircraft carrier, would be re-
ported immediately to permit plan modifications as necessary.
Further, a periodic intelligence brief would also take place. The Intelligence Fusion Cell
would review the force movements that had taken place, along with other information
that might have been gleaned through satellite surveillance or other forms of recon-
naissance, and detail this information to the respective sides.
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To summarize, the game day cycle began at 0800 with the Global Network News, then a
scenario update and the weather forecast, which utilized actual weather that had oc-
curred on the same day of the previous year.  The two-day planning session commenced
at 0830, and is shown in the illustration provided from the 1986 game (figure 5), for
D+21 and D+22.  During this period, the battles of D+20 were being fought and adjudi-
cated on the game floor. The D+21 and D+22 plan was delivered to the controllers at
1100, followed by the assessment of the D+20 interactions.  Planning for the D+22/23
move began at 1300 and was due at 1530.  The assessment of D+21 events followed at
1600. This cycle permitted the play of two days of war for each calendar day.
The ground war in Europe was displayed on what was called the “land table.” This
consisted of a horizontally mounted map of the Central Region on which were placed
“counters” representing the various Blue and Red units then engaged or moving toward
the FLOT. The respective “moves” of land forces by Blue and Red were entered into the
Army’s TACOPS system, which determined casualties, remaining effective combat
strength of units and the resulting geographic positions of units resulting from the en-
gagements. Another system, TACLOGS, supported TACOPS by maintaining the status
of major end items such as the loss of tanks, other armored vehicles, ammunition ex-
penditure, etc.
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Also of importance was the ongoing work of the logisticians. The inputs to the various
computerized systems to resolve battle damage assessment provided an excellent basis
for the tracking of equipment and munitions expenditure.
The game proceeded in this cycle until the Friday of each week. Normally, the morning
would be a day of war-fighting, and the afternoon given over to what was called the
“hot wash-up.” This was an opportunity for some of the senior players in the game to
address all the participants as to issues or events that had impressed them as being of
particular significance. It also allowed for interplay among the principal representatives
of Blue, Green and Red, for often the perceptions of what had happened and the im-
portance of events or specific decisions varied substantially. This kind of discussion on
the repercussions that could flow from misperceptions were often most enlightening,
informative, and cautionary. This was particularly true of “signaling,” a discrete action
that was designed to convey a concern or threat to the opponent. More often that not,
these signals were totally missed or wildly misinterpreted by the desired recipient. This
led players to reflect that if such actions were either useless or harmful in a game in
which players shared the same language and culture, what were the likely outcomes of
attempts at “signaling” in the “real world”? Following the “hot-wash,” the Analysis
Group would begin preparing an in-brief summary of events for new players arriving
for play the following Monday. This cycle was followed for each of the three weeks.
Overseeing and coordinating all of this activity was the Control Group. This organiza-
tion was composed of the Game Director, other individuals selected by him, and repre-
sentatives from major game cells. It met prior to the start of game play, at lunch, and
again following the end of the game day. Its primary function was to ensure that the
game ran smoothly. To this end, it was important to be certain that the head of each
cell was running that cell efficiently, particularly if the person in charge had come into
the game after the first week. It was also necessary to alert Battle Damage Assessment
and the Analysis Group of a planned operation that might require special oversight.
Further, with a game of this size, the possibility of discontinuities was always present,
and Control, on occasion, had to resolve problems that arose from failure in game me-
chanics. Typical of this would be a situation where Blue or Red made a questionable
decision without information that should have been available to them.
A large Analysis Group, staffed mainly by reserve officers, collected data on the game.
Every major cell had at least one analyst present, who took notes on what occurred.
This group held meetings on a schedule similar to that of the Control Group, so that all
members could be informed of potentially significant events before they occurred. This
was important so that the responses to and perceptions of a particular initiative could
be chronicled from the Blue, Red and Green perspective. The leaders of the Analysis
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Group generally stayed for a week after the game to put into final form the reports of
events in specific cells, for example the Red VGK, Blue Joint Chiefs of Staff, Green, Blue
CINCPAC, Red Southwestern TVD, etc. This served as the basis for the final game re-
port, composed by the staff of the Game Director and War Gaming Center and then
distributed to the participating organizations and commands.
As a seminar type of planning simulation, the mechanics of the 1988 game were con-
siderably different, although the fundamental, three-sided (Blue, Red, Green) construct
remained the same. Game time was frozen at D+75, which corresponded to 3 February
1991. The game functioned at three levels:
Instead of umpires/controllers, Theater Advisory Teams were established as part of a
Military Assessment Group to act as a source of information so that plans could be
properly formulated. These teams—there were two, one for Europe/Atlantic and an-
other for the Pacific—also assessed the theater commander’s war plans for feasibility
and potential weakness. Traditional assessment models were available for this purpose,
and the teams provided the same services to Blue and to Red.
Other simulated organizations that were utilized on the Blue side in this game were:
The National Security Policy Group (NSPG) focused on overall national policy for-
mulation and was comprised of the Vice President (chairman), National Security Ad-
visor, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) and the Director of the War Resources Board.
The Negotiators Cell was headed by the State Department, with additional member-
ship drawn from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the CIA and NATO.
The purpose of the Inter-Agency Mobilization Group (IG/MOB) was to advise the
NSPG concerning broad issues associated with the mobilization of the nation to sup-
port the war effort. Participants included representation from the Department of De-
fense, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the Department to
Energy (DOE), and the Department of Transportation (DOT). Members of other
cells, such as the NSPG and the War Resources Board, joined meetings as required.
The War Resources Board/National Defense Research Council (WRB/NDRC) ad-
dressed industrial mobilization and force structure planning issues. Its membership
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GAME LEVEL GAME RESPONSIBILITY
NCA/VGK National Planning/Negotiations
JCS/General Staff National Strategic Planning
CINCs/TVD Commanders Theater/Campaign Planning
was designed to replicate the interactions that would occur between the DOD, various
federal agencies, including regulatory, and private industry.
The remainder of the cells, control, nuclear, space, environment, logistics, analysis
etc. performed, essentially, as in previous games. An outline of the cells and their
inter-relationship is provided in figure 6.
The flow of activity in this game differed considerably from that of its predecessors be-
cause the five major game drivers, the NCA, negotiators, JCS, CINCs, and NATO were
doing different things at different times. Their respective timelines are displayed in fig-
ures 7 through 11. These charts permit one to follow the sequence of the game. The
CINCs prepared plans for regional strategies and campaigns that were presented to the
JCS. The JCS then went into the “tank” to come to a conclusion as to the course(s) of
action they would recommend to the NCA. While this was going on, the National Se-
curity Policy Group was determining the broader aspects of national policy, negotia-
tions were ongoing as were discussions among the NATO allies.
All the strands of the game began to come together on Wednesday afternoon, with the
negotiators report to the NCA. Success or failure on that front laid the basis for the re-
fining of the Blue political position Thursday morning. The military recommendations
of the JCS were available early Thursday afternoon, enabling the President to set fourth
to the NATO Council of Ministers the alliance options, political and military, as Blue
saw them. (At the same time, a session similar to the “hot wash” was taking place, in
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Organization
which the assessment teams met with Blue, Red, and Green players to discuss respective
plans and possible outcomes.) Finally, with consultations among allies complete, the
President finalized his decisions and delivered them to the “country” in a Friday morn-
ing “State of the Nation” address.
This cycle was followed for each of the three weeks of Global ’88.
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The 1984 Global War Game
Introduction
The 1984 Global War Game was the initial game of the second Global War Game series
(1984–1988). Consequently, there were some characteristics of this game that made it
unique. Aside from the overall purposes of the series stated above, this first game had
other specific objectives:
• To provide an initial estimate of the world of the 1990s that would serve as a basis
for the next four games.
• To explore evolving technologies that would influence military operations in that
decade.
• To explore the nature of protracted, conventional war.
• To provide a baseline reference in such things as the respective orders of battle for
the following games in the series.
• To serve as a test bed for specific areas of interest that had emerged from the analysis
of the First Global War Game Series, 1979–1983.
GWG 1984 also initiated a shift in focus from the games of the first series. Those games
had been primarily operational in nature, while the games of the second series would
emphasize a planning format supported by campaign analysis and operations gaming
techniques. The game book for 1984 emphasized this shift toward strategy:
The Global War Game is a research game designed to explore US global war fighting capabilities. The
main emphasis is placed on identifying issues that require attention in planning global strategy. Par-
ticular attention is given to where and how naval forces can make the greatest contribution to com-
bined arms strategy. . . . The Global War Game (GWG) is a test bed of current strategic wisdom. It is a
forum to assess the state of what we have and design the shape of what we want.
Operational decisions continued to play a prominent part in the game. Indeed, Global,
as played in 1984 and successive years of this series, consisted of four complementary
games. The first aspect was that of a research game, which cut players loose from
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established plans and doctrine and gave them the flexibility to explore. The planning
aspect of the game forced players to think in terms of a global, combined-arms strat-
egy. The operational game provided a time sequence of events that tested strategy and
confronted players with the necessity of making choices. Finally, the seminar portion of
the game presented an opportunity to develop topics of major importance in detail.
Aside from the overarching series objectives, the players in the 1984 Global War Game
were asked to do two specific tasks:
• Explore the characteristics of crisis and war in the early 1990s, and
• Increase the understanding of a long-war strategy.
Scenario
The scenario for the 1984 Global War Game postulated a world with many problems.
The crucial one, however, was the deteriorating economic situation in Poland and East-
ern Europe. It envisioned a situation where, by the late 1980s, economic conditions in
Eastern Europe had worsened and worker unrest reached such levels that it hampered
government efforts to meet even normal demands for goods and services. In the spring of
1990, the disruption in Poland had grown to nationwide proportions. General strikes had
paralyzed the economy on several occasions. The government was under extreme pres-
sure, both from its own citizens and from its Warsaw Pact allies, to restore order. Conse-
quently, Red mobilized seven divisions; in June those units, in conjunction with the
entire Polish army, two East German divisions, and one division each from Czechoslova-
kia and Hungary, reimposed government control.
In the German Democratic Republic (GDR), similar discontent was augmented by a
strong peace movement. In July 1990, harsh repressive measures on the part of the gov-
ernment intensified the opposition. During the third week of that month, security
forces opened fire on mass demonstrations, and 20 protesters were reported killed. At-
tacks on Communist Party headquarters followed in five cities, and troops sent to re-
store order were met with barricades. Skirmishes between government forces and
dissidents continued, and by the end of July, some GDR military units had mutinied.
As mobs began to gather in areas where Red troop garrisons were present, those forces
began to pull back to the east. By the end of July, the western GDR was in the hands of
the pro-Western rebels, while the eastern part of the country was in the hands of the
loyal East German and Red forces. The rebels in the west began to set up democratic
city councils and were in contact with both the press and officials of the government of
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).
As August began, the GDR insurgents resisted all efforts to restore order, and some uti-
lized the FRG as a haven from which to conduct minor but violent attacks into the
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GDR. The FRG had mobilized selected military units to maintain order at the Inter-
German Border (IGB) on 30 July. On 1 August (D-12), the Politburo, gravely con-
cerned about the continued deterioration of stability in the GDR, mobilized ground,
air, and naval forces to restore the IGB and the East German government by conven-
tional military action. Blue mobilized five days later (D-7). Although neither Blue nor
Red had desired war, circumstances beyond the control of both precipitated a situation
in which neither believed an alternative existed.
Political Objectives and Military Strategy
Blue Objectives
The most basic of the Blue political objectives was to maintain NATO and other alli-
ances around the world and to protect, or restore as necessary, the territorial integrity
of those allies. Blue sought to attain these primary goals without recourse to nuclear
weapons. Further, Blue believed that hostilities offered the opportunity to neutralize
Red influence over non-European surrogates. Indeed, achievement of these objectives
could well result in the fragmentation or dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.
Blue Strategy
The strategy devised by Blue to attain the political goals is best considered by geo-
graphic region.
Central Europe
• Meet any Warsaw Pact attack as far forward as possible.
• Establish reserves to block penetrations and to exploit opportunities.
• Effectively use Blue air power to blunt Red air operations and to retain key
command, control, and communications (C3), air defense, and nuclear capabilities.
• Establish and maintain local air superiority and provide air support to ground forces.
Atlantic and Norway
• Conduct a vigorous, forward anti-submarine warfare (ASW) campaign to quickly
destroy the Red strategic nuclear reserve.
• Insert Blue/UK/Netherlands marines in North Norway to block deep Red
penetration.
• Hold aircraft carriers and additional marines in reserve for use as necessary.
• Protect sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and lines of communication (LOCs).
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Mediterranean
• Destroy deployed Red naval forces.
• Provide support to NATO southern flank, if attacked.
• Conduct offensive operations in the Balkans to relieve Red pressure on the Central
Front in Germany.
Indian Ocean
• Destroy Red Indian Ocean Squadron.
• Retain USN Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR) plus one SSN for regional
contingencies.
• Move the only Indian Ocean carrier battle group (CVBG) to the Pacific.
Pacific
• Conduct vigorous ASW campaign.
• Thwart any Red attacks on Japan.
• Pressure Red by threat to southern Kurile Islands.
Red Objectives
The primary political objective of Red was the neutralization of the FRG. If all or even
a substantial part of West Germany could be occupied, NATO would probably collapse
due to the Alliance’s inability to protect its most important Continental member. The
dissolution of NATO would achieve a Red political goal—the diminution or elimina-
tion of Blue influence on the Continent. Another Red objective was to keep the war
short and nonnuclear by quick attainment of military objectives to be followed by ini-
tiatives for a prompt cease-fire.
Red Strategy
Central Europe
• Restore the IGB.
• Occupy all or substantial parts of the FRG.
• Capture West German ports on the North Sea.
• Conduct an offensive into Jutland to force Denmark to capitulate and thus
fragment NATO.
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Norway and Atlantic
• Establish air superiority over northern Norway.
• Eliminate Blue early warning capability in North Norway.
• Control coast and interior of North Norway.
• Posture nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) in Atlantic and Arctic
and protect their bastions.
• Control, if possible; otherwise, deny Blue use of Norwegian and Barents Seas.
• Position fleet submarines (SSN) for anti-SSBN operations.
Southwest Asia
• Minimize Blue capability to attack Red homeland.
• Block NATO access to Black Sea.
• Execute holding operations in Thrace and eastern Turkey.
Indian Ocean
• Deter/conduct holding operation against Iran and Iraq.
• Destroy Blue forces.
• Refrain from offensive operations to deny Blue a basing excuse.
Pacific
• Neutralize Japan and strip away Blue air defense capability.
• Attack targets in Aleutians, Alaska, and Hawaii.
• Destroy Blue forces, establish sea control, especially in the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk.
The Central Front
The war began on 16 August 1990 with a major Warsaw Pact (WP) offensive against
NATO forces. The primary weight of the Red attack was in the Northern Army Group
(NORTHAG) sector, and the advance carried 50 kilometers in the first two days and 70
in the first three. NATO forces attempted a counterattack against this penetration on
D+4, striking northeast from the Fulda area to try to turn the southern flank of the
Red salient. NATO air was surged in support of this offensive, and while it did serve to
divert some WP reinforcements, the advance across the north German Plain continued
and this limited counterattack was withdrawn on D+6. NATO reserves and air power,
including the use of B-52s, blunted the Red advance by D+7. In NORTHAG, the
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forward line of troops (FLOT) was in the outskirts of Hamburg and Hanover on D+10
when the Red Second Operational Echelon closed.
The Red buildup and consolidation continued on D+11, and two Polish armies pushed
into Schleswig-Holstein, cutting off Denmark from the rest of NATO. The Warsaw Pact
offensive in NORTHAG resumed on D+12. Red staged an airborne attack on
Bremerhaven as part of this renewed drive that soon carried across the Elbe.
Bremerhaven fell on D+13, while, to the south, Red commenced a thrust toward Munich.
That city fell, along with Augsburg, on D+15, and the Red advance continued on toward
Stuttgart. In NORTHAG, NATO had formed and was holding, with the aid of massive air
support, a new defensive line anchored on the Weser River. At D+19, relative combat
power in NORTHAG was about even, and to the south, NATO reinforcements caused
Red to hold up the advance on Stuttgart.
By D+20, however, Blue was confronted with two major problems on the Central
Front. First, the Red Second Strategic Echelon had closed and begun a strong attack
that threatened Frankfurt. Second, Red units had reinforced the Polish forces in Jutland
and renewed the offensive into Denmark. The political ramifications of the fall of a
NATO member were such that the Alliance decided on an amphibious operation that
went ashore on the western side of the Danish peninsula on D+22. A marine amphibi-
ous force (MAF) and one army division, supported by five aircraft carriers (CV) and
about 250 other ships, were augmented by an assault by the 82nd Airborne Division.
The Weser line continued to hold, while, to the south, a second defensive belt con-
tained the Red thrust on Frankfurt, although the city was within range of Red divi-
sional artillery. On D+23 this attack had been spent, and Red terminated offensive
operations to await developments.
NATO seized the initiative with a six-division offensive toward Hamburg, which, if suc-
cessful, would force the withdrawal of the Warsaw Pact forces in Jutland that were op-
posing the Blue beachhead. The 101st Airborne Division had been added to the
original force, but a breakout had not been achieved. This attack was to be followed by
a three-phase NATO counterattack.
• Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) was to launch 13 French divisions between
Kassel and Fulda toward Halle, to rupture Red LOCs and form a southern pincer to
cut off WP forces in North Germany.
• NORTHAG to attack in the direction of Magdeburg, forcing a breach south of
Hamburg, to form the northern pincer.
• AFCENT was also to attack toward the Oder River, with objective and direction to be
determined based on the deployment of the Red Third Strategic Echelon.
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Phases one and two commenced on D+26 with the French forces breaking through and
advancing to the northeast, while the NORTHAG units moved against light opposition.
In conjunction with these attacks, Rangers were employed in a deep penetration mis-
sion against airfields in the Berlin area. Meanwhile, Red was moving up reinforcements
composed of nine divisions from the Leningrad military district (MD) and 25 from the
Kiev and Caucasus MDs. By D+29, the French southern pincer had linked up in Halle
with two airborne divisions that had taken the city on D+27. However, the northern
arm of the pincer was held up at Luneburg by stiffening Red resistance. The Jutland
beachhead was stable, but efforts at breaking out had failed. The third phase of the
NATO counteroffensive began on D+29 in the direction of Brunswick (Braunschweig)
for the purpose of supporting the north shoulder of the French salient. However, Cen-
tral Army Group (CENTAG) was becoming concerned over increasing Red pressure on
the French in the vicinity of Mannheim.
D+30 found the NATO counteroffensives continuing in the face of strong Red opposi-
tion occasioned by the more rapid than expected arrival of the Third Strategic Echelon.
The French drove on beyond Halle toward Magdeburg and Leipzig and, supported on
their left by the CENTAG forces moving on Brunswick, crossed the inter-German bor-
der (IGB) into East Germany. However, the open right flank of the French penetration
was coming under increasing pressure. To the north, the check at Luneburg led
NORTHAG to redefine objectives, and the northern pincer swung south on an axis
Uelzen/Wolfsburg. In south Germany, the Red offensive toward Stuttgart was resumed,
and NATO forces were suffering heavy casualties. By D+33, the NATO offensive opera-
tions reached their limit with a link-up of the two pincers at Celle. Mounting Red pres-
sure, however, forced the withdrawal of the forces involved in all three phases on
D+34/35. This counterattack, however, had thrown Red off timeline and necessitated
diversion of forces destined for Norway and the Balkans, leaving Red vulnerable in
both regions.
By D+35/36, the 34 divisions of the Third Strategic Echelon had restored the initiative
to Red, and D+37/38 found NATO on the defensive on all fronts. The first of the Army
Reserve and National Guard units from the Continental United States (CONUS) ar-
rived in theater on D+38 and were immediately pressed into action to hold three War-
saw Pact offensives aimed at Bremen, Frankfurt, and Stuttgart. The Blue contingent in
Jutland remained confined to their beachhead. This, then, was the situation when play
went to a seminar format at D+48 (map 2).
Norway
Red attacked Norway on D-Day, moving across the Finnmark with two motorized rifle
divisions (MRD) and conducting an amphibious landing of a Soviet naval infantry
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(SNI) regiment in Porsangen Fjord. The airfield at Banak was captured, and four Nor-
wegian early warning posts were closed. The Red advance continued toward the
Skibotn valley, slowed both by bad weather and strong resistance of combined Blue,
Norwegian, and UK forces. The Blue components—a Marine Amphibious Brigade
(MAB) and Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS)—had arrived in Norway between
D-9 and D-7. NATO Improved Hawk batteries and tactical air forces were able to effec-
tively counter Red air, and Blue air strikes helped force Red to go over to the defensive
at Alta, short of their Skibotn objective.
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The Central Front 1984 Game D+48
Balkans
After the initial “shootout” in the Mediterranean, Blue naval forces were well posi-
tioned. With the exception of a few submarines and numerous mines, there were few
Red forces left to oppose Blue, and the swiftness and completeness of the Blue victory
had cowed Red surrogates into neutrality. Further, Red Soviet Naval Aviation and Long-
Range Aviation (SNA/LRA), bereft of targeting information, chose not to commit to
offensive action after D-Day. This left NATO forces free to launch a massive tactical air
campaign into Bulgaria to delay or disrupt any plans Red might have for invading
Thrace. This campaign essentially destroyed Red combat air patrol (CAP) capability in
the area, slowed the Red buildup for an invasion of Thrace, and laid the basis for the
NATO offensive of D+47. This attack involved six Greek/Turkish divisions backed by
two Blue army divisions and a MAB. Red responded by shifting two divisions from
Hungary, and the battle was continuing at game end.
The Atlantic
Red moves toward war became evident during the prehostility period of Global ’84
when, on D-15, 80 percent of Red submarine and maritime combatants sortied and the
Black Sea Fleet surged. Between that date and D-10, Warsaw Pact fleets in the Baltic
also left port. NATO took prompt advantage of this warning, and by D-Day had 16 SSNs
on station in the Norwegian, Kara, and Barents Seas. Blue also deployed other forces to
areas of potential conflict as a show of force. The America, Saratoga, and Wisconsin Bat-
tle Groups were tasked to cover Cuba, the Roosevelt, Coral Sea, and Lincoln Battle
Groups moved to positions south of the Iceland–United Kingdom Gap and the Inde-
pendence steamed to join the Sixth Fleet. Between D-10 and D-5, Blue marines arrived
in Norway, 10 guided missile frigates (FFG) were put on Eastern Atlantic (EASTLANT)
patrol, and Western Atlantic (WESTLANT) amphibious ships, including the Nassau
and Guam, were ordered to load out and proceed to the UK. Because of these actions,
D-Day found Blue naval forces well disposed, with SSNs forward, three CVBGs just
south of the Greenland-Iceland-Norway (GIN) Gap, and three others off the UK. FFGs
supported by Ocean Surveillance (T-AGOS) ships had assumed ASW positions, the
four Yankees in the Atlantic were being tailed, and two converted SSBNs were on sta-
tion to lay CapTor minefields in the Barents. Protective minefields were in place off the
Blue coast. At D-4, five Norwegian patrol submarines (SS) formed a barrier off the
North Cape and the French SSN/SSBNs were in safe haven in the Bay of Biscay.
When hostilities commenced, the converted SSBNs laid a 96-unit CapTor field in the
Barents and Mk-57 fields along expected Red SSN/SSBN transit routes. The Shetlands
and Faeroes were also mined, utilizing surface, subsurface, and air platforms. These op-
erations used 290 mines or 80 percent of assets. The Yankees in the Atlantic were
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promptly sunk, two by SSNs and two by maritime patrol aircraft (MPA). In the Norwe-
gian, Barents, and Kara Seas, Blue SSNs sought targets in the following priorities:
SSBNs, SSNs, and surface ASW platforms. During the first week of the war, Blue sank 7
Red SSBNs, 24 SSNs, 2 SSs and nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines (SSGNs),
the only operational CV, and one Kiev, with another Kiev so badly damaged as to be
out of action. During this period, Blue lost ten SSNs. During the entire game, Blue SSNs
sank 19 SSBNs, 38 SSNs, 6 SSGNs, 7 SS, and 23 major surface ships at a cost of 26 SSNs.
On D-Day, Blue surface forces moved initially to sink Red AGIs and then to support
ASW operations. Intensive air operations were conducted north of the GIN Gap coor-
dinated with surface forces. One CV was moved close to southern Norway to support
the land campaign, if necessary. Red sabotage of the Sound Surveillance System
(SOSUS) in Norway hampered the ASW effort, but the capabilities of thin line arrays
and the SQR-19 compensated. Aside from operations in support of the amphibious
operations in Jutland and an abortive Red anti-SLOC campaign (both of which will be
discussed separately), the naval war proceeded with Red forces suffering heavy attri-
tion. By D+48, surviving Red naval units had been driven into ports of safety, and,
while this remnant did constitute a fleet in being, only one Oscar-class SSGN remained
at sea. Specific events of interest are as follows:
• D+3, Danes and Swedes mine Baltic choke points.
• D+7, UK reports initial clearing of Red SS/SSN from North Sea.
• D+8, three CVBGs south of GIN Gap release support SSNs to replace those lost.
• D+10, two CVBGs off Cuba deployed to UK, leaving Wisconsin BG in position.
• D+23/25, two SSN-launched TLAM(C) strikes against Olenegorsk petroleum, oil,
and lubricants (POL) facilities and on Murmansk.
• D+25, Blue reviews SSN patrol areas. Decision made to pull units out of Kara Sea
and reduce those operating in the Barents.
• D+30, Blue SSNs attack Red amphibious force in the vicinity of Norway’s North
Cape, sinking the majority of Red surface units involved in an attempt to outflank
Skibotn defense line.
• D+35, Red sorties 11 diesel SS against Blue CVBGs operating in North Sea.
Invincible and Hermes attacked unsuccessfully; diesel submarine threat caused Blue
considerable alarm.
• D+38, only remaining Oscar SSGN launches sole successful antiship cruise missile
(ASCM) attack of war. Invincible and Hermes damaged, but not put out of action.
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At D+30, Red, sensing the probability of a longer war, embarked on an anti-SLOC
campaign. Fourteen SSN/SSGNs were sortied via the Kara Sea, North Spitsbergen, and
the Denmark Strait. Blue was caught unprepared, and Red was not detected until exit-
ing the Denmark Strait. Of the 14 boats involved, all were sunk by D+40, two by the
CapTor minefield in the Denmark Strait, eight by Blue SSN, and four by maritime pa-
trol aircraft (MPA). They did, however, sink one SL-7, four Ro/Ro (fast), and four Ro/
Ro (slow) transports.
At D+22, Blue forces conducted an amphibious landing near the FRG-Danish border
on the western side of the Jutland Peninsula to prevent that NATO member from being
totally occupied by Warsaw Pact forces. Five CVs and 250 other ships were involved in
landing a Marine Amphibious Force (MAF), MPS equipment, and one infantry divi-
sion. The 82nd Airborne was also utilized, and the 101st Airborne put ashore later. The
amphibious fleet and supporting ships were attacked by five regiments of Backfires.
The attack initially concentrated on the amphibious ships and resulted in a loss of
about 25 percent of available ground strength.
Following the landing, Blue maintained substantial CV assets in the North Sea to pro-
vide tactical air support to NORTHAG in general and the Jutland beachhead in partic-
ular. This concentration attracted the attention of Red and resulted in the SS/SSGN
attacks noted above. While the Blue forces were still pinned in their beachhead at game
end, Red had not knocked Denmark out of either the war or the NATO Alliance, and
Red forces that might have been employed elsewhere to NATO disadvantage had to be
diverted to Denmark.
At the end of the game, then, Red had been driven from the Atlantic and neighboring
seas, the SLOCs were secure, Cuba was not a factor, and Blue naval assets were assisting
in the land battle on the Central Front.
The Mediterranean and Southwestern TVD
Red actions prior to D-Day involved Spetsnaz operations and covert minelaying. Be-
ginning at D-12, Red began the insertion of Spetsnaz teams to sabotage nuclear storage
sites, nuclear attack–capable airfields, and command, control, communications, and in-
telligence (C3I), in that order of priority. Also prior to D-Day, Red sortied eight Ro/Ro
ships with an estimated 1,000 mines per ship. One was assigned the Straits of Sicily and
Messina, another the Suez Canal, and the other six to the Aegean. The ship assigned to
the Suez was detected on D-2 and sunk in the Canal, blocking it. A Foxtrot laid 12
mines in Souda Bay and a Tango laid 12 more in Augusta Bay on D-2, neither being
detected.
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On D-Day, Blue promptly destroyed Red AGIs and other tattletales as the expected
“shoot-out” began. The Soviet Mediterranean Squadron (SOVMEDRON) ships and
submarines struck two Sixth Fleet CVBGs in the vicinity of Rhodes, sinking three ships
but leaving the CVs undamaged. The Red forces were essentially destroyed, incapaci-
tated or forced into ports of Red surrogates. Red also launched an SNA/LRA attack
with three regiments of Black Sea Fleet (BLKSEAFLT) Backfire and one regiment of
Blinders. Red prepared for this attack with SS-22 attacks on six Turkish airfields, and
only four Backfires and six Blinders were shot down over Turkey. The attack against
Sixth Fleet was made with AS-4s; no CVs were damaged, and Red lost 36 Backfires and
nine Blinders. Blinders also hit the airfield at Souda Bay, cutting the runway for three
days. These attacks were the last air attacks launched against Sixth Fleet, as Red did not
wish to risk assets without targeting intelligence.
By D+25, NATO had completed mine-clearing operations in the Mediterranean, interred
89 of an estimated 250 Warsaw Pact merchant ships in the area when hostilities com-
menced, and forced the others into ports in Libya, Morocco, and Syria. The three
CVBGs now present, Independence, John F. Kennedy, and Eisenhower, became involved
in a successful air campaign against Red air assets and other targets in Bulgaria. A
number of Tomahawk land-attack missile (conventional) (TLAM(C)) attacks were
launched, the most notable being a strike on a new CV and a Slava fitting out at
Nikolayev, based on intelligence obtained from a remotely piloted vehicle (RPV). An
effort was also made to insert four SSNs into the Black Sea, but two were sunk and one
damaged by minefields.
Game’s end found NATO in control of the Mediterranean, with the CVBGs employed
in supporting an Allied ground offensive toward Bulgaria.
The Far East
While previous Global War Games had found Red essentially passive in the Pacific
Theater, it seized the initiative in 1984. Perceiving that it would be unable through dip-
lomatic pressure and military threat to keep Japan neutral, Red launched a large-scale
air attack on Blue/Japanese air defense assets, using both aircraft and SS-22s. These at-
tacks were so successful that Japan was left with essentially no air defense capability. An
example of this effectiveness was the D+2 attack on airfields at Chitose and Misawa,
which put both out of action for 48 hours and destroyed 85 percent of their POL
supplies.
Red also struck at Blue targets throughout the Pacific. Adak, Shemya, and Amchitka
were hit on D+1, 2, and 5. Further, key installations in Guam and Hawaii were attacked
by Red unconventional warfare forces, which were also employed against Japan. These
included high frequency direction finder (HFDF) sites and a super-high-frequency (SHF)
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station. Diego Garcia was also bombed and put out of action for three days, with 50
percent of all POL, hangars, and port facilities destroyed. These “worldwide” strikes
were conducted not because Red sought to expand the war, but because Red reckoned
it could not tolerate potential threats to its flanks and wanted to preempt them to the
extent possible. Red attempted to accomplish the same goal by offering bilateral trea-
ties of nonbelligerency.
Red had flushed a large number of SSN/SSGN to the east of Hokkaido and the Kuriles
prior to D-Day for anti-CVBG operations. The remainder of the Red navy was retained
in the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk.
Blue, acting on warning given by Red deployments, surged SSNs prior to hostilities to be
in a position to wage intensive ASW campaigns in the Bering Sea and the Seas of Japan and
Okhotsk. Initial Red SSBN losses were heavy, but ceased after D+16 as Red drew the re-
maining assets back into the well-protected shallow water bastions in the northern Sea
of Okhotsk. A Blue USN/USAF attack destroyed Red bombers, sank several small com-
batants, and damaged repair facilities at Cam Ranh Bay.
There was a small-scale “shoot-out” in the Indian Ocean, where the Kitty Hawk battle
group was en route to join the other Pacific Fleet CVBGs in the vicinity of the Philip-
pines. A Charlie-class SSGN attacked the Kitty Hawk, but its missiles were shot down
by an escorting Aegis cruiser, and the Charlie was sunk by the support SSN. This CVBG
also sank a Krivak by air-launched Harpoon and destroyed an AGI (auxiliary vessel
general intelligence purposes) with gunfire. A Kara and another Krivak were dis-
patched in the Arabian Sea by air-launched Harpoon shortly after D-Day. Although
these actions were the only major ones to take place in the Indian Ocean, Red did its
best to harass Blue/NATO/Japan energy supplies. Periodic bombing raids were under-
taken against oil production facilities; Ras Tanurah was heavily bombed, and a desul-
tory anti-SLOC campaign in the Indian Ocean claimed 12 super tankers. However, the
Middle East in general and the energy situation in particular never became a major
concern to Blue.
Blue held six CVBGs, including the Kitty Hawk, in the Philippine Sea during the early
days of the war, awaiting the destruction of Red submarines in the waters east of
Hokkaido and the Kuriles. This positioning of the CVBGs, combined with a protracted
period of extremely bad weather, which hampered Blue air operations, provided Red
with a “window” to invade Hokkaido. On D+11, Red initiated a large amphibious as-
sault led by two SNI regiments followed by motorized infantry units transported in
Ro/Ro ships. Eighteen amphibious and merchant ships were lost in this assault, and
both Kievs in the Red Pacific Fleet sustained severe damage. However, the Red forces
did get ashore and established two large salients, one on the Wakkanai peninsula and
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the other in the Sapporo area. Noting this Red success, the Democratic People’s Repub-
lic of Korea (DPRK) commenced mobilization and invaded South Korea on D+15.
As the weather cleared and Blue antisubmarine operations proceeded, the CVBGs were
able to move north and pound the Red forces ashore on Hokkaido. By D+30, the five
divisions of Red troops then ashore were unable to make further progress and a deci-
sion was made to withdraw them, which was accomplished on D+32/33. Partially to
cover this withdrawal, Red launched a massive air attack on the Blue CVBGs force op-
erating southeast of Tokyo. Red lost 182 planes in a raid that included Backfire, Badger,
Bear, Foxhound, Fulcrum, Flanker, and Fencer. Blue lost 101 aircraft; several escorts
and auxiliaries were sunk; Lincoln and Midway, heavily damaged, were towed to Japa-
nese yards for repair.
Blue planned to continue the Pacific war by invading the southern Kurile island of
Kunashir, with follow-on landings to take place on Simushir and Iturup. This decision
was taken in spite of urgent pleas from the Republic of Korea (ROK), which, while
holding its own against the North Korean invasion, wanted the CVBGs to provide ad-
ditional air support. As Blue naval forces maneuvered for the attack on Kunashir, Red
launched another massive air attack on the CVBGs, now positioned east of Hokkaido.
The Ranger sustained six hits, was on fire and dead in the water. The estimated time of
repair (ETR) was 10 months; seven escorts were also sunk. Blue bombing of the
Kuriles, including a number of B-52 strikes, appeared to have neutralized any military
utility the islands might have had for Red. With Red threatening to place atomic demo-
lition mines (ADM) on the islands, Blue and Japan seemed to independently reach the
conclusion that there was no military necessity to invade.
The situation on the Korean peninsula had become stalemated. Initial DPRK success in
the East had been blunted by a South Korean counterattack, and Seoul remained in ROK
possession. Little change had occurred since D+40 or so, and Blue continued to refuse ROK
requests for CVBG support. At game end, however, Red had agreed to provide MiG-21s to
Pyongyang, which appeared to threaten a shift of air superiority to the north.
The PRC had mobilized early in the war, but had taken no aggressive action against
Red. Nonetheless, Red had felt it necessary to maintain its regular defensive deploy-
ments against possible contingencies, and had not drawn down its forces employed
for that purpose.
Although these were the events of principal importance in the Pacific, there were ongo-
ing submarine operations against Red forces that put to sea. Further, both the Blue air
force and naval air assets attacked the Belkin coast, and TLAM(C) missiles were utilized
in attacks on Vladivostok and Sakhalin.
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Insights
The major issues of the 1984 Global War Game can be considered to fall under three
broad topics:
• Looking at longer war—out to D+60.
• Developing insights into unified global strategy.
• Implications of fighting with 1990s equipment and tactical innovations.
One of the questions of concern over the “long war” hypothesis involved the ability of
Blue and NATO to successfully wage protracted, conventional war as well as the effect
that Blue willingness and capability to do so would have on deterrence.
As far as the latter point is concerned, it appeared that the Blue ability to deter by
adopting a long war strategy might be scenario-dependent. While such a prospect
would give Red cause for concern, it seemed that Red, if faced with the prospect of the
loss of East Germany or the unification of Germany, would choose to fight, even if a pro-
tracted war was in prospect. Once the battle was joined, it appeared that Red, if con-
fronted with limited resources and potential trouble on the flanks, would scale back the
original objectives and settle for more modest goals, such as an intact Warsaw Pact alli-
ance and, possibly, a demilitarized Germany. However, should Red be thrown off its early
timelines and hit with a strong Blue counteroffensive, the use of weapons of mass de-
struction was a very real possibility.
As the Global Game progressed in 1984, it appeared that with reasonable mobilization
lead time and effective use of warning, Commander-in-Chief Europe/Supreme Allied
Commander Europe (CINCEUR/SACEUR) had stronger defensive fighting power than
many had perceived. A “flexible defense” that employed maneuver and flanking attacks
had succeeded in slowing Pact offensive. The air/land battle concept appeared to be
working well, and Blue (as distinct from NATO) had logistic and ordnance stocks that
were generally adequate. Thus, at D+48, Blue, though hard-pressed, was holding out, in
spite of Red’s commitment of all forces west of the Urals. Virtually all theaters except
the border with the PRC had been stripped of Red troops, a situation deemed unlikely
in a “real world” circumstance.
The game results tended to show that a long-war strategy did have some deterrent fea-
tures and was a valid war-fighting option for Blue/NATO. However, while successful ex-
ecution of the strategy avoided Blue selection of the nuclear option, it did have the
effect of pushing Red in exactly that direction. Red, at game’s end, was determined to
secure a cease-fire and satisfactory war termination, even if weapons of mass destruc-
tion had to be used. If the war continued, Red saw their long-term (two to three years)
situation as untenable.
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The development of a global strategy linking offensive operations to overall war objec-
tives had been recognized in the first global series as an issue of critical importance.
While maritime superiority gave Blue multiple options to put both military and politi-
cal pressure on Red, there was no “Big Game Plan” to coordinate Navy, Army, and Air
Force assets for combined and joint land operations, nor was there any pre-hostilities
planning to provide for follow-on campaigns and logistical support. In the event, it ap-
peared as though AFNORTH, AFCENT, and AFSOUTH were waging separate wars.
If Blue could implement an overall strategy, Red would be forced to react to it as the
initial offensive plan was upset and timelines began to slide. Without such a strategy,
both sides tended to remain in a reactive mode until Red built enough force to press
toward either original or modified objectives.
Blue had identified four major points of leverage:
• North Norway.
• Baltic Approaches.
• Western Mediterranean (Ligurian Sea).
• Eastern Mediterranean.
The western Mediterranean and the Baltic Approaches provided the opportunity for
direct support of the Central Front, while attacks from North Norway and the eastern
Mediterranean could threaten the Red homeland.
In Global ’84, Blue attempted to exploit offensive operations at three levels:
• Operational—A major double envelopment in AFCENT using NORTHAG and
CENTAG reserves.
• At the theater level, with an attempt to create pressure in the Balkans by AFSOUTH.
• By the planned use of the Strategic Reserve for invading Jutland and threatening the
Baltic coast.
If operations in North Norway to thwart the Red advance that began on D-Day were
considered, Blue/NATO was thus exercising three out of the four points of leverage
identified above.
Blue/NATO forces in North Norway were successful in halting the Red attack short of its
objective, the Skibotn Valley. However, there was no appreciable augmentation of Allied
forces in Norway after the very early stages of the war. Essentially, the CVBGs never en-
tered the Norwegian Sea. Consequently, there was only a token TLAM attack on the
Kola and no buildup of force of any kind to seriously threaten the Red homeland with
attack, let alone mount a ground offensive. Red felt free to reinforce the Central Front
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with forces from the Leningrad MD and could rationalize that the minimum objective
in North Norway had been attained.
The Blue landing in Jutland was not planned as a counteroffensive, but was initiated
for the political reason of keeping Denmark from being knocked out of the war. While
Blue was never able to break out from a beachhead that became more tenuous as the
game progressed, the operation did demonstrate several potential advantages:
• A number of Red divisions were diverted from offensive operations on the Central Front.
• The ability to support the operation with CVBG air allowed concentration of
land-based aircraft further south.
• If adequate force levels could be attained, the Central Front campaign could be
directly supported, with the offensive continuing east along the Baltic littoral or
moving directly south against the flank of the Red advance.
The decisive victory attained by Blue in the D-Day shoot-out in the Mediterranean Sea
opened the SLOC to Greece and Turkey and promoted regional stability, particularly
among the Muslim countries in the area. Blue wanted to exploit this situation, but was
unable to do so, in part because the Alliance had no plans for an offensive in this the-
ater. Therefore, both land forces and logistics sustainment were absent. While Blue uti-
lized air and TLAM assets to attack Bulgaria and the Black Sea ports, land operations in
Thrace were not begun until D+47.
While these events were taking place in Europe, Blue was endeavoring to seize the ini-
tiative in the Northwestern Pacific with the goal of invading the Kuriles. Although this
operation was finally shelved due to a Red threat to place ADMs on these islands and to
detonate them if Blue invaded (and then accuse Blue of initiating nuclear war), a larger
question arose as to whether it was better policy just to neutralize the islands rather
than occupy them.
These operations suggested that there were military criteria that should be considered
when actions about the Red periphery were contemplated and that these criteria had
applicability to air and naval as well as land operations:
• Is the leverage that may be gained from the operation worth the cost? and
• Can a large enough force package be built to exploit opportunities maritime
superiority creates?
The importance of a coherent strategy that brings all available assets into play is an im-
perative if a long-war strategy is to succeed. Such a strategy may not depend on a
“knockout punch,” and one probably does not exist in any event. The overarching
strategy appeared to be to stall the Red land offensive, constitute reserve forces, and then
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push the counteroffensive. Barring the use of nuclear weapons, the war would probably
end when one belligerent decided the price was too high and victory too far away.
Fighting with 1990s equipment and tactical innovations led to a number of valuable
insights. Some of the most important are discussed briefly below.
• Antisubmarine Warfare—The Blue submarine thin line arrays and SQR-19 appeared
to have achieved a quantum leap in Blue capability. While it had been anticipated
that Red efforts in quieting their SSNs would diminish the Blue advantage, this did
not prove to be the case. Blue did find it difficult to come to a conclusion on one
tactical issue. As Red losses mounted and Red units moved deeper into bastions, Blue
approached a point of diminishing returns. It is important to formulate parameters
as to when to reduce or suspend the anti-SSBN campaign.
• While tactical aircraft (TACAIR) attrition continued to be very high, 60 percent for
Blue and 70 percent for Red, the Blue technological advantage appeared to be
shrinking. While Blue held a 2.5-to-1 ratio at D-43, the capability of Red fourth
generation aircraft, particularly when integrated with Mainstay, was a cause for
concern. While further experience and intelligence may result in a downgrade of
current performance estimates, these airframes are clearly superior to their
immediate predecessors.
• Red utilized SS-22s with conventional warheads in their attacks on air bases in Japan
and Turkey. They proved extremely effective in the role, and both their use and
effectiveness came as a surprise to Blue.
• The possible use of chemical weapons by Red was a concern to Blue. As the outbreak
of hostilities seemed imminent, Blue pondered the question of whether or not Red
would use chemical weapons (CW) at the beginning of the war and, if so, how. Blue
considered what response to make if Red did attack with CW, the principal issue being
a perceived lack of symmetrical response due to the lack of a deep strike capability. The
possibility of a tactical nuclear weapons (TACNUC) retaliation was discussed. Overall,
the use of weapons of mass destruction was initially unattractive to both Blue and Red,
primarily because both sides feared that the response of the other side could lead to
loss of control and unintended escalation. However, by D+48, Red had determined
that massive chemical use was necessary. Red did not believe there was any significance
to the scope of their attack; that if Blue was going to respond with nuclear weapons,
they would do so regardless of the scale of chemical use by Red. Blue, on the other
hand, had decided on principle that a nuclear response would be appropriate if the use
of CW by Red was massive and devastating. It should be noted that Red decided not to
use chemical weapons against France because of fear of nuclear retaliation by the
French Independent Nuclear Force (INF).
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The 1985, 1986, and 1987 Global War Games
Scenario—The Road to War
The scenario for the 1985 Global War Game was based upon possible events, world-
wide, that culminated in the outbreak of war on 20 November 1990. As with the 1984
game, this scenario portrayed two superpowers not totally in control of events or their
allies and an evolving situation in which both Blue and Red finally found themselves in
a war that neither sought but which neither could avoid.
In Europe, the basic issue involved an apparent trend toward German reunification.
Dissident elements in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) had established con-
tacts within the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), and as these contacts expanded,
they were condemned by Red. For its part, the East German government restricted ac-
cess to West Berlin. This caused West Germany to insist that all Germans should have
access to Berlin, and the FRG government demanded a tripartite demarche to Red.
In early November, the situation worsened. On 5 November, the GDR placed further
restrictions on the air and ground corridors to Berlin, but implementation was ham-
pered as some East German border guards deserted their posts and a tide of refugees
began to flow westward. This action precipitated a border firefight, and the GDR au-
thorities took steps to ban all Western news reporting of the border chaos. Further,
West German National Television carried reports of Red frigates (FF) ramming open
boats crowded with refugees fleeing the GDR. The NATO refugee agency was ordered
into operational readiness.
Red also had troubles along the southern flank. The war in Afghanistan dragged on,
with support for the rebels provided by Blue and the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
being funneled through Pakistan. Further, chaos in Iran followed the death of the Aya-
tollah Khomeini in 1985. The council that replaced him was incompetent, and no sin-
gle faction was able to assert control. In October of 1990, the National Front for the
Liberation of Azerbaijan declared independence and requested recognition and mili-
tary support from Red. Red mobilized four divisions from the Transcaucasus Military
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District (MD) and three regiments of Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA), recognized the Re-
public of Azerbaijan on 20 October, and invaded on 4 November with seven divisions
plus elements of an airborne division from the Odessa MD. Resistance was light, and
Red anticipated that ten days would be required to “consolidate” the situation.
Blue was having problems to its south, as well. The situation in Central America was
festering as Red vastly increased aid to the communist government of Nicaragua.
“Contra” strength and activity had continued to grow, and when Blue army engineers
were killed inside Honduras by Nicaraguan government forces attacking the “contras,”
Congress acted. A joint resolution called on the President to define the roles and mis-
sions of all Blue forces in or close to Central America within 90 days.
Red activity in Cuba was also of concern to Blue. Military aid had been increased to in-
clude Nanuchka missile corvettes and Koni-class frigates, Fulcrum aircraft and SA-6
missiles. Further, deployment visits by Red surface action groups (SAGs) and fleet sub-
marines (SSN) had become more frequent, as had reconnaissance flights.
Elsewhere, NATO’s southern flank was in disarray. The Greek government had permit-
ted Blue basing agreements to lapse, requiring redeployment of assets to Italy and Tur-
key. Red naval units had begun Greek port visits, and anti-American and anti-NATO
demonstrations had become commonplace. Athens not only reasserted Aegean claims
but also threatened “unilateral” resolution of the Cyprus problem. The situation was
exacerbated when the Blue Secretary of Defense visited Ankara at Turkey’s request.
Red intervention in Azerbaijan was of immediate concern to the Turkish government.
Further, Red and Bulgarian complicity was suspected in a wave of terrorist bombings
and the assassination of diplomats, both at home and abroad. The Turks sought Blue
aid and reassurance.
In Asia, the Blue perspective was mixed. The Secretary of State visit to the PRC had
been productive. Agreements had been reached on Blue military aid, both for domestic
purposes and for forwarding to the Afghan rebels, and a port visit to Shanghai by an
Aegis cruiser emphasized the warming of relations.
Elsewhere in the Eastern Hemisphere, things were not promising. The death of Marcos
had plunged the Philippines into chaos and virtual civil war. The economy was in
shambles and the “New People’s Army” was on the march. American military installa-
tions were being attacked or sabotaged.
On the Indian subcontinent, fear of a Pakistan nuclear program led India to attack the
Islamabad reactor facility and airfields as well. Pakistan retaliated against Indian air-
fields. Further, both these countries suffered from serious internal problems. Political,
economic, and social difficulties raised questions of Pakistan’s internal cohesion, while
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Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi had placed India under martial law to try to control in-
ternal strife. India’s relationship with Red remained solid, while the PRC supported
Pakistan.
On 10 November 1990, Blue Special Operation Forces (SOF) became engaged with Red
forces in Afghanistan. Casualties were heavy on both sides. Surviving Blue personnel were
captured, tried by a field court martial, found guilty of being “mercenaries,” and executed.
Key Events on the Road to War, October–November 1990
15 October National Security Council (NSC) meets and decides to call up
100,000 reserves to deter Red. Other agenda items included possible
retaliation against Nicaragua, a demarche to Cuba, and the state of
Blue public opinion with regard to possible war.
16 October NATO “REFORGER” exercise begins.
1–9 November Major Red exercise in Sakhalin concludes, but a residue of the forces
remains, raising concerns in Tokyo about a potential threat to
Hokkaido. Various Red air defense and Soviet Naval Infantry (SNI)
exercises take place in the Far Eastern Theater of Military Opera-
tions (FETVD).
Red western military districts and Pacific military districts go to “in-
creased combat readiness” as do Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP)
forces. Two divisions from the Leningrad MD in the Kola mobilize.
10 November Blue receives indications that Red and NSWP are conducting wide-
spread mobilization. Red SSBNs leave port and ASW groups put to
sea. NSWP naval units marshal under Red control. Mobile missile
units depart their garrisons and the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) go
to “increased combat readiness.” Moscow issues a demarche to Nor-
way and informs Paris that a neutral France will not be attacked in
the event of a European war.
12 November Warsaw Pact (WP) forces in the WTVD move to a “threat of war”
readiness level.
The President of Blue requests and receives from Congress a Decla-
ration of National Emergency and orders full mobilization. NATO
declares a “simple alert,” and the Rapid Reinforcement Plan (RRP) is
implemented on SACEUR recommendation, with approval of the
Military Council and the DPC.
15 November NATO plan of operations (OPLAN) established.
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16 November Red declares a maritime exclusion zone around SSBN bastions and
orders naval forces to attack any intruders.
17 November Blue/NATO concludes that Red/WP forces have moved to “full com-
bat readiness.”
18 November NATO declares “reinforced alert.”
20 November Warsaw Pact offensive begins at 0600. NATO declares “general alert.”
Political Objectives and Military Strategy
Blue
Hostilities in the 1985 Global War Game commenced on 20 November 1990, when
Red and other Warsaw Pact combined arms forces launched a massive, multifront
offensive into the FRG, and on D+3 through Austria toward Bavaria. The Red decision
to go to war against NATO in Europe culminated over a year of increasing East-West
tensions stemming mainly from political and economic difficulties within Eastern
Europe. Red anxiety over the possibility of German reunification, fueled by incidents
along the inter-German border (IGB) and in Berlin, all contributed to the Red conclu-
sion that its fundamental security interests in Europe were at risk and that a resolution
of the crisis on terms favorable to Moscow was not likely through means short of direct
military action.
Of interest and worthy of examination are the original political objectives of Blue and
Red and how those objectives were modified and changed as the war progressed. Blue/
NATO political objectives in GWG ’85 were, essentially, the same as those cited for the
1984 game. There was, however, an expansion of Blue goals implied by the wording “to
protect Blue and Western vital interests worldwide.”
Red, on the other hand, tended toward more specificity, vowing to “Solve the ‘German
Problem’ once and for all on Red terms through demilitarization and/or neutralization
of the Federal Republic of Germany.”
In the 1986 game, Blue political objectives were enunciated in an essentially European
perspective that reflected the concerns and realities of the war in progress. By and large
consistent with prior games, they were stated as follows:
• Restoration of NATO territorial integrity and the restoration of status quo ante for
Austria, West Berlin, and Azerbaijan.
• Reduction of the status and influence of Red and the Warsaw Pact and a diminution
of Red “global reach.”
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• Attrition of Red nuclear assets to the point that Blue finishes the war with a
favorable nuclear balance.
The Blue strategy for achieving these goals emphasized three objectives:
• Stabilize the military situation in the central region as first priority. Use “economy of
force” in other theaters, as necessary, to accomplish this.
• When the front is stabilized, bring maximum coordinated military, political,
diplomatic, and economic pressure to bear to convince Red that a nonnuclear,
negotiated settlement is in Red’s best interest.
• Blue would make clear to Red that it did not intend to challenge its territorial
integrity of Red or its political leadership.
Blue acknowledged that the success of this strategy required that Red be convinced that
Blue was militarily, politically, and psychologically prepared for a protracted, conven-
tional war.
Red
Red political objectives were also generally consistent but tended to emphasize increas-
ing concern for the immediate safety of the homeland and the future security of Red
and its political leadership. While Red still viewed the neutralization of the FRG as par-
amount, and sought to roll back Blue influence, Red did not want the war to escalate.
Red wished to minimize damage to the homeland and reserve military forces, to sus-
tain Communist Party control, and to shore up the system of political and military alli-
ances in Eastern Europe. Red also wanted to retain strategic and theater nuclear
deterrence and, hopefully, dominance.
Red strategy in the ongoing war rested primarily on concentrating military forces to
consolidate the territorial gains achieved on the Central Front. Red believed that this
could be accomplished with a force deployment that achieved sufficient concentration
but retained enough strength to tie down Blue/NATO forces elsewhere and limit damage
to the homeland. Red also wanted to maneuver France out of the war. In total, Red was
determined to:
Make Blue realize that the war in Central Europe will be so long and costly to Blue that they will feel
compelled to negotiate with Red to regain the FRG on terms that would be favorable to Red in re-
establishing order in the Eastern Bloc countries—East Germany and Poland in particular.
In summary, then, the postwar status of Germany, particularly the FRG, was central to
both Blue and Red. While substantial symmetry seemed to exist in the respective objec-
tives and strategies, there was a growing Red concern for the physical and political
safety of the homeland and for the future of the “Eastern Empire.”
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Part of this elevated Red concern dealt with a rethinking of the nuclear conundrum. If
Blue defeat was to be defined as Red military victory in Europe and Blue being pushed off
the Continent, then Blue, with the rest of the free world at its disposal, would have a num-
ber of long-term military, political, and economic options vis-à-vis Red. If, on the other
hand, the Red Army could not deliver victory, Red faced unmitigated disaster. The “Eastern
Empire” would almost certainly be gone, and the strain of war on Red manufacturing and
agriculture would wreak such devastation on the Red economy that the primacy of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) would be under dire threat. In what repre-
sented a dramatic change in perceived conventional wisdom, it now appeared that Red
might be more likely to initiate nuclear war than Blue.
The Central Front
The size and timing of the initial WP onslaught was determined as much by the tempo
and nature of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military response to the
indications and warnings (I and W) of war in the central region as by the overall mili-
tary readiness posture of the Pact forces. NATO forces in the European Theater had at-
tained high states of readiness well in advance of D-Day. Indeed, NATO had conducted
its largest Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) exercise, and those troops, par-
ticularly the Blue III Corps, were available in theater. As a consequence, the WP de-
cided to begin its offensive with only those forces in the Western Theater of Military
Operations (WTVD) that had attained full combat readiness. Pact forces in other areas
lagged behind in preparedness and did not begin offensive actions until several days af-
ter the war started. The Pact had, however, mobilized the Second Strategic Echelon, and
the initial correlation of ground forces was about even.
At 0600, 20 November 1990, Red attacked along the length of the IGB with its First
Operational Echelon of 37 divisions. Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR)
military objectives were:
• To hold the Red attack as far forward as possible.
• To constitute reserves and reconstruct units as conditions permitted.
• To conduct counteroffensives to restore the territorial integrity of NATO members.
In conducting these operations, SACEUR was prohibited from attacking Red territory.
The major axis of the WP assault appeared to be against the Belgian Corps posted along
the Northern Army Group/Central Army Group (NORTHAG/CENTAG) boundary.
On D+3 (23 November), Red invaded neutral Austria in order to broaden the front
into the southern part of the FRG. On D+1, France had mobilized. Lead elements were
promptly dispatched to the FRG, as the main French units concentrated at their assem-
bly areas. On 24 November (D+4), Austrian forces came under NATO command.
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At the end of the first week of the war, NATO had lost but little ground. While the front
was stabilized in the north and center, pact forces had made gains in the south, advanc-
ing to within 50 km of Munich. The Belgian Corps had been badly mauled, and
SACEUR planned a counterattack by the Blue III Corps in the direction of the Fulda
Gap to relieve the pressure and to break up the Red salient that had been created at
the NORTHAG/CENTAG boundary. The southern situation also caused SACEUR
concern, where it appeared that Red was about to break through. Austrian losses had
been heavy and their resistance effectively broken. Red was moving on Munich with
seven divisions, and the 1st French Army was advancing to try to hold Red on a line
from Nuremberg to Stuttgart on 27 November (D+7). At the northern end of the front,
Polish forces had attacked into Schleswig-Holstein, but NATO was holding the line of
the Kiel Canal, although Hamburg had been abandoned on 26 November (D+6). It was
on that date that the NATO Defense Planning Committee (DPC) authorized Allied
Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH) to attack the Red homeland.
Air action was heavy from the start of the war, with Red concentrating on Blue airfields
with known or suspected nuclear assets. Blue air attacks centered on WP airfields and
on battlefield air interdiction (BAI). By D+3, both sides had lost about 960 aircraft and
the use of eight to ten airfields. On that date, Blue shifted the bulk of its air operations
to close air support (CAS). After D+4, SACEUR made the decision to utilize all air as-
sets available, including aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBG), to interdict the closing
Second Strategic Echelon.
On 27 November (D+7), Red fully committed the Second Operational Echelon and
achieved a major breakthrough in the vicinity of Kassel, which the Blue III Corps was
tasked to contain. In the south, in spite of stubborn French resistance, the Red drive on
Munich continued. On 30 November (D+10), the French 2nd Army went into line with
the 1st in the vicinity of Nuremberg. At the same time, Italian units began an advance
toward Innsbruck against battalion-strength opposition.
On 1 December (D+11), the II Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) staged an amphibi-
ous landing at Esbjerg on the western coast of Denmark. The landing was successful, but
the Coral Sea was lost in an eight-regiment Badger/Blinder/Backfire Soviet Naval Aviation/
Long-Range Aviation (SNA/LRA) raid utilizing AS-4 and AS-6 missiles launched at a
range of 150 miles. In concert with this attack, Red forces crossed the Kiel Canal and
the Danish border and attempted a coordinated attack with airborne forces to destroy
the beachhead at Esbjerg. The Red airborne units sustained about 60 percent casualties;
the Blue marines stabilized their position and linked with two Danish mechanized bat-
talions from Zealand and FRG elements that had retreated up the peninsula.
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While Red forces in the south continued their advance toward the Rhine, the main Red
effort on 2 December (D+12) seemed to be along the Göttingen/Paderborn/Giessen/
Fulda line. The Blue III Corps counterattack against the Red salient had attained its ob-
jective in relieving the pressure on the Belgian Corps, but that unit and the Nether-
lands Corps had to fall back as supplies were expended. As this gradual and orderly
retreat was conducted from an almost equally exhausted Red, Blue continued the III
Corps counterattack while the 8th Blue division attacked to the northeast on 5 Decem-
ber (D+15).
In Denmark, Red continued efforts to oust the Blue/NATO forces from the peninsula.
On 3 December (D+13), Red attempted an amphibious landing on the east coast of
Jutland. Twenty-five hundred SNI suffered 50 percent casualties, two guided missile
destroyers (DDGs) and seven amphibs were sunk, and another two DDGs and nine
amphibs were damaged. Red endeavored to suppress Blue air defense capability in
Jutland, but an offensive by II MAF reached the western part of the Danish-German bor-
der on 7 December (D+17). At the southern end of the front, Italian forces entered
Innsbruck the next day.
8 December 1990 (D+18) marked the end of GWG 1985 (map 3). SACEUR saw the pe-
riod 12–16 December as the next period of crisis; that was the expected closure date of
the five armies that constituted the Second Strategic Echelon. This force was aug-
mented by Red divisions pulled out of Bulgaria. The Central Front had lapsed into a
state of relative inactivity, and SACEUR utilized the respite to reconstitute units to the
extent possible while Red awaited the arrival of the Second Echelon. The Third Strate-
gic Echelon was moving through Poland.
The Blue III Corps counteroffensive was continuing as GWG 1986 commenced (map 4).
The objective of this attack was to wear down the Red and Polish armies north of Kassel
and, by so doing, force Red to use significant portions of the Second Strategic Echelon
as “gap fillers.” The attack succeeded in destroying seven WP divisions, but had to be
halted when the Second Echelon, delayed for four days by intensive air interdiction, fi-
nally closed.
Coincident with this counteroffensive was a deterioration of the situation on the
southern flank. The badly battered French forces, now reinforced by the 3rd French
Army, attempted to withdraw to protect their national frontier. Red massed 29 divi-
sions between Stuttgart and the French border and attacked on 11 December (D+21).
Four divisions of the 1st French army were trapped in Stuttgart. Red forced a crossing
of the Rhine at Mannheim on D+22, and the momentum of the assault carried Red
across the Rhine and into the hills of Eifel, where terrain and Blue reinforcements
stemmed the advance. Red had conserved and reconstituted air power during the bad
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weather that preceded this offensive and was thus able to support it with seven divi-
sions of tactical aircraft (TACAIR) for battlefield air interdiction/close air support
(BAI/CAS) operations. The four divisions encircled at Stuttgart had been allowed by
Red to withdraw as part of their effort to detach France from the Western Alliance. To
the east, the Italians maintained a slow advance in the direction of Munich, opposed by
two Hungarian divisions.
The closure of the Second Strategic Echelon definitively restored the initiative to Red.
Five divisions were allotted to the southern pincer where the principal effort was to be
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made. Five were sent north to take advantage of opportunities that might arise, and
three were retained in the center as a strategic reserve. The “opportunity” in the north
did eventuate as SACEUR rushed all available mobile reserves south to try to retrieve
the situation there.
On 16 December (D+26), a Red offensive shattered the Netherlands Corps, seriously
depleted by the early frontier battles. As the Dutch fell back, SACEUR tried but failed to
hold the line of the Weser. Remnants of the NATO force fell back behind the Ems Canal.
In an effort to counter Alliance air and to retard Blue reinforcements, Red launched
conventional missiles on NATO airfields and on Netherlands and FRG port cities.
A third Red initiative involved an attempt to destroy the Blue III Corps in the vicinity
of Siegen/Giessen. Fixed by a Red frontal attack and outflanked by Third Echelon
forces that closed on 23 December (D+33), III Corps and a United Kingdom corps
were unable to disengage. Outnumbered and facing fresh divisions from both the Sec-
ond and Third Echelons, these units held the Red advance for three days before being
destroyed. This gave NATO time to forge new defensive lines in the north and center.
Thus, on 25 December (D+35), the infusion of the Third Strategic Echelon had en-
abled Red to attain deep penetrations at both ends of the Central Front. Red reached
the borders of Luxembourg and the Netherlands and drove on into the Benelux. On 30
December (D+40), dikes were opened and the lowlands east of Amsterdam were
flooded to slow the Red advance.
In the south, Red continued to try to turn the NATO flank in the Vosges and along the
Moselle by making a “tactical incursion” into France. Red calculated, correctly, that
France would not resort to the use of nuclear weapons unless national survival was
threatened, and Red made certain that such was not perceived as the intention. France
committed its forces to NATO command on 25 December (D+35).
By 30 December (D+40), SACEUR was defending a line running from Amsterdam
through Düsseldorf to the vicinity of Verdun. Little of the FRG remained under Alli-
ance control, and NATO had grave concerns about possible political repercussions
should all of it be occupied by Red. On the other hand, the Red southern flank was “in
the air,” and the line on air parity ran approximately south from the Jutland Peninsula.
Consequently, NATO had superiority over the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA),
while Red held sway to the east.
As the military situation had deteriorated following the commitment of the Third
Strategic Echelon (D+33), deployment of Blue army combat units was accelerated at
the expense of sustainment forces in order to meet the threat. By 1 January 1991
(D+42), this accelerated deployment was essentially complete with the equivalent of a
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reinforced corps expected to arrive on D+48. This would move the correlation of forces
to about 1.3 to 1.0 in favor of NATO. However, the anticipated arrival of the Fourth
and Fifth Strategic Echelons, anticipated about 5 January (D+46) and 13 January
(D+54), would alter this ratio to 1.56 to 1.0 in favor of the WP.
However, on 30 December (D+40), increasing and unequal rates of aircraft attrition
caused the WTVD commander to substantially reduce the tempo of operations to con-
serve aircraft. This decision gave NATO control of the air over the FRG, and the unop-
posed CAS, BAI, and air intercept (AI) missions resulted in the heavy attrition and
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substantial slowing of the closure of the Fourth and Fifth Strategic Echelons. Further, it
greatly assisted the NATO defense against WP forces attempting to breach the Rhine
River line.
This was the situation that confronted NATO at the commencement of GWG 1987, 2
January 1991 (D+43). SACEUR faced a decision regarding the utilization of the arriv-
ing reserves: to strengthen the defenses along the Rhine or to initiate a counteroffen-
sive. Given NATO air superiority, the Red force concentration along the Rhine in the
vicinity of Bonn, the weariness of Red forces opposite CENTAG, and the extended and
unanchored Red southern flank, SACEUR planned a five-phase offensive:
• Attack in CENTAG to occupy territory from the Moselle to the Rhine.
• Assemble a major force (the First Allied Army) for the counterattack.
• Break through Red positions on a Frankfurt/Karlsruhe axis.
• Continue the attack toward Magdeburg and Leipzig.
• Maneuver to prevent breakout of encircled Red forces and then, if feasible, open
ground access to Berlin (see map 5).
The first phase of the operation began on 30 December (D+40) with CENTAG forces
attacking from the Moselle to attain the left bank of the Rhine. The attacking force was
composed of one Blue and one French corps, and as it advanced, AFCENT was forming
16 divisions from Blue, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom into the First Allied
Army. On 5 January (D+46), with the arrival of the Fourth Strategic Echelon delayed and
the WTVD commander concerned about the Blue advance toward the Rhine, the Su-
preme High Command (VGK) delegated authority to employ chemical weapons (CW).
D+48, 7 January, saw the arrival on the Rhine of lead elements of the VII Blue and
French Corps in the vicinity of Karlsruhe. Just to the north of the army group (AG)
boundary, the advance of I UK Corps toward Frankfurt, though heavily opposed,
threatened the encirclement of four Red divisions.
To the north, NATO forces were hard-pressed in holding the Rotterdam-Essen line. Ef-
forts to break out of the Jutland Peninsula had been repulsed. SACEUR was concerned
about this lack of success because it was believed that the northern pincer was neces-
sary to distract the Fifth Strategic Echelon.
On 8 January (D+49), Red used persistent and nonpersistent CW in Jutland, but win-
ter weather limited its effectiveness. The CW use was an indication of lack of Red com-
bat power, caused in part by the delay of the Fourth Strategic Echelon, which had
finally begun to arrive, albeit in a piecemeal and attrited state. Chemicals were used
again on 9 January (D+50), and while the I UK Corps was forced back across the
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Rhine, the VII Blue and I French Corps continued to advance. In the confusion caused
by the Red CW attack on I UK Corps, two Red divisions crossed the Rhine and became
established in what was to become known as the “Bonn pocket.”
On 11 January (D+52), Blue responded to the Red CW use with similar attacks against
WP forces along the Kiel Canal, and against two airfields in Czechoslovakia. The VGK,
concerned about escalation, had previously withdrawn discretionary authority from
the WTVD commander.
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SACEUR launched Phase Three of its offensive, code-named Operation GOLDEN
SWORD, on 12 January (D+53). The 16 Allied divisions massed at Luneville attacked
with VII Blue Corps to the north, I French Corps in the center, and German III Corps
to the south. The geographic objective was Magdeburg and a linkup there with forces
attacking southeast out of Jutland and the Italians moving north from the Munich-
Salzburg area. NORTHAG concentrated on the containment of the “Bonn pocket,”
which now had six divisions in it, as Fourth Echelon troops were fed in as they arrived.
GOLDEN SWORD made excellent progress: Fulda was reached on 13 January (D+54)
and Frankfurt taken by helicopter assault. On 15 January (D+56), a unit of the First
Allied Army crossed the IGB. Red reserves destined for the “Bonn pocket” had to be di-
verted to try to stem the three-pronged NATO attack: the Italians had crossed the Dan-
ube, and I and II MAF along with the Sixth FRG Panzer were breaking out of Jutland.
On 16 January (D+57), Red concern became obvious when CW was again utilized. Three
persistent CW “barriers” were laid: along the IGB to stop the First Allied Army; near
Munich to impede the Italians; and along the Kiel Canal to slow the northern pincer. De-
spite these attacks, the First Allied Army was advancing 50 km per day, and the Italians,
having passed through Regensburg, were under Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT)
operational control. The Jutland attack, however, was stalled by strong Red resistance.
The Red WTVD commander recommended heavy CW use as the situation continued
to deteriorate. In addition to the progress of GOLDEN SWORD, NATO forces had seized
the initiative at the northern end of the line. Allied forces were advancing on Amster-
dam, and the French were in the process of surrounding several Red divisions in the vi-
cinity of Strasbourg. Red was focusing on trying to build a force to counterattack the
First Allied Army, which now took precedence over reinforcing the Bonn pocket.
By 20 January (D+61), nine Allied divisions had entered the GDR, and on 22 January,
Leipzig fell and the southern bank of the Elbe was reached. To the south, the Italians
had pushed Red out of Bavaria and entered Czechoslovakia and the GDR. Link-up with
AFCENT southern pincer had occurred near Ansbach on 19 January (D+60). The
northern pincer out of Jutland had regained the initiative and was moving on Hamburg.
D+64 (23 January) found Blue digging in along the Elbe. The Rapid Reinforcement
Plan (RRP) was complete, and no additional reinforcements could be expected.
GOLDEN SWORD had reached its culminating point and could stretch the thin line of
ground forces no further. Another vital consideration was that the Elbe represented the
limit of Blue air cover. Red was pinning its hopes on the Sixth Strategic Echelon, made
up of 23 divisions from the Far Eastern Theater of Military Operations (FETVD), then
approaching the Elbe.
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The Atlantic
Commander-in-Chief Atlantic’s (CINCLANT) broad objectives at the outset of the war
were to establish and maintain sea control while denying the same to Red. The first
concern, however, was to ensure the safety of the SLOCs. Beyond that, Blue intended to
mount an early and sustained antiballistic missile submarine (SSBN) campaign against
both the Yankees in the Atlantic and the bastioned “boomers” of the Northern Fleet.
Further, the Blue concept of operations went beyond maritime-based support of NATO’s
northern flank. While the importance of holding North Norway remained an impor-
tant goal, Blue planned to secure conditions that would permit CVBG air, in coordina-
tion with Tomahawk land attack missiles (conventional) (TLAM(C)), to make direct
attacks on the Red homeland, particularly the Kola Peninsula area. As a part of the Blue
“long war” strategy, it was considered important to develop strategic leverage by dem-
onstrating the ability both to strike Red itself and to destroy “targets that matter,” facil-
ities that would have an impact on Red ability to wage a protracted war. A necessary
prerequisite to the execution of this strategy required the clearing of the Norwegian
Sea, and as much of the Barents as possible, of Red surface and submarine threats and
maintaining sanitization of the Norwegian littoral. Red diesel SSs were a particular
concern in this regard.
Red, on the other hand, endeavored to protect the bastioned SSBNs by geographic lo-
cation, heavy mining, and a defense in-depth provided by surface action groups (SAG)
and SS/SSN/SSGN deployed in the Norwegian and Barents Seas. While Red did not
plan to mount a classic anti-SLOC campaign, it did utilize a Cuban-based SAG, clan-
destine mining, sabotage, and special operations forces to introduce uncertainty into
Blue operations and slow the flow of reinforcements to Europe. Countering these Red
initiatives was one of CINCLANT’s first tasks.
The bulk of military action in the Western Atlantic (WESTLANT) took place during
the first week of the war. On D+2, a Red SAG consisting of a Kresta II guided missile
cruiser (CG), a Krivak I guided missile frigate (FFG) and a Krivak II FFG attacked the
Panama Canal, closing it for one week. This force was then promptly sunk by a Blue air
attack. The other major military threat in the hemisphere, Nicaragua-based IL-38s,
were taken out by Blue, and a coalition of Blue, Colombia, and Venezuela served to
preempt any attempts at aggression on the ground. A strong Blue demarche to Cuba
had the desired effect as that country’s Foxtrot submarine (SS) remained in port.
Red utilized submarines to mine the ports of New Orleans, Houston, and Galveston.
These efforts had minimal success, with only two merchant ships sunk out of 150 sail-
ing during the first days of the war. Both ports were closed briefly, and on D+7, Red re-
called all but two of the SS/SSN stationed in WESTLANT.
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Blue immediately attacked the three Yankee class on station in the Atlantic, and all were
dispatched by D+2. The actions of the first few days of the war left Red with three
cruise missile submarines (SSGNs) and eight SSNs in the Atlantic. In the Norwegian
Sea and the Barents, Blue attacked with forward-deployed SSNs against Red Northern
Fleet assets and the bastioned SSBNs. Red had deployed three SAGs, centered on
BLKCON 5, and including several Kiev aircraft carriers (CV) in the Barents Sea. Blue
found the bastions well protected and lost two SSNs on the third day of the war.
By D+7, Blue had marshaled a four-CVBG strike force consisting of America, Inde-
pendence, Roosevelt, and Saratoga. Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) protection was pro-
vided by the Illustrious and Invincible groups, and the Coral Sea had been ordered to
the vicinity of Jutland. On D+8, the CVBG strike force and supporting ASW groups
moved into the Norwegian Sea. This coincided with a general pullback of Red SS/SSN,
with those in the vicinity of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap mov-
ing north and those in WESTLANT withdrawing to the east. A strike against the Kola
was launched on D+9, after which the Roosevelt and Saratoga headed south (belatedly)
to support the Jutland amphibious landing while the America and Independence shel-
tered in the Norwegian fjords.
After two weeks of war and frequent attacks, the Northern Fleet SAGs had sustained
heavy damage. Blue SSNs and P-3 Harpoon strikes had sunk one Kiev CV, two Kresta I
CGs, one Krivak FFG, and one Sovremenny destroyer (DD), and gained a 50 percent
mobility kill on a Kirov battle cruiser. This result was attained at the cost of two Blue
SSNs and six P-3s. The SAGs were attacked again on D+15 as they were attempting to
withdraw. Blue launched a coordinated attack with SSNs, carrier-based air, Tomahawk
antiship missiles (TASM), and Harpoon. The damaged Kirov was sunk, as were a sec-
ond Kiev, one Krivak I, one Krivak II, one Udaloy DD, and three auxiliaries. Red lost 27
aircraft, Blue 14. Blue continued to assault the bastioned SSBNs and lost SSNs primar-
ily in minefields that Red continually expanded and thickened and also to minefields
laid by the SAGs across transit routes in the Barents.
On D+14, the Independence was torpedoed by a Foxtrot SS in Vestfjord. Dead in the
water (DIW), the ship was taken under tow only to be hit again on D+15 by two torpe-
does from two Foxtrots. As GWG ’85 ended, Independence was en route Trondheim for
shipyard repairs. This event had a strong influence on force mobility for the rest of the
war, as Commander Striking Force (COMSTRIKEFOR) could never be certain of being
free of the diesel threat.
As GWG ’86 began on D+19 (9 December), the aircraft carrier battle force (CVBF) was
in Vestfjord. Roosevelt and Saratoga had rejoined, and aircraft from the damaged Inde-
pendence and Coral Sea (sunk supporting amphibious operations at Jutland) were
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being consolidated ashore to provide a replacement pool and for utilization in support
of the land battle. Battle force ASW suffered a loss on D+21, when Ark Royal was torpe-
doed and departed to Bergen for shipyard repair. The battered Red SAGs, now consoli-
dated from three to two, one with BLKCON 5 and the other a Kiev, were trying to
withdraw to the eastern Barents.
Poor weather restricted air operations for most of the first week of Global ’86. How-
ever, on D+25 both SAGs were attacked by TASMs launched from the Dallas and Provi-
dence. The BLKCON 5 SAG lost a Kirov and had two other ships damaged. A planned
air strike on the BLKCON 5 SAG, scheduled for D+27, had to be delayed because the
CVBF lacked targeting intelligence and the CVBGs remained in Vestfjord. Red gained
information about the planned departure of the Forrestal from Norfolk and ordered an
Akula to take station northeast of the Virginia Capes (VACAPES).
In Washington, the subject of Cuba continued to be discussed. While the D-Day de-
marche by Blue had thus far been effective, concern still existed that Cuba might become
a problem. The JCS addressed the question on D+27 and laid out the following options:
• Form a CVBG based on Forrestal for air strikes in support of CJTF 140.
• Put Wisconsin in the Caribbean to strike selected targets.
• Institute a blockade of Cuba.
The JCS recommendation was that no forces be diverted to Cuba.
However, on D+29, Fidel Castro delivered a two-hour speech during which he ordered
mobilization of Cuba’s guard and militia units, and placed the naval forces on full alert.
The following day, the JCS sent a message to CINCLANT declaring that Cuba was a
threat to Blue military and civilian assets in the Caribbean, Blue southeast coastal areas,
and regional SLOCs. CINCLANT was ordered to take immediate action to neutralize
military installations, forces, equipment, and naval/aircraft/military and civilian com-
munications facilities. CINCLANT responded that a blockade was not feasible because
it would require a diversion of assets from the Norwegian Sea campaign. On D+31, the
battleship (BB) Wisconsin and the Kidd were ordered to proceed at best speed and take
station 50 miles south of Guantánamo. This was the start of a buildup that, by D+42,
would include the FFGs Truett, Simpson, and Groves as well.
While the majority of military action in WESTLANT occurred during the first week of
the war, Blue had worked diligently to maintain the security of the SLOCs and the
safety of the continental United States (CONUS), which were not without threat. On
D+16, for example, Red had attempted to bomb the Panama Canal and Kennedy Space
Center with two Bear aircraft, and on D+14 the Coast Guard had captured a Red mer-
chant ship flying the Spanish flag that had 300 mines aboard.
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Commander Maritime Defense Zone Atlantic (COMMARDEZLANT) had four task
units operating from Galveston to the Canadian border for ASW protection of the
coastal SLOCs. Mine countermeasure (MCM) operations were ongoing along the Q
routes, and the Coast Guard was stopping and inspecting vessels off Norfolk,
Wilmington, and Charleston. Protective minefields had been laid off Norfolk, New
York City, New Orleans, Galveston, Charleston, Morehead City, Kings Bay, and Mayport.
Hemispheric allies were providing assistance as well. On D+29, Argentina began con-
tinuous patrols of the Beagle Channel, Strait of Magellan, and Cape Horn to assure
the safety of Blue and Allied shipping. Chile also joined in, establishing a continuous
patrol of its waters at the continent’s southern tip.
On D+30, the Forrestal chopped to COMSECONDFLT to sortie on D+31 for the vicin-
ity of the Irish Sea and further assignment. She sank in the VACAPES op-area from
multiple torpedo hits and an escorting guided missile destroyer (DDG), struck by a
single torpedo, sustained a 50 percent mobility kill. The Red SSN was destroyed by
MPA based at Patuxent River Naval Air Station.
At the time of the Forrestal sinking, both Blue and Red were reassessing their respective
submarine campaigns. While Red surface forces capable of enfilading the SLOCs ap-
peared to have been neutralized, the Blue ASW campaign was intensifying. Submarine
Allied Commander Atlantic (SUBACLANT) assets were disposed as follows: 14 SSN
under the ice, 4 in the Barents, 13 in the Norwegian Sea, 4 in the Greenland Sea, and 5
in the GIUK gap. Seven French and Portuguese SS/SSN were postured in the Bay of
Biscay and near the coast of Portugal, seven Norwegian and three UK SS were operat-
ing in the Skagerrak. Three Canadian SS were on station south of Greenland. There
were no Red SSBN west of the line from Spitsbergen to North Cape. By D+35, Blue saw
a diminishing return from the anti-SSBN operations. The boomers that remained were
further east—around Nova Zemlya—and better protected as Red continuously
strengthened minefields. Therefore, Blue began a pullback of SSNs to form a nine-boat
barrier from Spitsbergen to North Cape.
Red was beginning to consider a limited anti-SLOC campaign, and to that end was do-
ing a “roll call” to determine the number of general-purpose submarines that might be
dedicated to that operation. Red was also evaluating the mine situation. While Red
mines had proved successful against Blue SSN trying to penetrate the bastions, usage
was running at 300 mines per day, and supply was a problem. Inventories would be ex-
hausted by D+36, with no remaining mines due in theater.
At D+35, Blue had gained control of the Norwegian Sea and western Baltic approaches.
While COMSTRIKEFOR complained about lack of information on Red SSN/SS/SSGN,
the fact was that there were extremely few in the area. Blue losses had been substantial,
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but offensive air and missile operations continued against surviving Red Northern
Fleet units and against the Red homeland. One of the two remaining SAGs was at-
tacked on D+35, and the BLKCON 5 was disabled and her aircraft reassigned to the
Northwestern Theater of Military Operations (NWTVD).
On D+36, Blue planned for a coordinated strike into the Kola Peninsula. The Blue ob-
jective was to try to influence the strategic balance by demonstrating that Blue had the
ability to attack the Red homeland. The attack was planned with the realization that
heavy losses were to be anticipated, as the DPC refusal to authorize overflight of Fin-
land severely restricted routes on ingress/egress. Targets selected for attack included:
• Red aircraft, early warning and ground control intercept (EW/GCI) sites, command
and control facilities, and airfields.
• A nuclear power plant.
• The mining of Murmansk harbor.
The attack was elaborately planned in an effort to minimize casualties. Signals intelli-
gence (SIGINT), obtained on D+25, indicated that Red would launch combat air patrol
(CAP) whenever Blue aircraft flew east of 27 degrees east longitude. Consequently,
while the plan of attack called for 103 aircraft, only 32 would actually be for strike pur-
poses. Most of the other aircraft involved would endeavor to overwhelm the Red air de-
fense system by penetration and feints.
Several other coincidental operations were staged to deceive and distract. One CG and
two DDs were stationed at 71 degrees 35 minutes north and 27 degrees 30 minutes east
to lure Red interceptors into a missile trap. Also, a TLAM(C) attack would supplement
an AFNORTH strike on the 77th MRD at Banak.
The attack was conducted on D+37, with aircraft launched from the America and
Roosevelt in Vestfjord and Saratoga in Andfjord. Red lost 23 aircraft (Foxhound,
Flanker, Fulcrum, and Flogger), one combatant and one auxiliary sunk, and an air-
field was rendered inoperable for several days. Blue lost 24 aircraft; the CG and two
DDs were targeted by an Oscar and later sunk by multiple torpedo hits while return-
ing to the CVBG.
The strike on the nuclear power plant was one of the most controversial events of the
game. While the plant was disabled, the damage inflicted was greater than that at
Chernobyl, and the resultant release of radioactive material precipitated massive diplo-
matic “fallout” from neutrals and allies alike.
D+43, 2 January, marked the start of Global ’87. The positioning of the CVBGs remained
the same with Independence and Ark Royal still under repair and HMS Illustrious
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conducting ASW northwest of Vestfjord. COMSTRIKEFLT defined the missions of the
CVBF as follows:
• Strategic ASW.
• Air superiority.
• Support to ground forces.
• Strategic power projection.
• Denial to Red of the use of the airfields at Alta and Banak.
The request for permission to overfly Finland was reiterated and denied by the DPC
on D+46.
As SACEUR began the counteroffensive on the Central Front, the naval war in the Bal-
tic became more intense. After massive air attacks to defeat the Blue amphibious land-
ings and early efforts to reinforce Jutland directly, the buildup of Blue forces on that
peninsula and the efforts by Blue to break out across the Lubeck Canal led to a fierce
struggle to control the western and central Baltic.
The main Blue effort in early January was against Warsaw Pact convoys transiting from
the eastern Baltic to support the Red units trying to contain the Blue salient south of
the Kiel Canal. NATO SSs faced increasing opposition from Red mining operations,
and surface ships were utilized extensively to keep the transit lanes clear. As Red mining
efforts intensified, FRG Tornados took over some of the interdiction efforts.
On D+50, as a result of losses to mines, Blue moved both an MCM and a fast-patrol
boat (FPB) squadron along the coast of Sweden to clear the SS transit routes. These
forces were withdrawn as Red countered by moving 40 small combatants in their direc-
tion. Red left part of this force in the area for the remainder of the game to discourage
future Blue incursions. Because neither side was able to establish definitive air control
over the west-central Baltic, advantage tended to ebb and flow depending on which
side held the temporary edge in assets.
For this reason, the struggle for supremacy continued throughout Global ’87, with nei-
ther side able to fully exploit the potential geography offered. Blue would have used
area control to secure the northern flank of an eastward offensive, Red as an avenue to
supply and reinforce divisions west of Rostock. A major effort to achieve this aim led to
a three-day running battle. On D+59, Red began to sail a 30-ship convoy from
Kaliningrad to Rostock with elements of the Sixth Echelon. This convoy came under
sustained air and submarine attack from Blue/NATO forces. It limped into Rostock on
D+61, having lost ten escorts and a number of troop and supply ships.
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Red continued throughout Global ’87 to interfere with Blue logistical support for the
Central Front. A success was achieved on D+54 when a Spetsnaz unit sank a merchant
ship in the Miraflores locks, shutting down the Panama Canal for three weeks.
Other initiatives were not so successful, primarily because of the reluctance of Fidel
Castro to do what Moscow wanted him to do. There were signs of Cuba’s lack of coop-
eration as far back as D+24, when both that country and Nicaragua abstained from a Red
request that both nations cooperate in mining the approaches to the Panama Canal, us-
ing Red equipment and with their personnel clad in Red uniforms.
By early January (D+44), Blue suspected a Red plot to rearm at least one SSGN utiliz-
ing a Cuban base for that purpose. Blue instituted intensified MPA/ASW operations off
the island, but with strict instructions not to violate Cuban air space or territorial wa-
ters. While this anticipated operation concerned Blue, no evidence that it occurred was
discovered. The fact that the operation did not come about was not for want of effort
on the part of Red. Indeed, continued inaction on Castro’s part led to a plan by Red to
accomplish the rearming without his permission, utilizing an Air India flight to trans-
port conventional warheads sufficient to replace 50 percent of the SSGNs’ normal nuclear
load out. Blue learned of this plan, and it was not attempted. Finally, a thoroughly frus-
trated Red suggested on D+61 that Castro consider a trip to Moscow for “consultations,”
an invitation that the Cuban leader felt it wise to decline.
Following the submarine “roll call” described earlier, the VGK decided to initiate a lim-
ited anti-SLOC campaign. This decision was taken on D+44 with the following assets
detailed to the operation:
• A northern Fleet Akula was dispatched to the southwestern approaches to the
English Channel (SWAPS) .
• A Sierra in the Mediterranean was to out-chop on D+47.
• A Mod Kashin in Luanda was ordered to participate as well.
The following summarizes the results of this:
• D+45—Akula sinks merchant ship in SWAPS
º Mod Kashin sinks Japanese tanker.
• D+47—Akula sunk in SWAPS
º Sierra exits Mediterranean.
• D+49—Sierra sinks four merchant ships off Spain/Portugal.
• D+50—Mod Kashin sinks two merchant ships off Angola.
• D+53—Sierra sinks merchant ship in Iberian Basin.
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• D+54—Sierra sinks merchant ship off Spain.
• D+58—Sierra sinks French SSN.
• D+60—Mod Kashin sinks two tankers.
• D+63—Sierra sinks two merchant ships.
As the game ended, the Mod Kashin was still at large, and Blue was dedicating substan-
tial assets to an intensive ASW campaign in the Iberian Basin. The widely dispersed
sinkings had convinced Blue that several Red SSNs were still operating in that area in-
stead of the single Sierra that was in fact responsible for the attacks.
As GWG ’87 progressed, both Blue and Red commanders gave thought to the possibil-
ity of nuclear escalation. Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) and Com-
mander Striking Fleet Atlantic (COMSTRIKEFLTLANT) feared that Red might use
such weapons against the CVBF to gain a more favorable correlation of forces. Therefore,
a request was made to the DPC for tactical nuclear release authority when there was clear
I and W of imminent Red escalation. This request was denied. Almost simultaneously, on
D+48, the NWTVD commander asked the VGK for permission to use nuclear weapons
against the CVBG. This request was also denied, as the VGK was generally satisfied with
the situation in theater, and further, was unsure of the Blue response.
The nuclear issue arose again at D+50. COMSTRIKEFLTLANT concluded that Red use
of chemical weapons had lowered the nuclear threshold and renewed the request to the
DPC for “conditional” tactical nuclear release and for permission to overfly Finland.
The nuclear request was again denied, but the long-sought over-flight permission was
granted subject to three conditions:
• The strikes be “surgical” against specific targets.
• There be no reattack until the DPC evaluated Finnish reaction.
• Finnish aircraft to be attacked only in self-defense.
However, on D+53, a planned strike into the Kola across Finnish air space was delayed
by the Blue National Command Authority (NCA) and on D+54, concerns over possible
diplomatic repercussions led Blue higher authority to deny permission for the attack.
The nuclear issue was raised again in another context on D+57.
COMSTRIKEFLTLANT expressed concern that a mass SNA raid on the CVBF would
overwhelm the available defensive assets of fifty F-14s, and four SM-1 and seven SM-2
shooters. Believing that a three-regiment attack would succeed, that commander re-
quested authorization to use SM-1-ER BTNs (nuclear warheads) as a “weapon of last
resort.” This request was denied.
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Throughout Global ’87, the primary utilization of the CVBF air assets was in support
of ground operations. At D+54, for example, the Strike Force was averaging 80 sorties
per day against the Red MRDs. An important adjunct of this air campaign was to pre-
vent Red from utilizing Norwegian airfields captured in their advance. Blue losses,
especially in attacks on these captured air facilities, were substantial, and on D+58
COMSTRIKEFLTLANT limited Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH) to 30 sor-
ties per day to conserve pilots and aircraft, A-6s in particular. That commander also
had to husband resources to provide cover and support for Operation ICE PICK, whose
amphibious component was scheduled to go ashore on D+62.
Red made two significant moves to reduce the power of the strike force. The first of
these was a deception operation using the hulk of the Leonid Brezhnev (BLKCON 5) as
a decoy to lure Blue strike air into a trap. The “trap” was baited on D+50 when the
Brezhnev was towed into a position where a Blue attack could be intercepted by Red air,
and a Mainstay orbit was moved to attract Blue attention. Forgers flying out of the
Kola simulated air operations, and auxiliary power was provided to operate radar and
generate other emissions. Towed barges were used to replicate escorts.
On D+54, Blue misidentified the decoy as the remaining Kiev SAG and decided on an
SSN attack rather than air. This strike was conducted with TASM on D+56, and it was
only after that that Blue began to believe they were dealing with a Red feint. The decoy
force remained in position at game end, ignored by Blue.
The other Red move against the CVBF was a multiregiment SNA/SAF attack spear-
headed by two Backfire regiments flown into Archangel from outside the theater.
Changed conditions on the Central Front led to a different perception of the CVBF by
the VGK. On D+45, Red had gone through an elaborate deception to keep the CVBF
north. Three MRDs had maneuvered in the “Finnish Wedge,” and an amphibious force
embarked and put to sea to try to persuade Blue that the strike assets would be neces-
sary to counter a massive invasion of Norway. However, the success of GOLDEN SWORD
caused a shift on the part of the VGK. As the Red position in Germany deteriorated, the
CVBF was seen as a potential strategic threat, regardless of its current tasking. On D+60,
the VGK ordered that plans be formulated for the destruction of the Battle Force, and did
not rule out the use of nuclear weapons. The result of this order was the attack of D+62.
This was another of the Red multiregiment attacks flown directly against the CVBF
through Finnish air space. Losses in the air were heavy to both sides, but effective air
defense, coupled with terrain shielding provided by the topography of the fjords, left
Blue with two escorts sunk and superficial damage to several other units. Carrier air
operations continued unimpaired.
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Perhaps the most significant result of this Red attack was that it brought at least
temporary closure to the long-debated question of Blue overflights of Finland.
COMSTRIKEFLTLANT had consistently believed that his force effectiveness was sub-
stantially reduced by the tactical complications imposed by the prohibition on the use
of Finnish air space. He thus had renewed his request for overflight on D+60, stating in
the process that the inability to do so was responsible for what was termed a “semi-
stalemate.” The Red attack on D+62 led to a granting of the desired permission on
D+63, and, as the game ended, planning was underway for a combined TLAM(C) and
air strike against railroad marshalling yards and a power plant in the Kola on D+64.
Finland was to be advised of the operation when the aircraft were en route, and it was
hoped that the government would do no more than issue a mild public protest.
Discussion over the best utilization of COMSTRIKEFLTLANT CVBGs had been ongo-
ing throughout Global. It was suggested that if both Blue and Red wanted to see the
CVBF remain in Vestfjord and environs, someone was wrong. Others observed that
“strategic ASW,” stated as the CVBF commander’s first priority for the 1987 game, did
not require three CVBGs. Orders from the NCA to use part of this force to support the
Esbjerg landing in the 1985 game were not complied with; finally two CVBGs were sent
south, but too late to provide assistance. Similarly, toward the end of GWG ’87, a re-
quest by SACEUR for one carrier to aid in averting impending disaster in the eastern
Mediterranean was rejected.
Tactically, COMSTRIKEFLTLANT was concerned about the Red submarine threat, par-
ticularly diesel SSs that might be lurking along the Norwegian littoral waiting for a CV
to emerge from the protection of the fjords. Further, and as noted above, the prohibi-
tion on use of Finnish air space was viewed as preventing the full exploitation of the
CVBF strike capability. Strategically, the situation on D+56 was seen by the CVBF com-
mander as follows: Red will shortly realize that Red alone cannot terminate hostilities.
It follows that Red will adopt a protracted war strategy, and, without the CVBF to the
north, Red would be able to target the UK and that such action could result in serious
limitations on Blue strategy and prospects.
The Mediterranean
AFSOUTH’s basic objective at the beginning of the war was to gain control of the
Mediterranean for Blue and to deny it to Red. The John F. Kennedy CVBG and the Iowa
SAG were initially positioned just south of the Aegean with the Eisenhower battle group
located south of Turkey. The overall plan of operations was to immediately strike all
Red units that could be attacked, to lay minefields to channel Red SS/SSN movements,
and to prepare for air and missile strikes into the southern tier of the NSWP states and
against targets in the Crimea and the Black Sea. Red planned to do what it could to
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reduce Blue striking power in the region, to maintain forces there as long as possible,
and to restrict Blue mobility. Preparations, particularly for the latter, had begun before
the start of hostilities, with clandestine mining of choke points and preparations to
close the Suez Canal. Red did achieve this objective on D-Day by sinking a merchant
ship in the Canal, closing it until 2 January (D+43).
The war in the Mediterranean began with the expected D-Day “shoot-out,” and by
D+10, Red surface forces had been eliminated or driven to seek shelter in “neutral”
ports. Blue success, however, had not been attained without substantial cost, particu-
larly from Red SS/SSN/SSGN:
• D-Day—Eisenhower, hit by three torpedoes from a Red SS, was unable to launch
aircraft for 24 hours. Ultimately the effects of this damage forced the ship into
Piraeus for non–dry dock repairs on D+27.
• D+1—Clemenceau sunk; Foch damaged and en route port after attack by Sierra SSN.
• D+2—Red sub attack on Blue amphibious group off Crete sinks LST-1179 with
heavy loss of embarked marines; Wasp (LHD-1) put out of action and arriving
Naples for repair on D+9.
• D+3—Kennedy hit by torpedo from Foxtrot SS and put out of action for six hours.
• D+5—AOE Detroit sunk by Foxtrot SS.
This early damage to CV assets turned out to be most significant in two aspects:
• The loss of the Clemenceau and Foch left the western Mediterranean bereft of NATO
naval strike capability and a bare minimum of two operational CVs in theater. This
concerned CINCSOUTH because it limited ability to support planned offensive
operations.
• When a major crisis did develop with the Red counteroffensive in the Balkans and
into Turkey in Europe, Kennedy was the only in-theater strike asset available to
CINCSOUTH, but accumulated battle damage and attrition to planes and personnel
severely reduced that ship’s capability.
Submarine assets aside, the major Red forces in the Mediterranean consisted of two
SAGs, one centered on a Moskva, the other on a Slava. Blue waged a running battle
with these two forces, and by D+6, they had consolidated into a single SAG that was
positioned off Libya. On that day, these forces launched an SS-N-12 missile attack on
the Kennedy CVBG and the Iowa BBBG. The Kennedy was put out of action for six
hours, and the Iowa received superficial damage. Almost simultaneously, the combined
Red SAG was attacked by Blue SSNs Phoenix and Newport News. While the Phoenix was
lost, a Slava CG and Udaloy DD were sunk, reducing the Red Eskadra to two Kara CGs,
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three Krivak FFGs, and ten auxiliaries. The last Red surface combatant was eliminated
on D+10. In spite of these successes, there was discussion of the relative merits of early
CV air strikes into the Balkans as opposed to the prompt and complete destruction of
all Red surface assets. Illustrative of this argument was the fact that a strike planned on
D+7 against the SAG off Libya had to be conducted by land-based air from Greece be-
cause of a shortage of CV-based attack aircraft.
A second operation was an ongoing offensive against Red forces in the Black Sea. On
D-Day, a Slava/Sverdlov SAG was positioned in the western Black Sea, 21 FFGs were
dispersed in seven different groups, 14 SSs were deployed, and a convoy was en route to
Bulgaria. These units came under immediate Blue/Allied attack, with a Turkish SS sink-
ing a Kara CG on D+4. On D+8, the Red SAG was struck by Blue air and at a cost of 38
aircraft sank a Krivak II FFG and a Sovremenny, damaged a CG, a light frigate (FFL), a
Udaloy DD, and an AOR. On D+10, Blue attacked this SAG again and, using TASM,
sank a Slava CG and another Udaloy. A Blue air strike the following day destroyed five
of the Black Sea FFLs and a Turkish SS took out an AGI.
As Global ’85 ended, Blue objectives in the Mediterranean had been accomplished. The
Red naval forces there had been essentially eliminated, and with no ability to target the
CVBGs, Red was reluctant to commit SNA/SAF. On D+13/14, the VGK ordered the
SWTVD commander to go on the defensive and transfer all attack aircraft to the
WTVD. Then, on D+24, Red withdrew all remaining surface units from the Black Sea
while continuing submarine activity therein. From then until the Red counteroffensive
described elsewhere, activity in the Black Sea was essentially confined to an endeavor of
Allied SSs to sink their opponents and vice versa. Blue carrier-based air operated prin-
cipally in support of the Greek/Turkish offensive in Bulgaria, and TLAM attacks were
launched against targets in the Crimea and against the Red space facilities at Tyuratam.
The deteriorating situation on the ground in Bulgaria was a factor in the decision to
introduce Blue/NATO surface forces into the Black Sea. With the Eisenhower in Piraeus
for repairs (D+27), nineteen Blue/NATO ships began entry into the Black Sea. Three
were sunk by mines, but the remaining sixteen hugged the Bulgarian coast and pro-
ceeded toward Burgas, and preparations began for the movement of the Iowa BBBG
through the straits to bolster the Turkish army’s seaward flank.
On D+36, 200 decoy vessels—various hulks and old merchant ships—were moved
from the Sea of Marmara through the Bosporus and into the Black Sea. At the same
time, Allied forces were massing in the Aegean: the Kennedy CVBG, the Iowa BBBG,
and various French, Spanish, Italian, and Greek task groups. Although some involved
expressed extreme reluctance to hazard naval units in the Black Sea, that movement be-
gan on D+40, with escorts taken from the Eisenhower BG establishing a screen with
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MODLOC 50 nautical miles from the Bosporus. The Iowa BBBG arrived in the Sea of
Marmara, and the hulks and barges were placed in position five to ten nautical miles
off the Black Sea coasts of Turkey and Bulgaria. On D+41, 4 Greek and 2 Turkish ships
established naval gunfire support (NGFS) positions off Burgas, and the arrival of two
Italian submarines raised the total of NATO SS in the Black Sea to twelve.
The Iowa entered the Black Sea on D+42 preceded by the Hawes (FFG-53), which
moved toward the central portion of that body of water operating a deception device to
simulate the Iowa. Iowa, meanwhile, took station off Burgas for NGFS missions, with 50
hulks to seaward to decoy missiles as well as a heavy ASW screen. A Kilo was sunk by
these forces, but a Foxtrot hidden among the hulks torpedoed Iowa. Dead in the water,
Iowa was taken under tow and was halfway back to the Bosporus at the end of Global ’86.
On 9 January (D+40), Red began to consider the prospect of targeting the Eisenhower,
pier side at Pireaus, and on D+43, the planning for Operation APOLLO was complete.
The next day, using HUMINT for targeting, twelve SS-12 missiles were launched and
five hit the Eisenhower. The carrier, about to return to active operations, departed for
CONUS; estimated time of repair six to eight months. This left the Kennedy as the only
theater strike asset available to oppose the Red counteroffensive.
From this point on to the end of Global ’87, Commander-in-Chief South
(CINCSOUTH) desperately endeavored to obtain air assets to halt the Red advance.
Appeals for a CBVG from another theater failed, and while B-52s were occasionally
available, the brunt of stemming the Red counteroffensive had to be borne by the
diminishing air crews and aircraft of the consolidated Kennedy and Eisenhower air
wings. Maritime success had come at a heavy cost to Blue/NATO: Clemenceau sunk;
Foch, Eisenhower, and Iowa out of action; and Kennedy resources so depleted that Blue’s
ability to stop Red was in serious doubt. Red occupation of the Turkish Straits ap-
peared likely at game’s end.
The Far East
Considering the Far East a secondary theater, Red objectives were limited. Because Red
did not want a two-front war, a primary objective was not to do anything that would
stir up historical animosities. Further, Red hoped through diplomatic and economic
means to secure the neutrality of Japan. Virtually any offensive action directed against
any forces but those of Blue would place those overarching goals at risk. The primacy
of these objectives led Red to restrain the DPRK, initially at least, from attacking the
ROK. Essentially, Red objectives in the FETVD can be summarized as follows:
• Protect the Red homeland.
• Preserve the Red strategic nuclear reserve (SSBNs).
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• Neutralize Blue nuclear strike capabilities.
• Keep the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Japan from actively aiding Blue
combat or combat support operations.
Blue objectives and concerns, in a geopolitical sense, were directed toward Japan as an
active ally and as an economic center whose productive capacity could be critical in a
protracted conventional war. Indeed, there were some who argued that these two goals
were in conflict; to the extent that Japan was active in the war against Red, the more
likely that the potentially vital plants and factories would be placed at risk of attack.
Further, Blue sought for some means to “play the China card,” to involve the PRC as a
clear potential threat to Red. Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) objectives can
be outlined as follows:
• Maintain control of the Pacific Basin and the SLOCs therein.
• Maintain pressure on Red to prevent the shift of forces to Europe.
• Destroy Red forces in the Far East.
• Maintain Japanese alignment with Blue and preserve Japanese economic power.
• Influence the PRC, at a minimum, to remain uncooperative with Red.
While a stated objective was to maintain pressure on Red to prevent the transfer of
forces to Europe, there were several other initiatives undertaken that were important in
a long war perspective. The 1982 and 1983 Globals had demonstrated the difficulty of
accomplishing this by simply launching air and missile attacks against Vladivostok, the
Belkin Coast, Sakhalin, and Petropavlovsk. However, there were targets which, if effec-
tively threatened, should give Red pause in shifting assets and, even if this was unsuc-
cessful, place Blue in a better position to fight a protracted conventional war. For
example, there were important Red manufacturing facilities at Komsomol’sk on Amur:
airframes for the fourth generation Flanker were produced there, as were Akula-class
submarines. The metal fabricating facilities at Khabarovsk were another valuable tar-
get. Further, amphibious operations against the Kurile Islands appeared valid. From a
strategic perspective, they could ease the task of attacking Red SSBNs bastioned in the
Sea of Okhotsk and pose a threat to Sakhalin; politically, a wavering Japanese govern-
ment might be steadied by the promise of the Kuriles’ return. These actions in the Pa-
cific can be viewed as a corollary to the shift in emphasis in the horizontal escalation
strategy in Europe—away from merely distracting Red and toward the development of
strategic leverage that could be critical in prosecuting a long war.
The war in the Pacific began with relatively limited activity. Red, as noted above, had little
to gain from offensive initiatives, and Blue was in the process of marshalling forces. The
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Ranger and Vinson battle groups had been ordered out of the Indian Ocean by the NCA
on D-Day and were en route to join the Kitty Hawk, Lincoln, Midway, and Nimitz battle
groups in the Philippine Sea. Missouri and New Jersey BBBGs were also present.
The Ranger and Vinson CVBGs were not engaged by units of the Soviet Indian Ocean
Squadron (SOVINDRON) during their eastern transit. Indeed, this theater saw little activ-
ity during the game. On D+2 a Krivak I was sunk in the Indian Ocean by a P-3 launched
Harpoon, and on D+4, a Krivak II was sunk in the North Arabian Sea, again by a Harpoon
from a P-3. This left Red with a Juliett SSG, a Foxtrot SS, an Echo SSGN, and a November
SSN in theater. Red used these assets in a desultory and ineffective anti-SLOC campaign
before withdrawing them for more important functions. Red also tried to interdict energy
resources with a brief ground incursion into northern Iran on 11 and 12 December and
with a D+10 air strike against that country’s oil facilities by two regiments of Badgers
transferred from the Crimea and staged out of Kabul. In the final analysis, Red actions in
Southwest Asia and the Indian Ocean were neither concerted nor coordinated and, there-
fore, not of lasting concern or consequence to Blue.
The position of the Japanese government tended to retard the pace of offensive operations.
During the first week of hostilities, Blue conducted air operations with units based in Japan
against Red SAGs operating in the Sea of Japan and against Bear reconnaissance flights.
When Red protested that this was not in keeping with Japan’s professed neutrality, the Japa-
nese government condemned the Blue actions and forbade the future use of Japanese soil as
a base for Blue attacks on Red forces. Efforts to resolve this issue were brought to a standstill
by the death of the Emperor.
While Blue was consolidating forces, Red spent the first week of the war putting all its
units on alert except for those on the PRC border. Air assets were dispersed, SSBNs de-
ployed to bastions in the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk, and SSNs positioned seaward of
the Kuriles. Red mining activity concentrated on the bastions, the Kurile passages and
the Strait of Malacca. Operational plans were developed for air and missile strikes on
Japan if diplomatic measures failed to secure that nation’s neutrality.
In addition to generating the CVBF out of SNA range, CINCPAC mined the Strait of
Tsushima and the Kuriles and, for defensive purposes, Guam and the approaches to
Tokyo Bay. The sanitation of the operating area of Red SSNs was begun as was the
anti-SSBN campaign. The results of these actions during the first week were heavily in
favor of Blue, with the exception of the torpedoing of the Nimitz by a Red SSN on 3
November (D+3). The Nimitz, DIW, was taken under tow for Hawaii and repair. On
D+6, Red again attacked the Nimitz, utilizing Bear aircraft and air-to-surface missiles.
One hit was obtained, and Nimitz rerouted to Guam for emergency repairs before pro-
ceeding to Pearl Harbor. Red lost three aircraft.
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While ASW and ASUW operations continued, Blue began an aggressive campaign
against Red air defense assets that was to continue throughout the war. Because of the
position of the government of Japan, land-based strikes had to be flown out of Korea
and losses were substantial. TLAM(C) augmented these Pacific Air Force (PACAF) at-
tacks and the CVBG forces joined when the submarine sanitation campaign permitted.
The principal targets were the airfields, over-the-horizon radar (OTHR), ground con-
trol intercept (GCI), and other facilities critical to Red air defense. Special Operations
Forces (SOF) units took part in these operations as well. Vladivostok, the Belkin Coast,
Petropavlovsk, the Kuriles, and Sakhalin were the geographic areas of concentration.
While the necessity of flying out of Korea increased Blue losses as noted above, Blue
was also confronted with a very capable Red air defense. Mainstay, combined with
fourth generation interceptors, gave Red a truly formidable air defense capability. The
importance of defeating this capability lay in the fact that offensive operations in the
Kuriles and the prosecution of attacks against the Komsomol’sk and Khabarovsk facili-
ties could not take place until they were overcome.
Early in December, CINCPAC moved the CVBGs and BBBGs north toward Japan in an effort
to draw out Red SSNs and SNA. Blue believed that most of the Red SSN threat had been elim-
inated, but was aware that two of three Red SSGNs were not accounted for. Red responded
with a coordinated SSGN and SNA/SAF attack on 6 December (D+16). The Red objective was
to eliminate as much of the Blue threat as possible with one massive strike. An Oscar SSGN
launched 32 SS-N-19 missiles at the CVBF, scoring hits on the Kitty Hawk and Lincoln; sev-
eral escorts were also damaged. One hour later, the force was hit by a 10–12 regiment SNA/
SAF air-to-surface cruise missile (ASCM) attack, with the missile launchers escorted by
Flanker and Foxhound. Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) based in Japan
were able to give warning of this attack, and counter-targeting devices were used to generate
an 8 to 1 false/real target ratio. An average of 84 missiles per CV were fired, but Kitty Hawk,
hit again, was the only carrier to sustain damage. Little attrition was inflicted on the attacking
force, primarily because of the effectiveness of the escorts. The Kitty Hawk went to Osaka for
repairs, the Lincoln to Yokosuka.
Red viewed Japanese willingness to take the two CVs into port as a serious violation of
neutrality, and attacked Japan at 0730 on 16 December (D+26). SS-12s were used for
air defense suppression in strikes on Chitose, Atsugi, Misawa, and selected South Ko-
rean bases as well. Bombers struck Komatsu to destroy the F-111s based there and the
Kitty Hawk in dry dock at Osaka. That CV, hit again, was put out of action for at least
one year. Lincoln was not targeted.
Diplomatic reaction was swift. The following day the government of Japan:
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• Reaffirmed its dedication to Alliance obligations and pledged to use its self-defense
forces to protect Blue forces in Japan.
• Recalled all reservists to active duty and appealed to all able-bodied Japanese to
volunteer for military service.
• Stated that Blue forces in Japan would be given permission to retaliate against Red.
Nor was this all. The PRC also denounced the Red attack, called up 200,000 reserves,
and ordered an additional five divisions to reinforce the border with Red.
The war against Red air defenses and the response by Red were mentioned above as a
key factor in the Pacific campaign. From D+20 to D+30 (10 December to 20 Decem-
ber), Blue lost 100 aircraft despite improved tactics and more support from Japan.
From D+30 to D+40 (20 December to 30 December), Blue lost an additional 70 planes.
Red attacks on Japan often utilized SS-12s as on D+30 when Chitose, Misawa, and
Komatsu were hit. Red air struck Chitose and Misawa on D+42, losing 83 aircraft
against 30 for Blue. Mining operations were continued by both sides through the
month of December. Blue also pressed attacks against Red SAGs off Vladivostok and
the Belkin Coast as well as continuing the ASW and anti-SSBN efforts.
The last week of Global ’86 saw renewed offensive initiatives by Blue. Efforts to roll
back the Red air defense continued with strikes against the Kuriles and southern
Sakhalin and the use of SOF against early warning (EW) and GCI sites. The airfield on
Iturup was a frequent target.
The Marines commenced offensive operations on 29 December, when the 1st MAB con-
ducted a heliborne assault on the island of Shikotan, which was taken with the loss of two
helicopters and 72 killed. The island was secured in two days, with Red losing 32 KIA and
568 prisoners of war. As Global ’86 ended, the remainder of the 1st MAB was loading out
at Tomakomai for an amphibious assault on the island of Kunashir in the Kuriles, and
Blue withdrew the marines from Shikotan and turned the island over to Japan.
The commencement of Global ’87 found both Blue and Red appraising their positions,
and both were influenced by events in Europe. The position of the Blue NCA had been
that when the Blue interests in the Far East were secure, then transfer of some assets to
the European theater would be in order. Red had in fact begun to do this as of D+28,
when ten seasoned divisions were moved westward and replaced by a similar number of
new recruits. On D+44, the Blue NCA directed that CINCPAC transfer 48 F-16s and 50
F-15s from Japan and Korea and 24 aircraft of various types from Alaska to SACEUR.
CINCPAC objected and sought to evade the directive. CINCPAC’s intentions were
as follows:
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• Continue to degrade the Red air defense by attacks on airfields, OTHR, SAM, and
GCI sites.
• Take out the remaining Red SAGs.
The CINC estimated that 50 percent of the Vladivostok air defense and sortie generation
capacity had been destroyed and, although losses had been heavy, wanted to pursue the
offensive. Three of the CVBGs were near the Aleutians, the other two were southeast of
Japan, and CINCPAC believed the remaining Red submarine threat was manageable.
The Red view of the situation was conditioned by the failure of the Western TVD com-
mander to secure victory on the Central Front. As had been the case in previous games,
Red sought solution to the strategic problem through horizontal escalation. Regardless
of warnings from the PRC, emphasized by the call-up of another 500,000 PLA reserves
on D+43, Red authorized an attack by the DPRK on South Korea on 5 January (D+46).
Red saw this as a no-lose situation vs. Blue, as it would force the latter to keep forces
and supplies in the Far East and might even pressure Japan out of the war. Moscow dis-
counted the likelihood of offensive action by the PRC. Further, Red felt that the relent-
less Blue air campaign was gaining superiority.
The question of transfer of assets as directed by the NCA now became a major issue, as
CINCPAC continued to evade and allies weighed in as well. On D+47, CINCPAC
agreed to the shift of aircraft and supplies to Europe, but airlift arrangements had to be
finalized first. The Republic of Korea protested the pull-out of these aircraft and sup-
plies, and the government of Japan expressed concern as well. D+48 found CINCPAC
informing the NCA that the transfer of aircraft would have to be delayed, because out-
side tanker support was required to avoid sacrificing the offensive counter-air (OCA)
campaign now showing evident signs of success. On D+49, the Blue NCA ordered
CINCPAC to use Pacific Command (PACOM) tanker assets to “swing” the aircraft to
Europe, even if it meant sacrificing the OCA campaign. CINCPAC responded that the
three CVBGs off the Aleutians were within several days of neutralizing Petropavlovsk,
promised to bring them south to aid PACAF on the Belkin Coast, and asked the JCS to
intercede with the NCA to delay the transfer of the PACAF assets. The JCS refused to
help. The issue surfaced again on D+50, with CINCPAC informing the NCA that
SACEUR had no “bed-down” facilities for the fighters to be transferred, and therefore
they would not be sent. On D+51, Allied Forces Command Europe (AFCE) agreed to
provide tankers the transfer, with an estimated time of arrival (ETA) of D+56.
While these “negotiations” were going on, the air offensive against Red continued, and
with growing success. Red endeavored to blunt this success with an attack against the
CVBF operating off the Aleutians. On D+48, a combined air and submarine attack was
launched against this force. Four regiments of Badger and Backfire made a feint to
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draw off Blue air as five Red SSN staged a torpedo attack. One Aegis cruiser, one FFG,
and two supply ships were lost. There was no damage to any of the CVs, and one of the
Red SSNs was sunk.
In spite of Blue progress, Red began the transfer of older aircraft to the FETVD on
D+50 in preparation for the move of fourth generation aircraft to the WTVD. The
progress of GOLDEN SWORD required this action, although the VGK viewed the situa-
tion in the Far East with mounting concern. The air defenses in Kamchatka were down
by 50 percent and the Blue kill ratio had risen to four-to-one as half of the FETVD’s
fourth generation aircraft had been sent to Europe. Of particular concern to Moscow
was the effect that apparent Red impotence in the face of Blue attacks might have in
Beijing. By D+53, the General Secretary was pondering the use of tactical nuclear
weapons against the three CVBG battle force that was attacking the Belkin Coast. From
his point of view, such an attack was not escalatory. Blue did not have a comparable tar-
get and, Red believed, would not use weapons of mass destruction (WMD) against the
Red homeland. Further, it would probably take Japan out of the war, and it would send
an unmistakable signal to the PRC as to the seriousness of Red intent. Red decided to let
things play out further, but did resume SS-12 attacks on Japan, hitting Chitose and
Misawa with four weapons each on D-55. Further, Red deployed two SSGNs with con-
ventional warheads to the West coast of Blue on D+61 and attacked Blue bases in Alaska
the following day. On D+57, Blue began to reduce the air sortie rate because of the transfer
of assets referred to above, and by D+59 it was down to 65 percent of the levels attained prior
to the “swing.” Planning continued for a helicopter-borne invasion on Uturup.
The DPRK launched an invasion of the ROK on D+62, assisted by Red aircraft. They
later attacked bases at Osan, Kunsan, and Taegu, all of which were put out of action.
Blue lost 78 aircraft on the ground and 77 in the air. Red lost 99. Misawa was struck
again by SS-12s. The PRC reacted immediately, closing the Yellow Sea to Red and
DPRK ships and aircraft, and offering the use of airfields to Blue for attacks on the
DPRK. On D+64, Japan, with Komatsu, struck again by SS-12s, offered to finance the
estimated $2.3 trillion for the first two years of the war.
CINCPAC proceeded with the invasion of Uturup, Operation PISTOL PETE, on D+62.
Following that success, he began to address the Korean situation and was doing so
when the 1987 Global Game ended at D+64. The three years of continuous play had
had a result similar to other games in the Global series: CINCPAC had clearly accom-
plished the mission assigned and protected the interests of Blue and its allies. This par-
ticular game highlighted the potential conflict between the NCA and theater
commander and drew a very clear contrast between theater and global priorities in
prosecuting a long, conventional war.
G L O B A L W A R G A M E 6 7

The Campaigns on the Flanks
Overview
The first Global series had examined the concept of “horizontal escalation,” or actions
away from the Central Front, as a means to deflect the Red focus and precipitate dis-
persal of forces away from Germany. Referred to by one participant as the “let’s go
thump on Cuba syndrome,” most perceived the concept as more harmful to Blue than
to Red. While the games of the first series were generally too short to completely ana-
lyze the effects of these operations, it did appear to be a common Red tactic to practice
“horizontal escalation” against Blue if the Central Front offensive bogged down.
The second Global series, while continuing these peripheral operations, saw them as
offensive initiatives that had the potential to develop strategic leverage against Red.
Four geographical avenues were identified in GWG ’84:
• North Norway.
• Baltic Approaches.
• Western Mediterranean.
• Eastern Mediterranean.
While three of these four areas had seen play in previous games, Blue had then per-
ceived that strategic imperatives dictated a response that was essentially defensive.
• Blue always prepared to defend North Norway against a predictable Red offensive
that sought, by degrading NATO air defense and SOSUS capabilities, to facilitate Red
control of the Norwegian and Barents Seas.
• Blue had become sensitive, particularly in the 1984 game, to the possible political
repercussions if Denmark were occupied or forced into a separate peace, thus
breaking the political cohesion of NATO.
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• Blue was always concerned that a Red offensive through the Balkans toward the
Turkish Straits would have adverse military and political consequences, especially
given the friction between Greece and Turkey.
The second global series, particularly the ’85, ’86, and ’87 games, saw the shift in Blue
approach from defense to offense. A successful offensive would not only secure the ob-
jectives that Blue required, it could also pose a threat to Red forces/homeland. Some of
the possibilities were as follows:
• While an overland offensive by Blue in North Norway appeared to have limited
prospects, could an effective joint air offensive be mounted against the Kola?
• Although political considerations required a robust defense of Denmark, could
NATO open an air corridor down the Baltic toward Leningrad? Could NATO ground
forces break out of Jutland and attack east into the GDR or thrust south into the
flank of the Warsaw Pact offensive?
• What was the potential of an attack north from Italy toward Munich? From a
military perspective, it could threaten Red LOCs; from the political, might it not
succeed in destabilizing Hungary?
• The potential rewards of a Balkan offensive also appeared attractive. Could an
invasion of Bulgaria be successful in knocking that country out of the Warsaw Pact
and thus putting pressure on even less reliable Romania? From a military
perspective, the occupation of a portion of the Western Black Sea littoral could
facilitate Blue sea and air operations against the Red homeland.
The second global series, in exploring all of these options, sought to develop answers to
questions such as the following:
• Can large enough force packages be built to exploit the opportunities maritime
superiority creates?
• Can sufficient leverage be attained or advantage gained to compensate for the cost or
offset alternative use of assets involved?
This section will examine these four campaign options as they were played out in
Global ’85, ’86, and ’87. It should be noted that the supporting naval force deployments
did not change to reflect the shift from a defensive to an offensive orientation. This led
to a game situation where a great deal was being attempted without a reallocation of
assets commensurate with a “risk/reward” type of analysis for each of the four
campaigns.
A further aspect of this shift to an offensive strategy was a conscious effort to identify
targets that matter. Previous offensive air activity, particularly in the Far East, had been
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judged as less than successful, because the objective had been the essentially negative
one of preventing Red from shifting forces from the FETVD to the West. A long-war
strategy, on the other hand, suggested that there were key targets, the destruction of
which would impinge on the ability of an adversary to effectively carry on the war at
some point in the future—a point not necessarily within the time limitations of this
game. Consequently, care had to be exercised when making a decision that assets de-
ployed in one location should be deployed somewhere else. In terms of the peripheral
offensive campaigns described below, it is probably best to view them as glimpses of
what might be possible and as an aid to contemplating future force allocations.
North Norway
The war in Norway began on D-Day, with Red air attacks focused on NATO radar and
acoustic sensors at Vardø, North Cape, and Kautokeino. The airfields at Kirkenes,
Banak, and Alta were also struck. These attacks were repeated on D+1 and resulted in
substantial degradation of NATO intelligence and aircraft basing capability. The first
three weeks of the war were characterized by air attacks by both sides, and although
hampered by darkness and bad weather, were pressed home against heavy opposition.
Indeed, the NWTVD commander had lost about 25 percent of his aircraft by D+6.
By D+7, Blue had assembled five CVBGs south of Iceland, and SACLANT ordered four
of them into the northern fjords to support the NATO defense of North Norway, to aid
in securing control of the Norwegian Sea, and to carry the war to the Red homeland.
Blue B-52s were also tasked for the latter mission. Once the CVBGs were on station in
Vestfjord, and the DPC authorized attack on the Red homeland, attacks commenced on
Pechenga and, in cooperation with B-52s, on installations in the Kola. B-52 losses were
considerable, as Blue found the Kola to be heavily defended and ingress routes re-
stricted by Finnish neutrality. Red troop concentrations on the Norwegian-Red border
were also targeted. The Blue CV Independence was torpedoed in Vestfjord on D+14.
The Red air offensive concentrated not only on the original targets noted above, but
also included Tromsø and Andoya. This was the essential character of the war in the
north until D+18, when a Red motorized rifle division (MRD) crossed into Norway.
On D+1, Red had moved the 131st MRD to the border, soon reinforced by the 45th and
54th MRDs. These units were joined on D+8 by the 77th MRD. The Blue 10th MAB
had been flown to Norway prior to D-Day, and the 2/9th had fallen in on its pre-
positioned equipment. On D+18, the 45th and 77th MRDs crossed into Norway at
Kirkenes.
The NWTVD commander envisioned a land campaign in North Norway as a low-risk
operation to keep the Blue CVBGs away from the Central Front, and with brief excep-
tions for repair of battle damage and belated participation in the amphibious assault
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on Jutland, there they remained. It is interesting to reflect that both Blue and Red be-
lieved that their strategic objectives were best served if the CVBGs were deployed to the
north.
Both sides tended to husband their ground forces during the games of the second se-
ries. The Red offensive consisted of a slow advance with three MRDs strung out across
the Finnmark along a single road. NATO forces fell back, destroying bridges and using
small unit actions to delay the advance. NATO did not want to seriously contest the
Red advance short of prepared positions of the Tromsø-Skibotn line, and maintained
tactical flexibility with the 4,000-man Canadian Air Sea Transportable Brigade (CAST)
ashore at Lyngen Fjord and the UK/NL Marines (7,000 strong) embarked and posi-
tioned in fjords southeast of Andoya.
The slow advance/retreat continued, with the allies destroying the airfield at Banak on
D+27. On D+31, Red moved two MRDs from the Leningrad MD to the Finnish border,
posing a threat to outflank Blue by an advance across the “Finnish Wedge.” Blue con-
tinued its gradual retreat and abandoned Alta on D+37, after destroying the airfield.
On D+42, the 77th MRD reached the Skibotn line, and, although the front stabilized,
NATO air superiority led to substantial attrition of the 77th, 45th, and 131st MRDs. At
this point, the NWTVD commander adopted an essentially defensive posture. Aside
from a multiregiment (110 aircraft) raid on Bodø and Evenes that sustained 50 percent
losses on D+47, Red had surrendered the initiative.
On D+54, NATO commenced planning for Operation ICE PICK, which was designed to
achieve the destruction of Red ground forces in North Norway. The Sixth MAB and the
UK/NL marines were to stage an amphibious assault west of Alta against the northern
Red flank. This landing was to be coordinated with a frontal attack by Norwegian
forces from the Skibotn line, augmented by the CAST brigade.
Operation ICE PICK was completely successful. By the end of D+64, when the attack went in,
the 77th MRD was surrounded, and the 131st was under heavy pressure. The end of GWG ’87
found the sixth MAB reembarking for future operations and the initiative firmly in the hands
of NATO.
Both Blue and Red could view their objectives as having been attained. Red had, with a
minimum of risk and force allocation, kept the CVBGs away from the Central Front.
Commander North Norway (COMNON), on the other hand, had stopped the Red ad-
vance, achieved air superiority, and gained the initiative. The essential question Blue
faced was not a new one: how to exploit these advantages to develop leverage against Red.
A primary objective of Blue was to carry the war against the Red homeland by attacks
against targets in the Kola that “made a difference.” This proved to be both difficult and
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expensive. The routes of approach were severely restricted by respect for Finnish neu-
trality, and losses in attacks were heavy. Eight B-52s were destroyed in a single raid on
D+8. One of the most controversial events of the entire war occurred on D+37, when a
major attack by 32 carrier aircraft struck facilities in the Kola. A Red airfield was put
out of action for several days, and, in a striking example of targeting judgment, a nu-
clear power plant was bombed, resulting in both the degradation of generating capac-
ity and the release of radiation. Twenty-four of the attacking aircraft were lost and only
one escaped undamaged. Blue also used TLAM(C), but unreliability coupled with the
loss of remotely piloted vehicles (RPV) prevented accurate damage assessment. At
game end, a Red violation of Finnish air space prompted the DPC to accede to repeated
Blue requests, and a 72-hour window was granted to overfly Finland.
The effects of Blue attacks on the Red homeland did not appear to have had significant
military impact. While Blue control of North Norway was imperative to Blue opera-
tions in the Norwegian and Barents Seas and a strategic necessity to shield the United
Kingdom from Red air attack, the principal impact of offensive air operations against
the Kola would appear to have been the tie-down of Red air assets. This may be signifi-
cant in terms of the impact these aircraft would have had if deployed in the Baltic. It
seemed clear that successful operations against the Kola depend on Blue ability to take
down Red defenses over time, probably with TLAM(C) playing a major role prior to
large carrier air/B-52 raids.
Denmark and the Baltic Approaches
The Jutland Peninsula grew as an area of Blue focus as the Global Series progressed.
The initial Blue concern was political: the surrender of Denmark or its occupation by
Red would demonstrate the inability of NATO to maintain political integrity. Earlier
games had indicated that a Red offensive across the north German plain could not be
halted before Denmark was cut off and, further, that NATO units retreating toward the
peninsula combined with the indigenous forces available were inadequate to hold the
line at the Kiel Canal.
Further analysis demonstrated that there would also be serious military repercussions
from a Red conquest of Denmark. Possession of the Danish airfields would permit Red
to outflank NATO air defenses on the Central Front, facilitate strikes on the West Ger-
man and Benelux ports, and aid significantly in contesting air superiority over the
North Sea. Also, Norway’s centers of both government and population, located as they
are to the south, would be subject to attack. The capitulation of Norway would isolate
both Sweden and Finland. The military consequences of this capitulation would be the
loss of North Norway, and the GIN line would almost certainly revert to the GIUK line.
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Clearly, the NATO position in all of northwestern Europe could hinge on the successful
defense of Denmark.
Conversely, the maintenance of the NATO position in Denmark could confer poten-
tially important strategic advantage. At a minimum, a Blue/NATO presence in Jutland
posed a constant threat to the flank or rear of any Red advance on the Central Front. A
“best case” scenario could involve a land/amphibious offensive along the Baltic littoral
into the GDR and Poland, as well as the possibility of opening an air or air/sea corridor
up the Baltic toward Leningrad and the Red homeland.
For these reasons—political and military, defensive and offensive—the Jutland Penin-
sula loomed large in NATO planning. Discussions of its importance began on 21 No-
vember (D+1) and meshed with an ongoing study of how best to utilize the II MAF. At
the commencement of hostilities, the main Red thrust had been against the NORTHAG/
CENTAG boundary. The northern flank of the Red advance had been guarded, in the
main, by Polish forces, which had crossed into Schleswig-Holstein on 21 November
(D+1). On D+5, Blue abandoned Hamburg and withdrew to the line of the Kiel Canal.
On this day, 25 November, it was evident that Blue forces in Jutland were not sufficient
for its defense and, a day later, the decision was made to land II MAF on the west coast
of Denmark at Esbjerg.
Red intentions were not entirely clear to Blue when this decision was made, as the op-
tion was still open to Red for a thrust by the ground forces in a southwesterly direction.
However, on D+7, the Kiel Canal line was attacked, and on D+8, with 4/9th of II
MAF in the Irish Sea, movement of the MPS was begun and the air combat element
of the II MAF deployed to Sola, Norway, and Vandel, Denmark. CAS in support of
the Kiel Canal line had become the AFNORTH air priority.
On 30 November (D+10), Red intentions became clear. Although the Kiel Canal line
was quiet as the heavily attrited Polish forces awaited reinforcements, it appeared that
those reinforcements were on the verge of engagement and that an operation by Red
airborne and SNI regiments was imminent.
Red forces breached the Kiel Canal line on D+11, and 4/9th of II MAF began landing at
Esbjerg. As they came ashore, they were immediately involved in a battle with two Red
air mobile brigades that were engaged in a weather-limited helo assault on the Esbjerg
airfield. While the marines were fighting to secure the town and airfield, the amphibi-
ous force of 46 ships, including the Coral Sea battle group, was struck by an eight-
regiment (152 planes) SNA attack. This mixed force of Backfire/Badger/Blinder, drawn
from the Moscow Air District, augmented by aircraft redeployed from the Kola,
launched AS-4 and AS-6 missiles at a range of 150 miles, sinking 27 ships, including
the Coral Sea, and heavily damaging four others. The Blue NCA had ordered the four
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CVBGs in the Vestfjord south to support the operation, but they did not arrive in time
to participate. (It should be noted that, while the results of this engagement remained
in effect as far as the Blue order of battle was concerned, a replay of the event showed
that proper tactics and deployment and effective use of deception and decoys would
have held losses to about four ships. This conclusion would tend to be validated by the
results of similar future engagements.)
On 3 December (D+13), Red endeavored again to flank the forces falling back from the
Kiel line with an amphibious operation designed to put 2,500 SNI ashore on eastern
Jutland. Blue/NATO air inflicted 50 percent casualties on this force, sinking 2 DDGs
and 7 amphibs and damaging an additional DDG and 7 more amphibs. A follow-on
strike on D+14 resulted in the loss of two more of the Red amphibs, but at the cost of
10 out of the 30 attacking Tornados.
From D+15 to the end of GWG ’85, activity was essentially confined to Blue efforts to
build force and Red attempts to prevent it. Polish forces on the ground were fought out
and had been heavily attrited, while Blue was still building combat power. Red air at-
tacks were frequent, particularly efforts to mine the Baltic approaches. Blue was able to
make progress along the west side of the peninsula, and while the FRG/Danish border
was reached there on D+17, Red was still 50 km north of the border in the east. As the
game ended (D+18), Red was pulling out the weakest Polish units and was moving up
an armored division, an MRD, airborne units, and naval infantry. The Red intention
was to fall back, fighting a delaying action utilizing prepared positions, and to counter-
attack when a more favorable correlation of forces was possible.
The beginning of GWG ’86 found the situation in Jutland as follows: 6/9th of II MAF
was engaged, as was the FRG Sixth Panzer Grenadier Division and two mechanized bri-
gades of the Danish army. The UK mobile force, of brigade strength, constituted the re-
serve. Amphibious shipping was en route Felixstowe, UK, to load the 7th MAB of I
MAF, and the 5th MAB was en route, expected to arrive in theater on 13 December.
Both were potentially available for deployment to Jutland.
Opposing Red forces consisted of the 6th Polish Airborne at about 35 percent strength,
and both the 16th Polish and 20th Red armored divisions at about 65 percent.
The Blue offensive continued with massive air support. The 387 sorties flown on 19
December (D+29) dislodged the 20th Red armored division, which fell back to pre-
pared positions near Logumkloster. On the 20th, all Danish territory was restored to
Danish control, and Blue continued to advance with the II MAF, the FRG Sixth Panzer
Grenadier and UK Brigade; massive air support continued. Red ordered up the 153rd
MRD and the 44th armored divisions, but Blue crossed the Kiel Canal and, by 23 De-
cember, held both sides of it.
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The movement to and landing of the I MAF plus the 25th Marine Regiment at Esbjerg
on 24 December (D+35) precipitated another major Red attack. First, an Oscar SSGN,
using targeting intelligence from the beach, fired SS-N-19 missiles from a range of
200nm at the 36 ships involved in the operation. All but one missile was destroyed, but
it struck the Belleau Wood (LHA 3), causing substantial damage. The Oscar was sunk
by a P-3, which had observed the launch.
Two hours later, Red struck again with an 80-bomber raid escorted by 90 fighters and 7
jammers. This force launched 135 AS-4/AS-6 missiles, but effective defense (105 inter-
cepted by SAM/CIWS) and extensive use of decoys limited Blue ship losses to 1 FF and
1 FFG sunk and the Whidbey Island (LSD 41) severely damaged. In the air, Red lost 15
bombers, 18 fighters, and 1 jammer; Blue lost 28 fighters.
At the front, Blue was consolidating positions in the vicinity of the Kiel Canal awaiting
the closure of I MAF. Red counterattacked at Rendsburg, held by the Danish 1st
Jutland division and the 2nd Zeeland brigade and the 1st UK brigade, using the 34th
and the 153rd MRDs. Blue, aided by heavy CAS, held on until 26 December (D+36)
when the I MAF joined up and Blue regained the initiative.
Blue resumed the offensive and was successful in crossing the Lubeck Canal and enter-
ing the GDR, but with the third Red Strategic Echelon engaged, Commander Marine
Forces Europe (COMMARFOREUR) prepared defensive positions in depth between
the Kiel and Lubeck Canals.
The closure of the Third Strategic Echelon created severe difficulties for NATO on the
Central Front, and the Blue NCA was desperate to find an offensive option to try to re-
store Allied morale. COMMARFOREUR preferred to move eastward along the Baltic
toward Rostock, but SACEUR decided on a thrust toward Wittenberge, 120km south-
east of Lubeck and about halfway to Berlin, as the most feasible of several unattractive
options. In spite of strong opposition from the DPC and various military commanders,
the I and II MAF launched the attack on 30 December and reached the outskirts of
Wittenberge, but the deployment of the Red Third Strategic Echelon required termina-
tion of the offensive and a retreat to the Kiel/Lubeck Canal defensive positions.
On 4 January (D+45), eight WP divisions breached the Lubeck line and advanced toward
the Kiel Canal. The FRG Sixth Panzer Grenadiers were surrounded by four WP divisions,
but managed to fight their way clear. The British Mobile Force and the Danish 1st Jutland
Brigade were destroyed in the heavy fighting between the canals. I and II MAF had as-
sumed defensive positions in the vicinity of the Elbe River/Kiel Canal, and the 82nd Air-
borne had been ordered to reinforce. One Red division had managed to cross the Kiel
Canal, but it was contained, and by 9 January (D+50) the Kiel line was secure.
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Coincident with these events (planning started on D+43), SACEUR was devising a
scheme to draw Red forces away from the Central Front. The outline of Operation
BAMBOO was as follows:
• Bremerhaven to be captured by air-dropped Rangers.
• I and II MAF to link up with Rangers.
• A feint at an amphibious landing in the vicinity.
• Construction of a missile trap for SNA.
• Withdrawal of all forces after 72 hours.
The land portion of this operation was never attempted, as I MAF had to be pulled out
of the plan to aid in holding the Kiel Canal line. The naval portion was executed, and
on 8 January a multiregiment Red air strike sustained moderate losses, and two Blue
ships were sunk.
On 8 January, Red began the use of chemical munitions. These weapons were targeted
on Allied forces in Jutland. Persistent and nonpersistent types were delivered by both
bombers and SSM. While some casualties were sustained, the adverse winter weather
reduced the effect of the Red attack substantially.
The arrival of the Red Fourth and Fifth Strategic Echelons from early to mid-January
continued to fuel intense fighting around the Kiel Canal. Red fought desperately to
contain Blue forces, which sought to break out of the peninsula and advance toward
the southeast as the northern pincer of the SACEUR counteroffensive. While the clo-
sure of additional divisions tended to benefit Red, the decision to use chemical weap-
ons was an indication that Red did not see its conventional combat power as adequate
to achieve the desired military objectives.
Red resorted to chemical use again on 9 January as bitter fighting continued. The ar-
rival of the 82nd Airborne reinforced the Kiel Canal defenses, and on 10 January,
AFNORTH prepared to counterattack toward the Lubeck Canal. This offensive, which
began on the 11th, D+52, was vigorously opposed by Red. On D+53, four divisions
from the Fourth Strategic Echelon were diverted north to bolster Red defenses, while
renewed chemical attacks slowed the Blue advance. Red withdrew across the Elbe on
D+54 and continued to reinforce as Blue advanced slowly in bitter fighting. On 14 Jan-
uary (D+55), the Red reinforcements succeeded in halting Blue at the Lubeck Canal.
The next day, Red laid a persistent chemical barrier across the LOCs from the Jutland
North Sea ports to the Blue forces at the Lubeck Canal. While casualties from the attack
were light, the chemical barrier did have a significant impact on Blue ability to support
the front. By D+58, the combination of blocked logistics, plus the diversion of other
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divisions from the Fifth Strategic Echelon, brought the Blue northern pincer to a halt
in the vicinity of the Lubeck Canal. A bit to the west, however, Blue was advancing to-
ward Hamburg as GWG ’87 concluded.
The progress of this campaign showed clearly that Red was extremely sensitive to Blue
initiatives in the Baltic. The massive air attack to disrupt the initial landing, the siphon-
ing off of divisions from the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Strategic Echelons, and the re-
peated use of chemical weapons made clear that Red was very concerned about the
development of significant Blue combat capability along the northern flank. While
Blue was not able to accomplish all that it would have desired, it did in fact maintain
the integrity of the NATO Alliance, successfully hold Jutland, and create serious prob-
lems for Red.
Potential for further development of strategic leverage would appear to depend on the
extension of air and sea control eastward up the Baltic. The use of that body of water
for offensive purposes had never played in Global, and, while naval actions were ongo-
ing and costly, further study could develop more effective strategies that would facili-
tate Blue operations. The same can be said for mining, both offensive and defensive.
The question of CVBG utilization also arose, particularly with regard to the initial am-
phibious operation at Esbjerg. Beyond that single operation, the CVBG commander’s
concern that movement outside the fjords would expose his assets to submarine attack
tended to preclude a more flexible utilization of his forces that could have contributed
to the success of the AFNORTH offensive scheme.
Southern Europe
Although southern Europe presented the possibility for NATO forces to move north into
the flank and LOCs of a Red offensive on the Central Front, such planning had to be
conditional because of Austrian neutrality. Developments in the Second Global Series
presented players with an opportunity to examine the potential of such a campaign.
The blatant violation of Austrian neutrality by Red presented Blue/NATO with the jus-
tification to send Italian troops across the Alps, through Austria, and into the southern
FRG. Austrian troops had come under NATO command on D+4, and the Italian move-
ment north was commenced in late November with the Munich-Salzburg area as the
initial destination. The force was led by four brigades of Alpini, with the heavier units
of the Italian Fourth and Fifth Corps to follow. The advance was discovered by a large
Spetsnaz contingent that Red had sent south to destroy bridges and tunnels along the
route from the Brenner Pass. This encounter, combined with heavy snowfall in the
Alps, retarded the progress of the Alpini and halted the advance of the heavier corps.
The Alpini reached Innsbruck on 1 December (D+10).
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As the Italians pushed north, units of the Austrian army that had been scattered during
the Red offensive began to coalesce with the Italians, and this force reached the vicinity
of Munich on D+20. On D+23, motorized units of the Fourth Italian Corps reached
Innsbruck, where they halted to replenish for the advance on Munich.
Red had been deceived as to Italian intentions and progress since the initial brush with
the Spetsnaz unit, but began to react on 7 December (D+17). Two Hungarian divisions
that were to be part of the Red southern pincer on the Central Front were tasked to
counter the Italians in the vicinity of Munich and, shortly thereafter, Red pulled two
airborne divisions out of the strategic reserve for the same purpose. These two divi-
sions were airlifted to Munich on 16 December (D+26), where their landing was con-
tested by the four Alpini brigades that had gained the outskirts of Munich.
Confused fighting in and around Munich persisted through the end of GWG ’85 and
into the beginning of GWG ’86. In and around the southern fringes of that city, the
Alpini fought the Red airborne troops, while to the south of the city, the two Hungar-
ian divisions battled the Italian Fourth and Fifth Corps that were moving to link up
with their countrymen to the north. By 20 December (D+30), the Italians occupied an
arc from Garmisch to Salzburg, and Red was reinforcing with an additional Hungarian
MRD. AFSOUTH was supporting the Italians with heavy air operations, primarily
CAS, but with some BAI as well. There was virtually no Red air response and, conse-
quently, few Blue losses.
As GWG ’86 ended, the Italian Fifth Corps on the right of the advance had pushed a recon-
naissance in force north and east of Munich to threaten the Red LOCs flowing south of the
Regensburg-Ingolstadt line. Red was forced to call in two more divisions of the Third Hun-
garian Army to address this potential problem. As these divisions traversed Austria along
the Danube corridor, they were subjected to destructive harassing attacks by reconstituted
Austrian light units that overwhelmed personnel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD)
LOC protection organization.
As Global ’87 commenced on 1 January (D+41), Red was practicing economy of force
operations in the Munich area, endeavoring to defend, reorganize, and reconstitute. On
2 January, Salzburg and Munich were recaptured by the Italians, who then launched a
flanking offensive with the Fourth Corps to the west, while the Fifth pinned the oppos-
ing Red forces. Red, however, hard-pressed by the SACEUR counterstroke in the central
region, launched a nonpersistent chemical attack to halt the Italian offensive. The units
most affected were the Italian Fourth and Sixth Armored Brigades, which suffered 70
percent and 75 percent casualties respectively. Both withdrew to the west and were
combined into a single unit.
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The Italian offensive recommenced on D+51, advancing north and east from Munich
into Bavaria. On 12 January (D+53), SACEUR made the decision to launch Phase
Three of Operation GOLDEN SWORD, and the Italians were ordered to move on
Magdeburg, link up with the southern pincer of GOLDEN SWORD, and thus restore a
continuous Allied line. They advanced against light opposition, and by 15 January had
put eight brigades across the Danube at Regensburg and were pushing toward
Nuremberg, protecting SACEUR’s right flank in the process.
On D+57, Red again resorted to chemical weapons use in the vicinity of Munich in an
effort to sever the Italian fighting and support elements. Casualties were low, about 2
percent, and the attack a failure because the Italians were moving north, not west as
Red believed. In spite of continuing chemical attacks, which slowed but did not stop
their advance, the Italians had, by 21 January (D+62), pushed all Red units opposing
them out of the FRG and had crossed one division into the GDR. They decisively de-
feated a group of Hungarian divisions inside Czechoslovakia on 23 January and
achieved a link-up with SACEUR forces at Ansbach as GWG ’87 concluded.
Balkans
The situation that developed in the Southwestern TVD perhaps most clearly illustrates
the uncertainty that Blue offensive operations can create for Red. On D-Day, Red began
the movement of five divisions from the Odessa Military District through Romania
and into Bulgaria, where they arrived on D+5. On D+4, Red reserve air units were
moved to Hungary and, on D+6, Red air in Bulgaria was bolstered by similar additions.
Red made frequent attacks on air bases in Italy, with Aviano being particularly hard hit.
Red air also struck support facilities at Thessaloniki, airfields in Greece and Turkey, and
the 82nd Airborne in Thrace. All this changed on D+13–14, when the VGK ordered the
redeployment of the five MRDs from the Odessa MD to the Western TVD and further
directed the Southwestern Theater of Military Operations (SWTVD) commander to go
on the defensive and transfer all attack aircraft to the WTVD.
Commander-in-Chief South (CINCSOUTH) had planned to seize the initiative as
soon as possible. NATO believed that an offensive against Red and selected members of
the Warsaw Pact could develop useful military options and exploit potential political
fault lines in the Balkans.
The “D-Day shoot-out” in the eastern Mediterranean resulted in the entire Red
Eskadra being sunk or driven into neutral ports. An important outcome was the loss by
Red of any ability to target Blue CVBGs and BBBGs in the Aegean Sea. This situation
contributed to the VGK decision to withdraw its attack aircraft, and the resulting es-
sential immunity from air attack permitted Blue and TLAM shooters to maintain sta-
tion in the Aegean. While close air support (CAS) was often a priority, the scope of
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targets and variety of platforms used was extensive. Aircraft involved included not only
CVBG assets but also B-52s and B-1s as well. Targets ranged from bridges and railheads
to the Red space station at Tyuratam. Mines were air-dropped into the Bulgarian
mountain passes to retard the progress of the five MRDs ordered to the WTVD on
D+13.
Many of the initial attacks were designed to facilitate the NATO offensive into Bulgaria.
Aircraft and TLAMs were used to suppress WP SAM defenses, degrade airfields, de-
stroy command facilities and headquarters, drop bridges over the Danube between Ro-
mania and Bulgaria, and to destroy railheads and infrastructure in general.
Targets in the Red homeland included airfields in the Caucasus and Crimea, MRDs, rail
and supply facilities, naval installations at Sevastopol, and the aforementioned space
station struck by TLAM(C). Blue air was also utilized for mining in the vicinity of the
Turkish straits and the ports of Burgas and Varna. Red surface units in the Black Sea
were attacked, and a SAG sustained the sinking of one Krivak II and the damaging of an
FFL, DDG, and AO. Blue losses in these activities were also considerable; 38 aircraft were
lost in the SAG attack noted above. By the last week of Global ’87, only one CVBG was on
station (Kennedy), and the aircraft complement was so depleted that the Sixth Fleet had lit-
tle CAS capability to respond to the rapidly deteriorating situation of the ground forces.
On D+15, Greek and Turkish forces began limited attacks into Bulgaria, and by D+21,
the latter had penetrated to the vicinity of Burgas. The major NATO offensive com-
menced on D+24, and Bulgarian resistance appeared to falter. Concentrated battlefield
air interdiction (BAI) had strained the logistics of the frontline Bulgarian units, and
the Turkish III and IV Corps in the east and Greek C and D Corps to the west advanced
with heavy artillery support and Blue air superiority. On D+25, the Turkish III Corps
surrounded the Bulgarian 3rd MRD and 23rd Infantry Division in the vicinity of
Bogdanovo. IV Corps encircled the Bulgarian 15th Infantry near the juncture of the
Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey borders. While some Greek units closed on the Bulgarian
2nd MRD, elements of the Greek 10th Infantry Division (ID) were pursuing the Bul-
garian 8th MRD as it withdrew. Burgas fell on D+26, and the Turks advanced on Varna
as Red tried to persuade a less than enthusiastic Romania to support the faltering Bul-
garians. The Hungarian government was also asked for assistance, but heavy losses sus-
tained while countering the Italian thrust into Austria made Budapest reluctant to
commit reserves.
On D+27 the Bulgarian army fell back to a line running from Sofia to Varna. The state
of Bulgarian morale was indicated by the surrender of the 15th and 23rd infantry divi-
sions on D+28 and 29. However, by D+34, the Allied offensive stalled before Sofia and
Varna. Two Romanian divisions had arrived to stiffen the Bulgarians, and the Red 59th
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MRD was en route to the front via Romania. That country, however, refused to permit
more than one Red division on its soil, so Red reinforcements were slowed.
A new front was opened on D+29 when Red invaded eastern Turkey. This operation
had the military objective of capturing the airfield at Erzurum. While Red hoped that
this operation would distract NATO from the Bulgarian offensive, use of the air facili-
ties at Erzurum would permit Red to attack Incirlik from which Blue F-111s were strik-
ing the Red homeland. The two-pronged Red offensive moved rapidly at first, but then
became slowed by Turkish resistance, bad weather, and difficult terrain. Horasan fell on
D+41, but the pace of the attack was so slow that Red resorted to weapons of mass de-
struction (WMD), utilizing nonpersistent chemicals on the Turkish 51st Division on
D+51. Red finally captured Erzurum on D+60, but the retreating Turks had rendered
the airfield unusable until D+67–70.
As the eastern offensive plodded toward Erzurum, Red was massing forces in Bulgaria
for a counterstroke against the Greeks and Turks. On D+36 the 86th MRD entered Bul-
garia, and on D+38 the Kagul MRD began off-loading at Varna. While this landing was
opposed by carrier air, the retirement of the Eisenhower to Piraeus (D+27) for repair of
damage sustained earlier in the war reduced Blue effectiveness. Three Red amphibs
were sunk, and the landing of the MRD’s equipment and headquarters was delayed.
Eisenhower’s escorts had joined the Iowa BBBG, and that force moved into the Sea of
Marmara on D+40. D+40 also saw the commencement of a Red advance down the
Black Sea littoral toward Burgas. Both sides resorted to heavy CAS; B-1s were used to
attack the 145th MRD. As the Red advance closed on Burgas, the Iowa BBBG entered
the Black Sea to support the Turks defending that port on D+42. Iowa was torpedoed
almost immediately by a Foxtrot, went DIW, and was taken under tow for the straits.
The principal Red counterattack was launched by six divisions on D+42. It was sup-
ported by heavy CAS and, in an effort to play on NATO political tensions, fell on the
Turks, initially sparing the Greeks. The NATO forces were holding a line Sofia-Maritsa-
Burgas, and both sides reinforced. The 3rd Romanian Army joined Red forces on
D+45, and the 7th MAB augmented the Turks a day later. The following day, D+47,
Red forwarded two more MRDs to bolster the front at Sofia and to ensure the free pas-
sage of Red supplies and forces through a still reluctant Romania.
The infusion of the 7th MAB stabilized the Allied center, but on D+49, Red achieved a
breakthrough west of Burgas, and the MAB was repositioned by helos to plug the gap.
Simultaneously, Red launched Operation TOLSTOY, a joint landing of two airborne and one
SNI regiments south of Burgas. The Kennedy air group opposed it and sank two amphibs
and damaged two others. While the naval beachhead was eliminated, the battle to do so di-
verted ground and air resources from the deteriorating situation west of Burgas.
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Red pressure west of Burgas had continued to build, and Blue/NATO had neither the
ground nor air assets to hold the line. On D+54, just as the Eisenhower was about to
leave Piraeus to return to action, Red used HUMINT to target the ship with twelve
SS-12 missiles (Operation APOLLO). Five hit, and the Eisenhower departed for CONUS,
estimating six to eight months to make repairs.
On D+55, AFSOUTH requested permission to employ ten tactical nuclear weapons to
prevent destruction of the Greek and Turkish armies and to avoid the loss of the straits.
This was denied, as was his request for an additional CVBG and more ground forces.
SACEUR told AFSOUTH that he must hold out for another five days to keep Red from
shifting forces to the WTVD. B-52s were allocated to AFSOUTH, apparently the only
forces available. On D+57, with five more Red divisions en route from Romania, the
B-52s, combined with determined resistance on the ground, forestalled a Red penetra-
tion west of Burgas.
On D+59, Red broke though the center of the Allied line and wheeled some units to
the east to surround Burgas. However, as the SWTVD commander appeared on the
verge of victory, the WTVD commander, gravely concerned with the success of
NATO counteroffensive that had carried into the GDR, was pressing the VGK for the
transfer of five divisions from the SWTVD.
The Allied situation around Burgas became critical on D+60, with six Turkish divisions
trapped in the city. Plans were begun for their extraction by sea, and all available B-52s
were assigned to halt the Red advance. Severe attrition to the Kennedy air group essen-
tially eliminated it as a significant factor in the Allied defense, and on D+61, Red
crossed the Turkish frontier west and south of Burgas. On D+62, the evacuation of
Burgas by sea began, hampered by Scud Attacks including a lay-down of chemicals on
port facilities. These operations were continuing on D+63, Red augmenting the persis-
tent chemical attacks with long-range artillery. The Red advance into Turkey-in-Europe
was continuing, although with decreasing momentum, and AFSOUTH saw his primary
responsibility as defense of the Turkish Straits.
While the Allied forces were hard-pressed at the end of Global ’87, there was clear indi-
cation that offensive operations in this area had the potential for both political and
military success. With respect to the former, it seemed evident that the morale of the
non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries could be exploited. The early reverses suf-
fered by the Bulgarians seemed to sap their will to fight, as indicated by the surrender
of entire divisions. This was particularly significant because the Bulgarians were fight-
ing in defense of their homeland against traditional enemies.
From another perspective, the “fraternal socialist order” seemed to suffer when placed
under strain. Hungary demurred in sending troops to aid their Bulgarian neighbors,
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and Romania was not only chary about providing aid, it actually imposed limitations
on Red reinforcements to their beleaguered ally.
From a military perspective, the operation also showed promise. The Red reaction to
events in the SWTVD, both in terms of reinforcement and by the opening of a “second
front” in eastern Turkey demonstrated concern not only for the situation on the
ground but for the ability of Blue to strike a wide variety of targets in the homeland
with both aircraft and TLAM(C). This first iteration of a Balkan offensive showed both
the problems and the potential of the approach to the homeland.
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The 1988 Global War Game
Introduction
The essential focus of GWG ’88 was war termination; the purpose of the game to
assess how relative military, economic, and diplomatic strengths and weaknesses affect
the ability of Blue, Red, and their respective allies to conclude the war on a favorable
basis. The concept of the game was to spend one week concentrating on each of three
different scenarios based on possible culmination points of the strategic battle on the
Central Front: Red dominant, Blue dominant, and stalemate.
A “time step” from D+64 (the end of GWG ’87) to D+75 provided the means to build
in a set of events to transition to the three scenarios used in GWG ’88. All three scenar-
ios essentially notionalized the military situation in theaters other than the Central
Front in Europe based on the play from Global ’87 (GWG ’87). In Korea, the DPRK in-
vasion had been thrown back and the FLOT stabilized in the vicinity of the DMZ. Mili-
tary operations in North Norway had been stalled by force constraints and appalling
weather. The balance of power in the Pacific remained unchanged as Blue paused to
consider further amphibious options, and Red sought forces from that region to shift
west. In Thrace, Red chose not to press the apparent advantage in deference to a maxi-
mum effort on the Central Front, and the Red salient toward Erzurum was in danger of
being cut off.
As with its predecessors, GWG ’88 was a three-sided game with a Blue team and a Red
team to represent the principal protagonists and a Green team to play other nations
and international organizations such as the United Nations, the Papacy, etc. Unlike the
previous games of the series, however, Global ’88 was a nonoperational, seminar-style
planning game. Time was frozen at D+75 and concentration was on the planning pro-
cess, with particular emphasis on the NCA level for determination of national goals
and the conduct of negotiations, the JCS for coordination and prioritization of mili-
tary operations, and the CINCs for sequential campaign planning.
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Game Objectives
In the military dimension, the objective of the 1988 Global War Game was to identify
and analyze the dynamics and leverage that military operations can bring to the war
termination process and what constraints or other effects negotiations have on theater
initiatives by the armed forces. This objective was pursued and studied in all three sce-
narios played in Global ’88. Of particular interest were the following issues considered
during game play:
• The combination and interaction of military, economic, and political instruments
that can be used to terminate a global conflict with Red while preserving the Blue
global strategic initiative.
• The combinations of regional/theater strategies that best serve the war termination
interests of Blue.
• Green (third party) diplomatic initiatives that could be beneficial to enhance the
probability of a war termination effort favorable to the West.
• The impact of logistics sustainability and industrial mobilization issues on war
termination for both Blue and Red.
• The impact of war termination on moving toward or receding from the nuclear
threshold.
Political Objectives Overview
Despite the differences in the three scenarios, Red believed that its basic goals of neu-
tralization of the FRG and the reduction or elimination of Blue influence on the Conti-
nent were within reach. Red felt generally comfortable with the military situation and
focused on a negotiation process Red believed would ratify what had been achieved in
battle. Red became very frustrated by the failure of Blue to recognize what Red saw as
“the realities of the situation.”
Blue was less dogmatic than Red in terms of objectives and had a tendency to adjust as
fortunes fluctuated on the battlefield. This was due in part to the fact that NATO was a
genuine alliance, and internal congruence among the members of the Alliance was not
always present, particularly regarding the Blue policy that stressed a global, protracted war.
When the war began, Blue objectives centered on the restoration of the territorial and
political status quo ante. Specifically, NATO fought to restore the prewar boundaries of
its members and neutrals, maintain Alliance cohesion, protect Blue and Western inter-
ests around the world, and limit the war to conventional means while eroding some
Red strategic nuclear capabilities. While there were occasional thoughts about
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enlarging these goals in the 1985, 1986, and 1987 games, they remained reasonably
consistent throughout. It should be noted that Blue did not thoroughly realize that at-
tainment of these objectives would have far-reaching consequences. For example, the
restoration of the status quo ante would mean that the Red military had been in fact
defeated, an outcome that would have repercussions in the Warsaw Pact particularly.
Further, the defeat of the Red navy would have a significant impact on Red ability to
project influence overseas, to import food, and to operate a fishing fleet. Therefore,
while return to the status quo ante seemed a relatively modest war aim, the ramifica-
tions flowing from its attainment would be profound.
In the Red-dominant scenario, Blue continued to pursue those original aims. The en-
circlement of the Blue V corps and the anticipated closure of the Red Seventh Echelon
prompted Blue to consider settling for less. Blue pondered several status quo ante “mi-
nus” outcomes, one example of which was a move in the Congress for Blue to withdraw
from Europe and adopt a “fortress America” policy. While Blue studied various possi-
bilities, it never found a palatable alternative to the status quo ante. Indeed, with no ap-
parent threat to the Blue homeland and with the NATO Alliance politically united, no
change was deemed essential by the NCA.
On the other hand, Blue believed that the Blue-dominant scenario presented the op-
portunity for something more than a return to the status quo. Having made great sac-
rifices, Blue was determined to secure a military victory and to exhaust Red. Buoyed by
the encirclement of numerous Red divisions and its access to global resources, Blue
wanted to expand objectives to the fragmentation of the Warsaw Pact. The other mem-
bers of NATO, however, were reluctant to agree.
In the stalemate scenario, Blue remained flexible in determining its final goals. With
the potential of the military situation to go either way, Blue alternatives were seen, in
theory, to range from something less than the status quo ante to something more. Blue
eventually decided to seek military advantage and acknowledged that success on the
battlefield or lack thereof would be the ultimate arbiter of war aims. In general, Blue
leaned toward the status quo ante as its bottom line but wanted more if military suc-
cess made this possible at reasonable cost.
Red and Blue approached war termination from quite different perspectives. Having
substantially achieved its military objectives, Red was anxious to terminate the war
through negotiations. Blue perceived the military situation in Europe to be disadvanta-
geous and, therefore, felt negotiations were unlikely to lead to an acceptable settlement.
Consequently, Blue believed it imperative to improve the military situation before join-
ing in a cease-fire or going to the conference table. In all scenarios, Blue always thought
in terms of “win” rather than “draw.”
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Blue Strategy and Operational Planning Overview
Blue strategy and planning was dominated by a preoccupation with the anticipated ar-
rival of the Seventh Strategic Echelon. While the Blue situation worldwide was favor-
able indeed, the status of the battle on the Central Front remained foremost in each of
the scenarios. In essence, Blue felt that losing in Europe would place Blue at a serious
disadvantage, no matter how successful elsewhere. Consequently, in each scenario, dis-
cussions took place as to the relative military value of forces deployed on the “flanks” as
opposed to their concentration on the Central Front. While many transfers of forces
were contemplated, few were actually planned.
The situation that confronted SACEUR had a number of points of similarity in each
scenario. Dominating all campaign planning, however, was the question of
sustainability. Even in the Blue-dominant scenario, logistics concerns forced Blue to re-
gard its advantage as ephemeral. This factor, combined with the closure of the Seventh
Strategic Echelon, placed Blue in a situation where the window of opportunity for of-
fensive operations was limited. This combination of factors exerted pressure on
SACEUR with regard to the negotiation process: the need to improve the military situ-
ation to enhance diplomatic bargaining power essentially required prompt offensive
action. However, because the NCA found it impossible to revise political objectives re-
gardless of the military situation, SACEUR tended to be driven toward a recommenda-
tion for tactical nuclear use.
The result was the classical mismatch of political ends and military means. Blue could
neither retreat nor modify war aims lest NATO disintegrate, did not believe it could ne-
gotiate successfully given the military situation, and appeared to lack the military
power to achieve its goals either through offensive action or at the conference table.
The Blue planning process revolved around this set of problems. As long as the NATO
Alliance was firm, there was no pressure on Blue to develop negotiating flexibility. With
nuclear use ruled out, it appeared that Blue policy of protracted conventional war was
operative, but the short-term requirements for Alliance cohesion and an offensive to
build bargaining strength ran counter to that strategy. In the final analysis, few players
were given to address the sobering issue: how to fight a war of attrition and keep that
war going until Blue industrial mobilization provided the decisive advantage in an esti-
mated D+2 years?
If the nature of the situation on the Central Front could be generalized as “military” and
of “impending crisis,” that in the Pacific might be termed “political” and “long term.” If
SACEUR’s concern was immediate military success to sustain Alliance cohesion and im-
prove its negotiating position, CINCPAC’s was restraint in conducting military initiatives
that might have adverse political consequences. Both the political and military situations
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were most favorable to Blue. The primary strategic question to be resolved was the utili-
zation of PACOM military assets. Aside from reducing his offensive capabilities,
CINCPAC raised other arguments in opposition to a “swing” of forces to the west. He ar-
gued that, given a strong Blue military presence in northeast Asia, dating from the end of
World War II, a significant drawdown of Blue forces could lead various countries to take
initiatives detrimental to the long-term interests of Blue. (All three weeks of game play in
Global ’88 saw Japan planning a rearmament program.) Economically, CINCPAC
stressed the vital importance of the Far East industrial and financial strength to the Blue
war effort and to postwar recovery. From a military perspective, it was argued that Red
should not be permitted to appear the dominant power in the region.
A central issue in CINCPAC planning was whether military initiatives against the Red
homeland and the Kuriles had a short-term effect on the war in Europe. In spite of fre-
quent Red statements to the contrary, Red was concerned about events in the Far East,
which was the second strategic priority. The question that emerged over the series was
that of Blue tying down Red military assets in the Far East. As Blue saw Red forces rede-
ploying from the region, Blue was never sure how much its actions really affected Red.
Global 1988—Scenario One
The D+64 through D+74 scripted events to attain the starting basis for the Red-
dominant scenario were as follows:
The military situation on the Central Front had turned decisively against Blue.
• Utilizing extensive operational deception, the Sixth Strategic Echelon had closed
with and defeated NATO forces on the Elbe. The Blue V Corps and one FRG division
were encircled in the vicinity of Leipzig and a 600-km gap was torn in the NATO line
in Bavaria.
• The NATO northern pincer, unable to make progress toward Stendal, had fallen back
on the Elbe-Lubeck Canal line.
• The NATO offensive north into the Netherlands had been repulsed by Red, and
NATO had failed to eliminate the Red “Bonn pocket” on the west bank of the Rhine.
• Blue was experiencing severe shortfalls in critical items such as “smart” munitions
and main battle tanks. Blue held a 1.6-to-1.0 advantage in the air.
• The Seventh Strategic Echelon was moving through western Red.
Blue forces and their allies in western Europe had achieved considerable success in the
GOLDEN SWORD counteroffensive, but were dealt a series of disastrous setbacks in the
period from D+64 to D+75. The gains of the attack, which had carried NATO forces well
into the GDR, had been eliminated. While not routed, Blue had been unable to
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establish a cohesive defense and Red had penetrated the Bonn-Frankfurt line. Multina-
tional forces of AFCENT stretched from positions on the North Sea in the Netherlands,
along the Rhine, and then through Bavaria to and along the Main River, then back to
the Swiss and Austrian borders. The failure of the recent counterattack to liberate the
bulk of the Netherlands left NORTHAG defending south of the Neder Rhine at Rotter-
dam and Arnhem. This and other recent setbacks had required the extension of
NORTHAG perimeter over hundreds of additional kilometers. The NORTHAG area of
responsibility (AOR) met that of CENTAG in the vicinity of Mainz.
Operations out of Jutland had included a four-nation counteroffensive which advanced
on Wittenberge but was then thrown back to the Elbe-Lubeck Canal line by elements
of the Sixth Strategic Echelon. The combination of remaining Danish, Norwegian, UK,
and Blue units provided a sizable force capable of conducting defensive operations.
CENTAG’s primary concern was with two forward corps, the V Blue and the III FRG.
The crushing Red counterattack that reversed prior NATO gains placed both these
corps in extremis. The V Blue was encircled and on the verge of total collapse, while the
elements of the III FRG had either been destroyed or were encircled by forces of the
Sixth Strategic Echelon. The NATO right flank in CENTAG was in a state of shambles.
The View from Blue
Political. The deteriorating military situation made the NCA’s position one of ex-
treme difficulty. On the one hand, Blue needed some kind of military success to sup-
port any negotiating position, but military advisors took the position that tactical
nuclear weapons would be required to attain the required result on the battlefield.
Congress, on the other hand, which had turned distinctly hawkish when the news from
the front was good, now supported a virtual surrender and a retreat to a vague “fortress
America” concept. Further, the NCA had to deal with NATO members who wanted the
war to end without the use of nuclear weapons and were resentful of the large Blue
commitment of forces to other theaters.
The NCA formulated the following set of Blue options and they provided the basis for
discussion at all levels of command:
1. Return to the status quo ante without use of nuclear weapons.
2. Return to the status quo ante with nuclear weapons use.
3. Preserve as much of the territory of the FRG as possible.
4. Settle for a continental defense line west of (outside) the FRG.
5. Develop a new Blue political/military order with a focus outside Europe.
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The NCA considered that options 4 and 5 were simply not politically acceptable and
tended to dismiss any tactical nuclear option for two reasons, in spite of SACEUR’s vig-
orously pressed recommendation for such use. First, he believed that the time frame in
which tactical nuclear weapons would have utility had passed, and second, the NCA
was concerned that the Red response to Blue limited use would be broad-based and re-
sult in Blue losing the war. The choice and implementation of the remaining option(s)
was, essentially, a military question.
Military. Taken on a worldwide basis, the Blue situation was favorable. Red was essentially
isolated, and a massive global coalition had been constructed to support Blue/NATO. How-
ever, Blue faced the imminent possibility of collapse of the European theater. The problem
was to sustain a viable military presence on the Continent until negotiations could termi-
nate the war successfully or sufficient global military and industrial mobilization occurred
to overwhelm Red. While Blue retained a 1.6 to 1 air superiority, Red had regained all of the
territory lost to the Blue GOLDEN SWORD counteroffensive, the V Corps was surrounded,
and Red was moving 21 divisions of the Seventh Strategic Echelon toward the FLOT.
While the Blue retreat was organized, Blue forces had not been able to establish a viable de-
fensive line to hold Red.
SACEUR was tasked by the NCA to develop a conventional option to regain territory to buy
time for and provide a basis for substantive negotiations. The following alternatives were
discussed:
• Retake the Netherlands and the Ruhr (nuclear use open).
• Establish a defensive line in the FRG and then either continue a war of attrition or
negotiate a cease-fire.
• Use nuclear weapons to improve the military situation or to compel Red to withdraw to
prewar boundaries.
The fact of the matter was that the SACEUR analysis of the military situation did not sup-
port the ability of Blue/NATO forces to retake any territory in Europe, nor was there much
basis for believing that Blue could win a war of attrition given the lead time required for in-
dustrial mobilization. The nuclear option, as noted above, appeared to have limited utility
and risked Red escalation. Given these circumstances, SACEUR proposed to the NCA the
“3+” plan based on the NCA’s third option to “preserve as much of the FRG as possible.”
The salient features of this proposal were:
• Form a defensive line along the Rhine and thence to Munich, which, it was estimated,
could hold for nine to fourteen days.
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• Establish another defensive line running from Lubeck to Emden. It was estimated
that this line could be held for 30 days.
• Use deep interdiction strikes against the Red LOCs, targeting in particular the
Seventh Strategic Echelon.
In order to implement this plan, the following shifts in assets to support the Central
Front would be required:
• Transfer of the three CVBGs from the Norwegian fjords.
• All TACAIR, a total of 800+ aircraft including the CV A/C.
• The BBBG from the Caribbean.
• B-52s from the SIOP, conventionally armed.
• TLAM(C).
• Blue USMC forces deployed in Norway to bolster the Lubeck-Emden line.
While this was not entirely satisfactory, SACEUR felt it was the best that could be done.
The surrounded V Corps would have to be sacrificed, and, by falling back in the center
and south, the line could be consolidated with prospects of holding out for two weeks.
The longer term was uncertain, with the speed of Blue/Japan industrial mobilization a
major determining factor.
CINCPAC viewed the situation in Asia with considerable confidence. Theater objectives
had been achieved, and the CINC sought ways to aid the global war effort in general
and make a contribution to the beleaguered Central Front in particular. The theater
commander was, to some extent, faced with a “Hobson’s Choice.” Aggressive use of as-
sets was required lest they be “swung” to Europe. However, offensive operations faced
the problem of “attrition without replacement,” as all noncommitted forces were prior-
itized for the Central Front.
CINCPAC’s objectives were:
• Wear down Red.
• Seize additional islands in the Kurile chain.
• Destroy the remainder of the Red Far Eastern Fleet.
• Support the ROK against the DPRK.
• Encourage the cooperation of the PRC against Red.
• Encourage deeper involvement of Japan.
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CINCPAC believed that Vladivostok was too heavily defended to attack and proposed the
seizure of three more islands in the Kuriles to cut the SLOCs to Petropavlovsk, facilitate
ASW operations in the Sea of Okhotsk, and divert Red forces aiding the DPRK. The JCS ap-
proved this plan.
CINCPAC’s major concerns were political. Japan was contemplating a more assertive
role in the region, both as a military power and as a source of capital. This as well as
the possibility of a reunited Korea would have substantial impact on the relatively sta-
ble relationships that had existed since the end of the Korean War.
The View from Red
Political. The Red perspective on the war was somewhat less complex than that of
Blue. Essentially, the VGK believed that the war had been won. All that remained was to
convince Blue/NATO of this truth, but if they failed to grasp this reality, the Seventh
Strategic Echelon would secure military victory.
Red, however, did have some concerns. First, while Red fortunes appeared favorable on
the Central Front, there were sufficient vulnerabilities and uncertainties to put pressure
on Red to end the war and to do it expeditiously. A key emerging problem was agricul-
ture. Never a strong point of the Red regime, wartime dislocations were certainly going
to impact the winter wheat harvest and probably spring planting as well. Further, with
so much of the national transportation assets devoted to the military logistical effort,
food distribution, a chronic problem in peacetime, had become exacerbated. In more
general terms, the cost of the war to the Red economy had been enormous, and the
sooner the war ended, the quicker this drain could be abated.
Among the major international uncertainties was the PRC. That nation had provided
assistance to Blue in a number of ways, particularly since the invasion of the ROK by
the DPRK. China’s large military potential and the historic enmity between the two na-
tions weighed on the VGK.
Finally, Red did not want a long war. Along with the factors noted above, Red was
aware that the eventual mobilization of the Free World economies would doom Red
militarily. Consequently, Red needed an end to the war—preferably by negotiation, but
by whatever means—quickly. The problem for Red was to find a lever to bring this
about, and there was substantial frustration in the VGK over the Red inability to obtain
a cease-fire. Red groped for solutions; the possibility of holding the V Corps hostage
instead of destroying it was discussed. However, the fact remained that while Red
might win militarily in Europe, Red could not compel a Blue capitulation, and a pro-
tracted war with a Blue that dominated the oceans could blockade Red and keep its
fishing fleets in port—a prospect Red did not look forward to.
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Military. Red felt extremely confident in terms of the military situation. Most military
objectives had been achieved, the Seventh Strategic Echelon was en route, and even
Blue tactical nuclear use was viewed as inadequate to reverse the favorable outlook on
the Central Front. Consequently, much of the General Staff thinking focused on initia-
tives that could facilitate negotiating success.
A major planned initiative was to try to demonstrate to Blue that their homeland was
not invulnerable and thus develop pressure from public opinion and Congress for seri-
ous negotiations. Red therefore decided to launch conventional “demonstration” at-
tacks on the Blue mainland, timed to occur just prior to a Presidential address to the
nation. One strike was to be delivered by an Akula-class submarine against military
and aerospace facilities on the West Coast. Meanwhile, Spetsnaz teams based in Cuba
were tasked to destroy railroad facilities and marine terminals in North Carolina.
Global 1988—Scenario Two
The D+64 through D+74 scripted events to attain the starting basis for the Blue domi-
nant scenario were as follows:
The military situation on the Central Front had turned markedly in favor of Blue.
• The Sixth Strategic Echelon had failed to break the NATO line on the Elbe, and the
Blue/NATO forces were advancing on Stendal, which had been taken by NATO
airborne assault.
• The NATO northern pincer had broken though Red defenses and was advancing on
Stendal from the northwest.
• The imminent linkup of these Blue/NATO forces in Stendal would cut the LOCs to 60
Red divisions (attrited to about 32 division equivalents) between the Elbe and the Rhine.
• The NATO offensive north into the Netherlands had failed to gain ground.
• NATO had, essentially, eliminated the “Bonn pocket” on the west bank of the Rhine.
• Blue maintained a 1.6-to-1.0 ratio of air superiority over the FLOT; Red was
assembling the Seventh Strategic Echelon in western Red.
The Blue military outlook on the Central Front had swung from the precarious brink
of defeat and force exhaustion of D+42 to a more positive posture of cohesion and sta-
bility because of recent military success achieved by the mutually supporting counter-
offensives conducted by AFNORTH and AFCENT.
The situation in AFCENT found the NATO Alliance holding positions from the North
Sea in the Netherlands through the southern FRG to the Swiss and Austrian frontiers,
with a sizable portion of the forces maintaining a salient in the GDR. The Northern
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Army Group had strengthened its defensive line from a northern anchor at Kampen,
thence to the Rhine at Arnhem, and then south along the west bank of the Rhine to the
confluence with the Main at Mainz. The air campaign of the combined NATO air
forces in the Central Region had achieved some measure of dominance over those of
the WTVD commander.
In the Jutland area of NORTHAG operations, Danish, Norwegian, UK, and Blue forces
represented six divisions and approximately 18 brigade equivalents of combat power.
While these forces could sustain their positions for the next few weeks, reinforcements
would be required for the execution of subsequent offensive operations. In the air, as in
CENTAG, NATO maintained a degree of air superiority over Jutland and the North
Sea. However, air defense of the area was a problem. The lack of an effective SAM net-
work forced heavy reliance on all-weather interceptors, which were in short supply.
The View from Blue
Political. The second scenario of the 1988 Global War Game found Blue with a tactical
advantage that the military believed marginal and transitory, and which the NCA saw
as an opportunity to be exploited. This led to a tension that permeated the strategic
planning process for the “Blue-dominant” scenario as an aggressive President demanded
offensive options from a concerned military that sought to conserve territorial gains.
The President focused particularly on what the world would look like after the war. He
told SACEUR: “You have a temporary victory on the Central Front and a strong advan-
tage throughout the rest of the world.” He then asked, “How can we use this situation
to our advantage?” The Presidential view of war aims had much to do with his desire
for offensive operations. He wanted to end the war with all Red forces back in their
homeland, self-determination for the nations of eastern Europe, and the demilitariza-
tion of the GDR. He did not view the military situation extant conducive to the attain-
ment of those ends.
The NCA gave the JCS three broad options to consider:
• Seek further military advantage by accepting high short-term risk; seek a
fundamental change in the world balance of power.
• Consolidate military dominance by accepting moderate near-term risk; maximize
diplomatic leverage to gain a Europe more Western than at the start of the war.
• Consolidate military gains to those that can be defended with minimum risk over the
long term (strategic defense); utilize protracted diplomacy to achieve status quo ante.
When SACEUR proposed the consolidation option combined with active defense and
expedited negotiations to terminate hostilities or the alternative of withdrawal to
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France or beyond, he was taking into consideration a sustainability problem the Presi-
dent did not accept. The President rejected the SACEUR defensive recommendation
and directed him to develop an offensive option and to define his requirements.
The NCA was not unaware that risk was attendant to this position. However, the Presi-
dent believed that the logistical situation, coupled with a parochial perspective on the
part of the Blue theater commanders, contributed to a pessimism that prevented them
from exploiting the present advantage. Hungary had dropped out of the war and Ru-
mania, Czechoslovakia, and Poland appeared to be wavering. If Blue could collapse the
Red sixty-division pocket, the NCA believed dissolution of the Warsaw Pact might re-
sult. Further, the President was convinced that the logistical shortfall could be over-
come by pooling free world resources toward that aim. He was so confident in this
regard that he assured an extremely skeptical SACEUR that he could count on his lo-
gistical needs being met.
Military. The SACEUR perspective was dominated by two concerns:
• The anticipated imminent arrival of the Seventh Strategic Echelon, the 27 divisions
of which would shift the initiative to Red.
• The estimate that Blue forces had 21–30 days of sustainability if maintaining an
active defense—less than that if offensive operations were to be conducted.
Other SACEUR concerns involved the sixty-division Red “pocket.” Analysis showed
that the so-called “pocket” was so large that it was in fact a series of multiple “fronts”
occupying most of the FRG. Further, air superiority existed only over NATO-occupied
territory. Air parity could be said to exist over the NSWP countries, and Blue air losses
were running at 40 percent over the Red homeland. Two-thirds of Red combat aircraft
were outside the WTVD, and the current air force superiority ratio of Blue in CENTAG
was seen as tenuous. What this meant, as far as SACEUR was concerned, was that Blue
air could not stop the Seventh Strategic Echelon, collapse the Red “pocket,” gain air su-
periority over the NSWP, and destroy important targets in the Red homeland.
SACEUR’s outlook, therefore, was that while all NATO territory had not been re-
gained and access to Berlin not assured, GOLDEN SWORD had been a resounding
NATO success and had placed the Alliance in the most favorable negotiating position
it was likely to have.
SACEUR concluded that offensive operations anywhere (North Norway, Central Front,
or Balkans) would endanger current positions in the other areas. Therefore the recom-
mendation to the DPC was as follows:
• Consolidate and actively defend in all regions.
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• Seek out and destroy the logistical support for the sixty “surrounded” Red divisions
and delay the arrival of the Seventh Echelon.
• Utilize deception operations.
• Expedite negotiations.
• If negotiations break down, use nuclear weapons against the Seventh Echelon when
it arrives, or withdraw to French territory or beyond.
There appeared to be a degree of confusion regarding planning in the CINCPAC AOR.
The Navy interpreted the NCA’s instructions to mean the continued execution of the
global strategy they had been pursuing since the war started. Therefore, the theater
commander made plans to support ROK initiatives with amphibious landings in the
DPRK, with a longer range objective of threatening Vladivostok, urging Japan to take
greater responsibility for air defense, and to carry out other aggressive actions when
and where appropriate. However, the President made it clear that what he really meant
was to use global assets to win on the Central Front, and he was not interested in a lot
of “meaningless” activity in other theaters.
The View from Red
Political. The Red political viewpoint changed substantially during the play of the
Blue-dominant scenario. At the outset, the General Secretary was anxious to negotiate.
He evidenced a distrust for the Red military, which he believed should have concluded
the war long before D+75; yet not only was it still engaged but was fighting at a tactical
disadvantage as well. He ordered the General Staff to put their plans on hold for ten
days while he pursued a diplomatic solution. He felt relatively comfortable doing so,
based on a VGK appraisal that Blue could hold in place but do little else.
The General Secretary wished to reach a cease-fire agreement as soon as possible and
put forth a “bottom line” proposal that he thought would be acceptable to Blue. He was
taken aback and frustrated by the outright rejection of his offer and by the Blue refusal
to even negotiate. When a subsequent diplomatic initiative designed to fragment NATO
was unavailing, the General Secretary resolved on a prompt military solution.
There was unanimous agreement among the VGK that hostilities must be terminated
before the “long war” phase was reached. Red believed that Blue industrial capacity
combined with Red isolation would doom Red to defeat. Red frustration over failed ne-
gotiations with Blue, a sense that Blue had decided to seek a military solution, and the
perceived requirement to end the war quickly led the General Secretary to declare the
sixty divisions in the “pocket” a “Red vital interest” and, therefore, that Red was pre-
pared to use tactical nuclear weapons to preserve that army’s integrity.
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Military. The Red General Staff was optimistic regarding the situation on the Central
Front. The current situation was seen as but a temporary tactical disadvantage, soon to
be redressed by the arrival of the Seventh Strategic Echelon supported by an additional
350 combat aircraft drawn from other military districts. The Military Intelligence Di-
rectorate (GRU) estimates of NATO force accretions saw the possibility of a maximum
of ten new divisions in an undefined time frame. The General Staff saw no requirement
for nuclear use.
Red concerns focused on the safe passage of the Seventh Echelon forces to the front
and the preservation of the divisions in the “pocket.” Heavy use of chemical weapons
was planned to facilitate both objectives. Initially, Blue air operational capability was to
be decreased by heavy and repeated use of CW, both persistent and nonpersistent.
Scuds were to be used as the delivery system, and Red was planning for attacks over a
fifty-day period, if necessary. Artillery would be used to pour chemicals on the northern
and southern pincers of the encircling Blue forces for at least several days. Further, Red
planned to mass forces to open the rail LOC south of Berlin. An initial force correlation
of 4 to 1 was intended for this operation, with chemical weapons utilized there as well.
Concentration on the Central Front was total. If necessary, all peripheral theaters
would be stripped of forces and aircraft to provide an Eighth Strategic Echelon. The
General Staff had identified 30–40 divisions that could be moved west from the Chi-
nese border. Under this proposal, one Red division would remain at the PRC frontier to
act as a “trip wire,” with a Red promise of nuclear retaliation if it were attacked. The
General Secretary believed that Red war aims had been achieved and his task was to
end hostilities as rapidly as possible.
Global 1988—Scenario Three
The D+64 through D+74 scripted events to attain the starting basis for the stalemate
scenario were designed so that neither Blue nor Red had a clear military advantage.
• The Red Sixth Strategic Echelon and Blue/NATO forces along the Elbe had fought
each other to a standstill. While unit cohesion remained intact on both sides, neither
possessed offensive capability.
• The northern NATO pincer, objective Stendal, had stalled, and a weak but cohesive
defensive position had been established in the vicinity of Wittenberge.
• The NATO offensive north into the Netherlands had failed, and NORTHAG was
forced to consolidate in defensive positions along the Neder-Rhine line.
• All Red forces had been cleared from the “Bonn pocket” on the west bank of the Rhine.
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• Blue/NATO air was in a high state of readiness to aid in the defense against any
renewed Red offensive and to provide limited offensive air operations.
• The Seventh Strategic Echelon was assembling in western Red.
The land situation in Europe was relatively favorable to Blue because of the recent suc-
cess achieved by the mutually supporting counteroffensives conducted by AFNORTH
and AFCENT. NATO forces in the Central Region were holding a stable line, and the
front from Rostock to Vienna was essentially quiet. While the WP had experienced
heavy attrition, the balance of conventional power on the ground lay with Red, offset,
however, by NATO air superiority.
The FLOT in AFCENT ran from the North Sea in the Netherlands along the Rhine and
through Bavaria to Leipzig in the GDR, then back to the Swiss and Austrian frontiers.
The failure of recent counterattacks in the Netherlands had left NORTHAG defending
south of the Neder-Rhine at Rotterdam to Arnhem, then south along the Rhine to a
junction with CENTAG at the confluence of the Main.
The north flank was held by the small but well-entrenched elements of the I Nether-
lands Corps. To the right of the Dutch, the Belgian Corps, while relatively light, was ca-
pable of defending well-prepared positions and could be relied on to deter any crossing
of the Neder-Rhine. Next in line, the Blue XXX Corps held a small bridgehead on the
north bank of the Neder-Rhine. It sustained heavy casualties in the unsuccessful at-
tempt to liberate North Holland and, while capable of defending for the next week to
ten days, would require reinforcement. Various other forces along the Rhine contrib-
uted to defense in depth. Overall, the CENTAG posture was a relatively good one, capa-
ble of defending current positions over the coming weeks. However, any offensive
operations would require reinforcements.
The multinational force based on Jutland and Zealand had made substantial gains over
the last two weeks of the war. The XVIII Blue Corps, composed of two MEFs, one ar-
mored, one mechanized, and one airborne division, and two heavy brigades, had taken
Rostock. However, the current lines of this corps were stretched thin, and any apprecia-
ble pressure could not be held for more than a week without reinforcements.
The View from Blue
Political. The NCA began the stalemate scenario trying to ascertain what military op-
tions were available to improve the Blue negotiating position. The first issue that had to
be resolved was that of sustainability of the NATO forces. The NCA believed that until
they were able to know the ramifications of the logistical situation, they would be un-
able to delineate offensive options and did not want to engage in immediate,
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substantive negotiations if military initiatives were available that could improve the
Blue posture.
The President did, however, state the Blue objectives:
• Maintain the cohesion of the NATO Alliance.
• Restore prewar boundaries.
• Fracture the Warsaw Pact and neutralize Eastern Europe.
• Advance Blue/Western vital interests worldwide and amputate Red global reach.
• Avoid the use of nuclear weapons except to:
º prevent Red victory in Europe
º counter massive Red CW use.
• Initiate full-scale Alliance economic mobilization as a part of “long-war” strategy.
The President was entirely committed to a long-war concept and worked to facilitate it,
diplomatically and logistically, while trying to develop a military strategy that would
permit it to succeed. Congressional resolutions indicated solid support for the admin-
istration and the military and public opinion polls showed a majority endorsing the
President’s war aims. In the Far East, Japan and the PRC were forming a North Asia Se-
curity Council, and China had agreed to provide bases to Blue for limited attacks on
Red. Global allies were pressed for military assistance in terms of men, supplies, and
the buyback of military equipment previously provided by Blue. While it appeared that
NATO was divided on negotiating objectives, this was due in part to the reluctance of
the Blue chief executive to be specific until military options had been determined. In-
formation provided by the Director of Central Intelligence lent credence to the validity
of the long-war policy. The Red homeland was essentially destitute of trucks, the har-
vest was in danger, and famine was a distinct possibility.
The question of military strategy was finally resolved in favor of an offensive. The Pres-
ident had initially been opposed to this course of action, fearing it would be wasteful in
terms of supplies. He acceded only because he became convinced that a defensive strat-
egy would result in military defeat.
Military. SACEUR viewed the situation in Europe with far more concern than ap-
peared evident in the NCA and Congress. Sustainability was the central issue. A JCS as-
sessment showed that NATO forces had experienced significant losses in capability,
particularly because of shortages of ammunition and major end items, such as tanks.
Air sortie generation was dependent on fuel distribution capacity, and, while ports
were open, infrastructure damage restricted the flow of POL. Significant resupply from
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CONUS would exceed D+100. Taking these factors into consideration, the JCS esti-
mated that NATO could sustain an offensive for from one to three weeks, could hold in
place for three to six weeks, and fight a delaying action for six to eight weeks.
It was in part because of these sustainability problems that the use of tactical nuclear
weapons was reviewed. SACEUR recognized that retaliatory strikes would be costly but
believed that there would be a “window of opportunity” created for negotiations. He
proposed an offensive that envisioned the use of twenty-five 70kt nuclear weapons, but
planned to proceed with offensive operations even if nuclear release was not granted.
SACEUR believed that even a temporary advance was better than standing on the de-
fensive. He requested the transfer of other assets to Europe, which raised the issue of
theater priorities. CINCPAC was extremely concerned that moving the CVBGs could
lead to a questioning of Blue political and military resolve and lead to a perception that
Red was the dominant military power in the region. Similarly, SACLANT would not ac-
cede to the movement of the three CVBGs from the Norwegian fjords because of the
priority of SLOC protection.
At the insistence of NATO, SACEUR prepared a plan for a strategic defensive dubbed
Operation OSTRICH. This plan was based on instructions to disregard initial mission
guidance and to select the best defensive position that would be both to the east of
France and would include a portion of the GDR. SACEUR developed the plan but was
adamant in opposition to it. In the event, SACEUR’s offensive plan was approved by the
NCA and the DPC, although both were extremely concerned about escalatory ramifica-
tions. SACEUR was granted “conditional nuclear release,” but launch authority was with-
held. Convinced that doing something was better than doing nothing, SACEUR was
prepared to try to close the northern and southern pincers at Stendal, with or without nu-
clear weapons.
CINCPAC’s fundamental objection to the “swing” of the CVBG force has been noted
above. Further, CINCPAC believed that the crisis on the Central Front would be re-
solved, one way or the other, before they could get there. The theater commander was
also mindful that a perceived reduction in Blue interest in the Far East could lead to
unilateral initiatives on the part of other states in the region that might seriously com-
plicate postwar relations. CINCPAC was very sensitive to the political, economic, and
military relationships that would be critical in sustaining and enhancing Blue worldwide
influence. It was the CINC’s position that an unquestioned Blue security commitment
during the war would be essential to regional stability and access when hostilities ended.
Therefore, CINCPAC proposed the following potential options for his forces:
• Consolidate and declare victory.
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• Use two CVBGs and one BBBG to support the ROK.
• Capture two more of the Kurile Islands.
• Launch an attack on the Red fishing and merchant fleets to complicate Red postwar
problems.
The View from Red
Political. The VGK viewed the situation at the outset of the “stalemate” scenario
with confidence. It believed that Red was in a position of military superiority and a
primary objective—the neutralization of the FRG—had been accomplished. As Red
forces occupied almost all of West German territory, the VGK sought to ratify mili-
tary success through negotiations with Blue while keeping the military pressure on.
To this end, all military effort was to be concentrated on the Central Front at the ex-
pense of other theaters.
Red opened negotiations with Blue and was initially quite optimistic. The VGK ac-
cepted an initiative by the UN Secretary General, pressed for bilateral meetings with
France and the FRG, and tried to involve Blue in substantive negotiations. When the bi-
lateral efforts failed and Blue refused to move from the initial position, Red, clearly
frustrated and feeling isolated, took the following actions:
• Withdrew all existing proposals.
• Refused to negotiate under UN auspices.
• Refused a Blue offer for a “walk in the woods.”
• Established a provisional socialist government in the occupied FRG.
• Withdrew French immunity from nuclear and chemical attack.
Red was so confident of military success that it was not seriously concerned with Blue
tactical nuclear use. The VGK agreed that as long as such use by Blue was not decisive,
Red would not retaliate.
Military. The General Staff believed that Red had a decided military advantage over
Blue. Aware of the potential for Blue to attempt a double envelopment, Red was not
concerned because of the belief that Blue lacked the staying power, even if successful, to
sustain an encirclement long enough to discomfort Red forces to the west. Further, the
closure of the Seventh Echelon and, if necessary, the mobilization of an eighth, would
unquestionably seal the military victory.
Contrary to Blue, Red had a short war, Central Front focus. Although defeated at sea
and on the defensive in other sectors, Red felt comfortable in moving whatever assets
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were necessary to Germany. Matters in other theaters could be taken care of once the
war on the Central Front was concluded.
Again, even Blue theater nuclear use did not greatly concern Red. The General Staff was
convinced that by the time Blue/NATO could make a nuclear decision, it would be too
late because Blue would lack the conventional capability to follow up and exploit. Con-
sequently, the General Staff faced its tasking from the VGK with considerable
confidence.
The Negotiating Process
The primary focus of GWG ’88 was “to identify and analyze the dynamics and leverage
that military operations in all theaters can bring to a war termination negotiation pro-
cess and what constraints or other effects negotiations have on theater military opera-
tions.” The stated political objectives of the belligerents are the starting point for an
analysis of negotiations. These can be summarized as follows:
Blue/NATO
• To restore the territorial status quo ante of allies and neutrals and maintain the
cohesion of NATO.
• To protect Blue interests worldwide, but especially in the Caribbean, Latin America,
the Pacific Basin, the Indian Ocean, and the Persian Gulf.
• To keep the conflict at the lowest possible level of intensity by avoiding the use of
nuclear weapons and destroying Red nuclear capabilities through conventional means.
• To defeat Red conventional forces while minimizing Alliance casualties.
Red/Warsaw Pact
• To solve the “German problem” once and for all on Red terms—a demilitarized
Germany.
• To destroy or seriously weaken NATO by demonstrating the inability of the Alliance
to protect its most important continental member.
• To diminish or eliminate Blue influence in Europe.
• To attain these objectives while avoiding escalation to nuclear war.
Negotiations to D+64
Demands for war termination began immediately following the outbreak of hostilities.
The government of India sponsored a plea from the “nonaligned” movement for an
immediate cease-fire. Then, and as the Warsaw Pact invasion of Austria unfolded, the
government of Yugoslavia presented a more comprehensive proposal that called for the
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withdrawal of forces to premobilization positions (those as of 1 November 1990) im-
mediately following a cease-fire. Subsequent calls for negotiations evoked the following
Red proposal on behalf of the Warsaw Pact.
“In contrast to NATO’s apparent aim of prolonging the war, reestablishing a militarized
West German regime, and overthrowing democratically elected governments in eastern
Europe, we seek to end the fighting as soon as possible and eliminate the conditions
that gave rise to the current conflict. We seek neither the destruction of free societies
nor the occupation of territory and we are determined to make a breakthrough for
peace. Accordingly, we put forward the following proposal:
• That both sides agree to a cease-fire in place and tactical withdrawals of 5km by both
sides to assure that military incidents do not occur.
• That both sides agree to begin negotiations in Geneva at the foreign minister level
that have the following agreed central objective:
• Establishment of a West Germany and an East Germany that would be demilitarized,
belonging to no military alliances and having no military forces on their territory
and no indigenous military forces beyond those required for maintaining internal
order and the security of their borders.
“If the NATO side will agree to this proposal, we are prepared to begin immediately to
implement a mutual withdrawal from western Europe and other theaters of all Pact
and NATO forces introduced since 1 November 1990 and to complete such withdrawals
within 60 days. Agreement to this proposal would also set the stage for the discussion
of further objectives:
• The abolition of all military alliances.
• The reduction of conventional forces from the Atlantic to the Urals to levels well
below those existing on 1 November 1990.
• The elimination of all tactical and medium-range NATO and Red nuclear weapons
from Europe and the surrounding seas.
“It should be clear from this proposal that we do not seek to impose our will on any-
one. Under its terms, Germans and other peoples would resume their rightful place as
sovereign masters of their own territories. It should also be clear that if NATO seeks to
impose by military actions the withdrawal of Pact forces that we offer to carry out
peacefully, it can only be for the purpose of reimposing militarism and revanchism in
the center of our continent. This we will not tolerate.” (This proposal is quoted at
length because the language and terms are typical of the Red negotiating position
throughout this series.)
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Blue and its NATO partners totally rejected the substance of the Red proposal, but
agreed to negotiate. On 15 December 1990, the President of Blue announced that he
was sending his Secretary of State to Geneva to negotiate “a return to pre-hostilities
boundaries as provided for in the Yugoslav Proposal.” By 18 December the negotiations
had made no progress. In a hotline message to the Red General Secretary, the President
stated that “cease-fire in place without essential guarantees of immediate, phased with-
drawal to the pre-hostilities lines” was unacceptable and that “we will never stop fight-
ing until the pre-war boundaries have been re-established.”
The week before Christmas, 1990, the Pope and the United Nations General Secretary
proposed a 48-hour cease-fire over Christmas. This initiative was rejected by both
sides—Red because of concern that a pause would break their offensive momentum,
and Blue out of fear that any halt would result in a de facto cease-fire in place.
The week following Christmas, a modalities working group consisting of representa-
tives from Blue, Red, and NATO, chaired by the Secretary General of the United Nations,
was formed to work out the details of a phased withdrawal as a precondition for a
cease-fire. The terms of reference used by the working group were:
• A phased withdrawal of Warsaw Pact forces combined with a cease-fire.
º Withdrawal to begin within 24 hours of agreement and completed within 10–30 days.
º The goal of withdrawal by phases to be restoration of prehostilities borders.
º No flights or hostile acts to take place in or over the buffer zone to be created as
part of the time-phased withdrawal.
• A commission to be formed composed of representatives of those forces in contact to:
º Investigate incidents reported to the commission.
º Establish “police” or specially designated units contributed by the combatants to
patrol the buffer zone phased withdrawal areas.
The working group for these modalities was to assume that a cease-fire agreement
would be agreed to and determine the procedure that would facilitate a withdrawal
should the principals resolve outstanding points of disagreement, such as the posture
of reinforcements. Blue proposed possible withdrawal lines, but by D+48 military
events rendered the proposal obsolete.
As the Warsaw Pact advance stalled in the Benelux, and the NATO 1st Allied Army
counterattack succeeded, war aims and consequently negotiating positions became
less well defined for both Blue and Red. Escalation to chemical warfare and changing
peripheral strategies, with their theater-oriented political considerations, tended to
cloud the intentions of the opposing camps, not only in Europe but globally.
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The success of the NATO 1st Allied Army thrust was a cause of substantial concern to
the Red leadership. After some vacillation and much discussion within the VGK, Red
surmised that the NATO attack was a last-resort effort that would have to be contained.
Upon reaching this conclusion, several Red planning adjustments were made:
• A decidedly more aggressive posture in peripheral theaters.
• A delay in Central Front offensive operations until a more favorable correlation of
forces was created with the arrival of the Sixth Strategic Echelon.
By D+64, Red leaders had regained confidence in the strength of the European position
and, further, felt that implementation of pending initiatives in other theaters would en-
hance the Red negotiating stance.
The Blue/NATO military position in Europe had indeed improved, and this led to a
rather euphoric mindset at D+64. The successful counteroffensive had helped to bol-
ster Alliance morale, but the self-assessed improbability of sustaining those gains much
beyond D+70 did not translate into an impetus for timely and aggressive negotiations.
What “window of opportunity” for successful negotiations NATO might have had
while Red was trying to adjust to the reality of the success of GOLDEN SWORD was
quickly lost. However tardy, the Blue President requested a projection of the NATO
post–D+70 position in preparation for exploiting the recent military gains by reviving
what was, in essence, the earlier Yugoslav proposal.
Consequently, D+64 found both sides far from any mutual accommodation over how
to end the war. Although plagued with uncertainty over each opponent’s nuclear
threshold, particularly after both had used chemical weapons, the combatants felt that
the other was “on the ropes” and that near term events on the field battle would en-
hance leverage at the bargaining table. NATO was less confident than the Warsaw Pact,
but neither side was convinced that all political objectives could be realized by
diplomacy.
Negotiations in Global 1988
Introduction
Red, with its military objectives secured or apparently within reach, sought a termina-
tion of the war that would ratify Warsaw Pact military success and limit losses. From a
military perspective, Red, at D+75, was in about as favorable a position (Red-dominant
scenario) as it had been at D+46, yet had sustained substantial losses due to the inabil-
ity to translate military conquest into political victory. Red in fact had become quite
frustrated trying to persuade Blue to accept what Red perceived to be inevitable.
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Blue generally believed that military success was prerequisite to satisfactory negotia-
tions. Blue viewed neutralization of the FRG as equivalent to the end of the NATO Alli-
ance and was convinced that Red would settle for nothing less. As long as the NATO
Alliance remained politically united and the Blue homeland was not threatened, it ap-
peared that Blue would continue to spurn negotiations in favor of a protracted conven-
tional war strategy. Blue also believed that a cease-fire in place would be the equivalent
of a Red victory, as Blue felt that public opinion would not countenance resumption of
hostilities should subsequent negotiations fail.
Both Blue and Red, then, believed that military success was the key to political victory.
Red, having achieved most of the military objectives, was eager to negotiate. Blue saw
the perceived military advantage of Red, both in terms of position and the closure of
the Seventh Echelon, precluding any success at the bargaining table. As negotiations
showed little prospect of fruition, the focus shifted to other options. Both sides saw the
nuclear option as counterproductive, while conventional war, “soldiering on,” gave
Blue the prospect, however remote, of regaining parity or of attaining victory.
The crux of the matter, however, was that the minimum conditions for war termination
for both sides, or even any compromise positions that were reasonably available, were
mutually exclusive. Given this circumstance, negotiations were essentially certain to fail.
Red-Dominant Scenario
With Red dominant on the Central Front, Blue was unable to develop a bargaining
strategy and concluded that circumstances did not provide a basis for negotiations. The
Blue NCA considered five options ranging from a territorial status quo ante to a new
Blue political/military order with focus away from Europe. However, it was perceived
that negotiating from a position of less than military superiority by Blue was impossi-
ble, and any cease-fire under such conditions was viewed as surrender. Further, any
cease-fire would give a short-term resupply advantage to Red. Blue believed that, given
the conditions postulated by the scenario, some substantial military achievement would
be necessary to allow successful negotiations. The major negotiating strategies for Blue,
and indeed for Red, were played out on the battlefield and in private bilateral discussions,
not at the general conference table. Blue dominance in theaters other than Central Europe
did not appear to provide sufficient leverage for Blue to use in that theater.
Red felt that in this scenario it had achieved its war aims and sought to conclude nego-
tiations that would give political ratification to its military achievements. Although Red
put forward a very demanding set of proposals, Red was willing to compromise, a
premise that Blue never tested. Influenced by this set of proposals and a self-perception
of a hopelessly weak negotiating position, Blue walked out.
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The salient points of the initial Red proposal were:
• Dissolution of NATO.
• Restoration of prewar boundaries for FRG and GDR.
• FRG army abolished.
• Demilitarized zone in Benelux.
• Repatriation of forces.
• Return of occupied Kuriles to Red.
• Reduction in Blue nuclear forces.
• Separate negotiations with France over nuclear weapons.
The “bottom line” for Red was actually:
• A demilitarized FRG.
• Blue out of Europe (or, possibly, just Blue nuclear forces out of Europe).
• Return of the Kuriles.
The minimum criteria for a negotiated settlement developed by Blue were:
• Freedom for the FRG and Netherlands.
• Continuation of the NATO Alliance.
• Blue forces to remain on the Continent.
Negotiations did resume, with Blue under the impression that Red had accepted these
minimum conditions as a basis for negotiations. This was not the case, and the Secre-
tary of State endeavored to sidestep the critical issue with a cease-fire proposal subject
to a number of conditions, one of which would have required Warsaw Pact forces to be
withdrawn behind prewar borders within two weeks. This was clearly unacceptable to
Red, as it left open entirely both the future status of the FRG and of Blue military
forces on the Continent.
Red sought other negotiating avenues in an effort to circumvent the impasse. Spe-
cifically, Red tried to both convince and demoralize the French with news of the Sev-
enth Echelon and an overture to favor France by conferring nonbelligerent status.
Fortunately for NATO, France spurned the offer.
Red also failed to understand that Blue’s inability to monitor world events during a
cease-fire due to the attrition of space assets was of considerable concern, and some
sort of arrangement to facilitate a space cease-fire could have been a start for
negotiations.
1 0 8 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
In summary, then, Red wanted a quick war termination to secure military and political
victory. Although the Red negotiating strategy appeared to have substantial flexibility,
the minimum conditions were not acceptable to Blue. Blue, although running out of
supplies on the Central Front, rejected negotiations due to the solidarity of the NATO
Alliance, its long-term industrial strength, and its dominance over the other theaters, and
the possibility of assistance from a variety of heretofore noncombatants. Blue therefore
made a deliberate choice to spurn negotiations in favor of a long-war strategy.
Blue-Dominant Scenario
The negotiating process in the Blue-dominant scenario was strongly influenced by a
perception, shared by both sides, that the Blue advantage was short term. Red believed
that the military objectives had been attained and that it was time to stop the war. The
General Secretary was, therefore, serious about negotiations, but saw no reason to
modify the terms offered with the Seventh Strategic Echelon moving to the front.
Given this perspective, the General Secretary presented Blue with a “bottom line” pro-
posal that contained the following points:
• A demilitarized and neutralized FRG and GDR under existing governments.
• An immediate, in-place cease-fire.
• Withdrawal of all NATO and Warsaw Pact forces from the FRG and GDR within 90 days.
• FRG and GDR forces demobilized within 90 days.
• Withdrawal of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces to prewar territories within 90 days.
• FRG and GDR citizens free to decide for themselves how they wish to live, as long as
political union is not an option.
The VGK proposal was in anticipation of a Blue status quo ante position, which would
in fact imply Red defeat and erode Red legitimacy. The longer term implications of the
Hungarian situation, and by possible extension, the Eastern European bloc, would be
difficult enough with legitimacy intact. Therefore Red proposed what amounted to a
vacuum in Central Europe.
Blue felt, as in the Red-dominant scenario, that the military situation was not favorable
enough to negotiate successfully; that it could not negotiate what it had not won mili-
tarily. Blue went to the table reluctantly and with no position, apparently for the sake
of public opinion and to lay the groundwork for strategy. In the event, Blue rejected all
points of the Red proposals except those calling for a cease-fire coupled with the with-
drawal of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces to their prewar territories within 90 days. The
General Secretary received this Blue response with a certain amount of disbelief, con-
cluding that Blue either had no understanding of the Red position or had no desire to
G L O B A L W A R G A M E 1 0 9
negotiate and was pursuing a military solution. The next Blue response tended to con-
firm that view. Blue proposed, among other things, the payment of reparations to the
nations that had suffered economic damage as a result of Red aggression and self-
determination for all countries, east and west alike.
As the “negotiations” proceeded, both sides endeavored to secure advantage in other
ways. Blue sought through military success in other theaters to exploit worldwide dom-
inance, but Red kept the issue focused on the Central Front. Red held to its termination
objectives and stood by its proposal while making diplomatic overtures designed to
fracture NATO. France was a primary target, but neither they nor any other Alliance
members were willing to negotiate with Red. Eventually a “back channel” was opened
that allowed Red to expand the proposal to include the demilitarization of western
Czechoslovakia and the return of Austrian neutrality. This “back channel” served to
clarify positions and, had the scenario continued, could have proved beneficial.
In general, negotiations in the Blue-dominant scenario were characterized by signifi-
cant perceptual mismatches. Blue was looking for leverage. NATO was considering op-
tions to terminate the war before faced with a choice of surrender, nuclear escalation,
or protracted war. Red, depending on the Seventh Strategic Echelon as the arbiter of
victory, preferred a diplomatic settlement to sustained military action. In the final
analysis, Blue was not seriously interested in negotiations because of the perception
that the military situation had to be improved before Alliance political objectives could
be successfully negotiated.
Stalemate Scenario
As in the other two scenarios, the stalemate construct was dominated by the Seventh
Strategic Echelon and the concomitant perception of Blue disadvantage. Red, as in pre-
vious scenarios, believed that a negotiated settlement could prove advantageous. Red
felt it had achieved its military objectives and wanted to convert this achievement into
lasting political advantage. A confident General Secretary instructed the VGK to think
“bold ideas” and to pursue economic initiatives with special attention to the Far East.
Accordingly, the following proposal was presented to Blue:
• Immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from the FRG, GDR, and the Netherlands
preparatory to:
º Permanent withdrawal of all NATO forces from FRG and the Netherlands.
º FRG and the Netherlands withdrawal from NATO.
º Restructured FRG and Netherlands armed forces for internal security only.
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• Red forces in GDR to retain defensive capability only and to guarantee external
security of the FRG jointly with Blue forces stationed elsewhere on NATO territory.
• No Blue or Red nuclear forces anywhere in Europe.
• Red forces to be withdrawn from Norway provided the following undertakings are
agreed to:
º Reaffirmation that no foreign forces will be permanently based in Norway or
Denmark.
º No stockpiling of foreign military equipment to be permitted in Norway or
Denmark.
This proposal was tabled at the first negotiating session, chaired by the Secretary Gen-
eral of the United Nations.
The Blue perspective was that Red must be convinced that the war could not be won,
but was dubious that NATO military power was sufficient to accomplish this. However,
Blue intelligence was reporting that there was political unrest in both Hungary and Po-
land and, further, that the possibility of famine existed in the Red homeland. These fac-
tors, combined with Blue success everywhere except on the Central Front, led Blue to
stall. Blue entered negotiations halfheartedly and sought to improve its standing in
world public opinion, to bolster Allied national will, and to maximize the potential for
assistance from other countries.
Another problem that Blue had in entering negotiations was that there were consider-
able differences between the goals of the President and the objectives of other Alliance
members. The President’s initial position was no cease-fire without withdrawal to pre-
war boundaries in Europe, neutralization of Eastern Europe, and the fracturing of the
Warsaw Pact. NATO did not agree that the Warsaw Pact should be fractured, and there
were further divisions within NATO as to the approach to a cease-fire. It seemed appar-
ent that the Blue actions were directed toward buying time to plan global offensive op-
erations rather than to achieve a negotiated settlement.
The Red proposal elicited the response that it contained little to encourage Blue/NATO
to end the war and, due to the inability of Blue/NATO to formulate a position, the sta-
tus quo ante was put forth yet again. The Blue Congress passed a resolution calling for
an eastern European “buffer zone” consisting of a neutralized Poland, Czechoslovakia,
and Romania as well as an open corridor to Berlin as part of the FRG.
After a delay that frustrated Red, NATO finally put together a counteroffer consisting
of the following:
• Acceptance of a cease-fire conditional on Red withdrawal from all NATO territory.
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• All nations, east and west, to be allowed without coercion to determine alliances and
regional arrangements.
• Discussion of postwar environment must be based on negotiating political
arrangements in Central and Eastern Europe that satisfy the aspirations and security
interests of the states concerned.
• Norway and Denmark have no intent to have permanent stationing of foreign forces.
• The stockpiling of military equipment is a decision for each sovereign government.
While NATO was developing this proposal, the President of Blue was seeking the advice
of the principal negotiator. Two options were proposed:
• Reject the Red proposal.
• Begin negotiations on Central Front based on cease-fire, withdrawal of forces, and
some restrictions on stationed and indigenous troops/weapons within the region,
including Eastern Europe.
The second option seemed more pragmatic, and the Secretary of State suggested a
counterproposal based on that option. At this juncture, there was no agreement be-
tween Blue and NATO on specific counterproposals. Some distinct national views had
emerged: Norway and the Benelux wanted an immediate cease-fire; the FRG, UK, and
France wanted some measure of retribution—the status quo ante was not adequate for
them; the Italians and the Turks supported the Alliance; and the Greeks were wavering.
Consequently, without a Blue/NATO position, negotiations stalled.
Red, unaware of the internal problems in formulating an allied position, again sought
to end the impasse by a diplomatic offensive. Bilateral talks were offered to several
NATO countries and overtures extended to the PRC and Japan. All of these initiatives
came to naught, and, feeling isolated internationally, Red withdrew all proposals, broke
off negotiations, and decided to seek a military solution with a goal of occupying the
FRG and establishing a provisional government in Frankfurt.
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Industrial Mobilization, Logistics, and
Sustainability
Introduction
Prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Global ’85 both NATO and the Warsaw Pact con-
ducted extensive mobilization of personnel. The vast majority of the war-fighting to
D+64 had been accomplished using resources immediately available to the theater
commanders and by deploying reserve assets as rapidly as possible. The very nature of
this global conflict had caused massive losses in a relatively short period of time. Con-
sequently, national decision makers and theater commanders confronted political and
military decisions with options seriously constrained by equipment shortages and sup-
ply problems.
The related issues of mobilization, logistics, and sustainability were critical to the ability
of Blue/NATO to fight a protracted conventional war. The NCA addressed these issues
with a continuing, multifaceted approach throughout the series.
Authorities and Controls
The President declared a national emergency when the war broke out, and the Con-
gress promptly declared war on Red and the other members of the Warsaw Pact. Eco-
nomic controls and consumer rationing were not deemed necessary early on, and
authority for wage, price, and rent controls was not requested from the Congress.
Congress also passed timely legislation amending the Defense Production Act of 1950
to permit closer industry-to-industry cooperation in the war effort by ameliorating anti-
trust provisions and allowing government intervention in the economy if other meth-
ods of meeting defense needs failed.
Several Defense Production Act authorities were utilized to:
• Ensure the production and delivery of defense requirements ahead of commercial
items.
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• Expand production capacity and supply.
• Integrate industry leaders and experts with the government’s mobilization
management force.
• Convene industry representative committees to solve defense production problems.
• Enable emergency (streamlined) contracting and financing procedures.
Industrial Base
After the initial production surge, capacity expansion efforts were intensified. Measures
adopted included:
• Conversion of plants and the development of supporting plants.
• Financial assistance to expand prime contractor and subcontractor capacity,
particularly munitions.
• Overtures to allied and friendly nations for the provision of supplies.
• Recommendations for funding authority to activate machine tool trigger orders
across the board.
However, production capacity improvements were limited by the unavailability of
components and manpower limitations.
Economy
At D+75, Blue industry was operating at or near full-surge capacity. However, that ca-
pacity was only about 10–25 percent higher than prewar levels, and because it was
achieved at the cost of drawing down lower priority pipelines, it was not sustainable. It
was estimated that 12–30 months would be required to convert plants from peacetime
to wartime production and to expand capacity by construction of new facilities.
Two potential production problems that plagued Blue involved shipbuilding and am-
munition. The former was constrained by few yards, a lack of critical resources and
materials, and skilled talent. The latter was plagued by lack of manufacturing plants,
which necessitated both prioritization and work-around. Indeed, this condition re-
garding ammunition was expected to worsen as short-term substitutes were depleted
before new plants came on line. Alternatives, such as the offshore building and repair of
ships, were considered as well as foreign procurement of ammunition, but some play-
ers believed that the ammunition problem could not be remedied in the short term.
Farm production levels had not diminished in spite of the labor demand; labor was
close to the full employment level with some near-term shortages anticipated. Increases
in productive capacity, combined with increased military manpower demands, would
eventually mandate occupational deferments for those with critical skills.
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Manpower was sufficient to match the production capacity and, with increased work-
ing hours, would sustain the maximum level of output to D+135. The increase in re-
quirements to man new production facilities coming on line in D+2 years outstripped
the ability to train and provide competent personnel. Early and extensive training pro-
grams were viewed as essential to alleviate some of the impact and to offset the needs
for potentially scarce skills.
At D+75, the economy in general was strong and undamaged. Although the economic
expansion of the service industry had been halted as assets were shifted from the civil-
ian sector to government use, the average citizen had yet to feel an economic impact
from the war. Consideration was given to the implementation of wage and price con-
trols, and the intent was to delay these steps as long as possible. Inflation was moderate,
but some consumer discontent had developed as wartime demands preempted civilian
production and distribution.
The Blue domestic transportation system could meet essential defense and civil move-
ment requirements in both the short and the long term. The Defense Production Act,
Title I, DOT, established a priority control movement system to handle essential de-
fense and civilian traffic before routine market goods.
Over 1,200 Blue-flag and NATO ships were supporting the sealift requirements of the
war in Europe. All Blue ports were operational, and Canada made both eastern and
western ports available for ammunition out-load. Other allied nations and reliable
Third World carriers were providing adequate capacity to meet essential Blue economic
shipping needs. Air transportation was relying heavily on the use of chartered, foreign
flag aircraft. Transportation capacity was adequate for military requirements in both
the short and the long term.
The outlook for providing the petroleum necessary to meet military and civilian needs
did not provide a cause for concern. Foreign sources of supply had not deteriorated,
and alternate refinery capacity existed to meet expected growth of requirements. Elec-
trical generation capability was limited in some parts of the country and remained vul-
nerable to sabotage. The long lead-time required to construct these plants and their
associated transmission lines mitigated against a near-term solution. Conservation
measures such as close management of industrial work periods and controls on public
use as required were coupled with increased levels of Canadian imports to ameliorate
the problem. Supplies of most raw materials were generally satisfactory and expected
to remain so as long as Blue retained access to certain key foreign suppliers.
The prospect of a long, conventional war mandated a shift in planning priorities to-
ward financial requirements and the development of technological and production so-
lutions for problems associated with sustainment, reconstitution, and force-level
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expansion. Because revenue-raising measures were in place, the outlook for long-term
financing of the war, 50 percent pay as you go, appeared favorable. However, the cost of
the war was going to be staggering. For example, it was estimated that reconstitution to
prewar levels would require 25 percent of GNP over a two to four-year period, and ex-
panding to planning force levels would consume 41 percent over the same period.
Therefore, in order to avoid the financial depletion that struck Great Britain after
World War II, careful planning was essential if Blue were not to share a similar fate. Not
only the pay-as-you-go plan alluded to above, but other alternatives including a luxury
tax, a national sales tax, an increase of $1.50 per gallon in the gasoline tax, and an in-
come tax surcharge were identified and reviewed. Japan was seen as an essential part-
ner, both from a credit management standpoint and for financial and industrial
assistance. Other non-NATO nations might be willing to reduce the overall burden, but
there was no question that the major cost would end up being a Blue responsibility.
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Weapons of Mass Destruction
Introduction
The use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was far more frequent in the first
Global series than in the second. Indeed, it was not until GWG ’87 when a Red chemi-
cal attack occurred on D+49, and nuclear weapons were not used. Red had in fact con-
templated earlier use of CW when the military situation in Bulgaria began to
deteriorate, but did not do so. Blue/NATO considered nuclear use on several occasions
to stem the Red advance in Central Europe, but could not make a credible case that
such use would provide military or political advantage. Red was very much aware that
nuclear use was under consideration by Blue and, while using all means available to de-
ter such use, did study targeting options for a retaliatory strike should Blue escalate.
Chemical Weapons Use (to D+64)
Red had initiated the use of chemical weapons on the Central Front and in eastern Tur-
key. Both persistent and nonpersistent types were employed to facilitate offensive and
defensive operations. NATO forces were not well prepared to operate in a chemical envi-
ronment and perceived that their capacity to retaliate was limited. By D+60, the reality
of chemical warfare was accepted by both sides, although unfavorable weather condi-
tions led to generally inconclusive results.
Status of Nuclear Forces (to D+64)
The central strategic systems of each side, including command and control, remained es-
sentially intact. Although Red had lost about one-half of their SSBNs, their land-based
nuclear arsenal remained undamaged. The tactical and theater systems of both sides had
been substantially depleted by conventional means, but significant capabilities remained.
Nuclear Considerations (to D+64)
Blue and Red were well aware that on several occasions the use of tactical nuclear weap-
ons had appeared to make good military sense, but political concerns combined with the
uncertainty over nuclear escalation led to a decision against such use. Typical of the latter
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aspect of the problem was uncertainty of the other side’s nuclear doctrine. For example,
would “limited” or “tactical” use by Blue be the signal—or excuse—for a massive riposte
by Red? As the games progressed and the perceived stakes mounted, the resort to nuclear
use seemed to come closer to a realistic option in the minds of some players.
Blue/NATO held firmly to its position that it would not initiate nuclear use unless War-
saw Pact forces achieved a major breakthrough, even though there was no clear deter-
mination as to how such use would solve the problem, especially in view of the
assumed Red response. Blue considered nuclear use against the DPRK after their inva-
sion of South Korea but rejected such use because of the expected adverse political
consequences, particularly from Japan.
Red began to consider nuclear use as a means of terminating the war. A principal Red
objective was an early end to hostilities because of a concern that the economy, and es-
pecially agriculture, would be unable to sustain a protracted (one-year-plus) conven-
tional war. Red perceived that it had, for all practical purposes, won the war in Central
Europe based on its territorial conquests and that Blue/NATO was refusing to recognize
this reality. Some in the VGK believed that the use of nuclear weapons would so shock
public opinion that war termination would be forced upon the Western governments.
Red also considered the use of nuclear weapons to stem the Greek-Turkish invasion of
Bulgaria. Red reasoned that such use would be non-escalatory because:
• Use would be on Warsaw Pact territory and thus defensive.
• No Blue forces would be involved
• The theater was geographically isolated.
Red concluded, however, that the allied offensive was not sustainable and, therefore,
with the danger quite limited, the risk of first use was not commensurate with any ob-
vious benefit. However, Red did believe that if the Central Front offensive bogged
down, the Balkans might be ideal for a nuclear “demonstration shot.”
In the Pacific, Red had debated the feasibility of a nuclear strike on Blue CVBGs to
eliminate some of their problems. Because Blue/NATO homelands were not involved,
Red saw such an attack as a horizontal rather than vertical escalation that would greatly
reduce the Blue conventional offensive assault on the Red Pacific rim, possibly drive Ja-
pan into neutrality, and send a strong message to a potentially aggressive PRC. From
the Red perspective, Blue would not have an in-theater, symmetric retaliatory target
and would be faced with the prospect of a nuclear response in Europe or in the Red
homeland itself. Red believed that in either case, world public opinion would focus
blame on Blue for escalating the war, which might result in NATO disintegration and a
war termination decidedly favoring Red political goals.
1 1 8 T H E N E W P O R T P A P E R S
Nuclear issues were always in the forefront of Red thinking and planning. The specific
concerns varied—contingency planning for Red nuclear employment, concern over
possible Blue/NATO use, etc., but the nuclear question was always close to the surface
in VGK deliberations.
Early in the war, Red was definitely worried about a possible “penalty for success” that
a rapid advance by Warsaw Pact forces would lead to Blue/NATO nuclear use. However,
as the war progressed and what Red perceived as several nuclear “gates” (e.g., crossing
the Rhine) were passed without escalation, the Kremlin’s fears tended to diminish.
However, Red remained wary that if Blue shared their belief that the military objective
had been essentially attained, the temptation to escalate would increase. An interesting
side issue involved France and the possible use of the “force de frappe.” Early in the
war, Red tried to avoid invading France for reasons both political and military, with
French nuclear weapons a subject of discussion. Although most were more conserva-
tive, one Red leader quipped that perhaps the best thing that could happen from the
Red perspective would be unilateral French employment of nuclear weapons against
Warsaw Pact forces. The logic was that, in accordance with their goal of early termina-
tion, Red wanted a “war stopper” and nuclear use might very well provide it. Further, if
France chose to engage in a nuclear exchange with Red, the result was a foregone con-
clusion. The troubling unknown was the degree of linkage between a France-Red ex-
change and Blue/NATO use.
Throughout the war, Red seriously considered the employment of tactical nuclear
weapons as a viable military option. However, while Moscow struggled with the possi-
bility that tactical nuclear use might lead inexorably to a central systems exchange, not
all VGK members viewed this possibility as a major deterrent.
One issue that often arose in Red deliberations was the possibility of “decoupling” in
the use of tactical nuclear weapons by using them against the Blue CVBGs or outside
the Western TVD. This was a concept that had been utilized in games of the first series,
and Red speculation was that Blue did not have a symmetrical response to such use.
Further, and as noted above, Red believed that any Blue nuclear use would be viewed as
escalatory by world opinion and would redound to Blue disadvantage. In the event,
however, Red always assessed the risks as needless given the generally acceptable results
of the conventional offensive on the Central Front. Indeed, through D+64, the final
analysis always showed that there was no point in jeopardizing the already attained
successes in Europe.
There were two other nuclear related issues that arose during the games. The first in-
volved the Blue air carrier raid on the nuclear power plant located in the vicinity of the
Kola. This attack was executed without consultation with either the DPC or the Blue
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NCA. Expert opinion differed regarding the precise effects of a successful strike, but, if
the Chernobyl accident could be taken as a valid guide, damage and casualties would
presumably be widespread and serious. Further, with the recent disastrous chemical
leak at Bophal, India in mind, the issue was raised that attacks on chemical plants also
had the potential for massive destruction. Two points emerged from these discussions:
• There was a need for a Blue/NATO targeting policy and
• Defense of similar installations in Blue and NATO countries from attack or sabotage
should not be overlooked.
A second issue concerned the destruction or capture of Blue/NATO tactical and theater
nuclear weapons based in western Europe. The early Red independent air operation
against these weapons would seem certain to have resulted in the release of radioactive
material, and this situation was not addressed in terms of its possible effects on mili-
tary operations and civilian populations. Of additional concern was the possible
over-run by advancing Red forces of these same weapons. Here again, little thought ap-
peared to have been given to planning for this contingency.
Weapons of Mass Destruction: GWG ’88
Week One—Red-Dominant Scenario
As might be expected, discussions of the use of tactical nuclear weapons were promi-
nent in a scenario where Blue/NATO forces were threatened with military defeat.
Off-line simulations were utilized to provide Blue players with an analysis of several
“what ifs.” Although Blue perceived the situation as desperate, Blue players were unable
to frame a plan of nuclear use that provided a clear military advantage. While it was
conceivable that the Red offensive could be blunted with nuclear use, Blue lacked the
conventional capability to counterattack and exploit any advantage that nuclear weap-
ons might provide. Further, off-line gaming suggested that, at this stage of the war, any
nuclear use could rapidly escalate to a central systems exchange.
Red clearly wished to avoid nuclear weapons given the enhanced prospects for success.
The two possible exceptions were the ongoing friction with the PRC, a major cause for
concern, and a contingency plan by the FETVD commander to attack the Blue CVBGs,
considered most unlikely to be implemented. Curiously, the French situation contin-
ued to cause Red some concern. When Paris declared a 15-kilometer “kill zone” along
the border, Red took this threat seriously. While the Kremlin did not believe that Blue
would resort to nuclear weapons use, it did feel that French use in defense of or in re-
taliation to conventional attacks on France was a distinct possibility.
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Week Two—Blue-Dominant Scenario
The primary Red concern in this scenario was the large number of troops in the Cen-
tral Front “pocket.” This force had been designated a “national asset” by the General
Secretary, who had threatened nuclear use if its destruction appeared imminent. Red
military planning was, however, that should Blue develop the combat power to threaten
collapse of the pocket, Red would use a heavy chemical attack to aid in establishing a
relief corridor to the trapped forces. Massive amounts of persistent, thickened chemical
weapons would be delivered by tube artillery and multiple rocket launchers to protect
the corridor flanks, and nonpersistent CW would be used on Blue forces threatening
the corridor. It was judged that Blue casualties would be minimal due to experience
gained from previous chemical attacks and good defensive posture. It was thought,
however, that the protective measures would have a detrimental impact on NATO
fighting ability, leaving the forces vulnerable to follow-on conventional attack. Further,
decontamination would be required.
The planned Blue response was to use persistent chemicals on the Red front-line divi-
sions in order to prevent Red from attaining total control. Given an excellent defensive
capability, Red casualties probably would have been minimal and impact on Red fight-
ing ability nominal.
Red planning envisioned the strong possibility of a Blue nuclear reaction to the pro-
posed large-scale use of chemicals. Therefore, the Red off-line planning involved a pre-
emptive nuclear attack to reduce the risk and effectiveness of such an event. Red would
use 200 Scud-delivered, high-altitude (to minimize fallout) 10kt to 200kt weapons
against Blue C3 nodes and nuclear delivery systems. The Blue response in this off-line
excursion was to detonate one 350kt weapon at high altitude over Mosowka, Lithuania,
a WP naval port without a large civilian population. Red perceived this Blue response
as a signal and, having suffered no military damage, did not respond.
Week Three—Stalemate Scenario
The Red position at the beginning of week three was that the “stalemate” would not
last long and would quickly be resolved in the favor of Red. While the General Secre-
tary tried at first to seek a diplomatic solution, he abandoned negotiations altogether
when faced by Blue/NATO intransigence. While the PRC appeared restive, and while
Red appeared to be totally isolated, the VGK position toward nuclear weapons was un-
changed. Red was not afraid to use nuclear weapons in retaliation or if Blue was able to
severely attrite the Seventh Strategic Echelon. But Red was so confident of the strength
of its position that even Blue tactical nuclear use was viewed with, essentially, lack of
concern. In summary, Red believed that the use of nuclear weapons by Blue would be
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insufficient to disrupt the offensive, that Blue realized it was “too late” for their use,
and that Blue knew that it did not have the combat capacity to follow up and exploit
any temporary advantage nuclear use might confer. While Red did select targets such as
troop concentrations for retaliatory strikes, Red even questioned whether the damage
Blue might inflict was even worthy of a nuclear response.
The Blue situation was one of a classic mismatch of ends and means. While the Presi-
dent urged the military to “be bold,” the lack of combat power and logistical support
meant that offensive operations would create an enormous drain on sustainability.
Therefore, Blue planning had to turn to consideration of tactical nuclear use. The Blue
NCA and NATO reluctantly concurred that if SACEUR’s conventional offensive failed,
then nuclear use would be authorized provided both agreed. SACEUR then planned a
campaign that involved the use of twenty-five 70kt weapons on specific military tar-
gets. It was his belief that if he were going to conduct an offensive—and he felt that was
better than remaining on the defensive—tactical nuclear use would be essential. The
game ended without the final decision.
Summary
Military considerations aside, there were several political considerations that mitigated
against Blue first use:
• NATO Allies were opposed to options in some of the scenarios because the weapons
would be detonated on their soil.
• Red retaliation might cause the loss of positions gained in other theaters as well as
increase the possibility of Blue losing advantage at sea.
• Japanese neutrality might result.
• Separately negotiated treaties could result in dissolution of the NATO Alliance.
Each side seriously questioned the utility of nuclear weapons, as was clearly demon-
strated by their failure to use them in situations that appeared to warrant that use.
Therefore, both sides tended to believe that the other would not escalate across the nu-
clear threshold. An example of this mindset occurred in the Blue-dominant scenario
when the Blue President ordered the destruction, by conventional means, of encircled
Red troops that the Red General Secretary had declared a “national asset” to be de-
fended by nuclear use if their annihilation were threatened. Conversely, unaware of
how frequently and intensively Blue had debated first use, Red did not believe Blue
would resort to nuclear use unless there was profound provocation. The consideration
of nuclear use was event-driven, and both sides seemed to lack an appreciation for
what their opponent might consider critical.
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The War in Space
The war in space was ongoing throughout the game series and had a substantial impact
on Blue intelligence, reconnaissance, and command and control capabilities. This was
an important constraint on Blue military operations. For example, by D+48, only a
limited Blue space reconnaissance capability remained. UHF SATCOM was sporadi-
cally jammed, making it an unreliable medium 60 percent of the time. SHF SATCOM
channels lacking anti-jam features were effectively lost.
Red commenced an active antisatellite campaign on D-Day. Nearly all Blue LEO recon-
naissance satellite systems were neutralized early in the war. Blue counterattacked in
space, but ran short of antisatellite (ASAT) weapons before Red ran out of replacement
satellites. Blue then attacked Red space launch and antisatellite targets on the ground
using TLAM(C) and B-1 bombers.
Blue used alternative, nonspace means as a substitute for its losses. Air-breathing recon-
naissance platforms (SR-71, U-2, RC-135, EP-3, RPV, etc.) were particularly important.
After about D+20, both sides “stood down” from their antisatellite campaigns. Red had
accomplished the objective of neutralizing the Blue LEO reconnaissance threat but had
sustained damage to their ASAT lasers at Sary Shagan and co-orbital ASAT launch fa-
cilities at Tyuratam. In the face of the Red reconstruction of satellite assets, Blue de-
cided to conserve its remaining antisatellite weapons for use at a critical time against
high priority targets. Faced with the prospect of a protracted war, both sides found it
necessary to take a hard look at the availability of space systems over the long term.
Blue space warfare planners and operators had the following goals:
• Deny Red use of their space systems through such means as operational deception,
attacking launch/control facilities, jamming, and other electronic countermeasures.
• Regain superiority in space over the long term through improved ground site
security, accelerated production of satellite and antisatellite weapons, development
of cheaper satellites, use of the shuttle, and increased space asset survivability.
After D+46, space action was at a reduced level as each side concentrated mainly on re-
constituting space reconnaissance assets and ASAT capabilities lost or utilized in the
opening days of hostilities. Blue particularly played a catch-up game on reconnaissance
satellites, starting with 11 on D+43 and ending with 17 on D+64. Red was able to re-
cover their losses more effectively. Starting with ready replacement units, by D+64 Red
had 40 orbiting missions and 23 ready replacement units with associated booster assets.
ASAT capabilities for both Blue and Red were reduced due to successful attacks on
their launch bases. Inventories were low on both sides: Blue was down to four ASAT
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satellites; Red had an estimated five. Both had begun exploring new ASAT technology
and recommended increased ASAT production rates.
In the satellite communications area, Blue was severely hampered (FLASH priorities on
occasion being delayed up to six hours) by communication jamming in the SHF/UHF
bands. This situation was particularly acute in the European Theater. Red attacks on
ground communications stations had less effect on Blue very-low-frequency submarine
communications. Some relief from jamming was attained from Blue raids on Red jam-
ming facilities; eight Red jamming sites were destroyed or severely damaged.
By D+64, Red had made two ASAT attempts against the Space Shuttle, neither of which
succeeded. Blue had made a decision to expend its remaining ASATs against the Red
Cosmos 929 RECON satellite and the Red Space Station, but had not yet launched.
Red had been quite successful in the war in space; Blue less so. Blue was hampered in
its recovery of space assets, partially due to the sophisticated technology integrated into
both the orbiting hardware and ground control systems. Simpler satellite designs that
could be put in orbit more quickly and were still adequate, at least as gap fillers, to pro-
vide the strategic and tactical intelligence and communication required for the near-
term war effort were discussed. The judicious use of nonspace reconnaissance assets
and more conventional communication networks appeared to be the near-term
solution.
The three-scenario GWG ’88 found the situation little changed. Blue strategic warning
capabilities were intact and not in jeopardy as were its navigation and weather satel-
lites. Satellite communications, however, were subject to intensive jamming, and non-
satellite systems were severely overloaded, extending message time from the minutes
expected for the satellite-supported system to up to ten hours. Commander-in-Chief,
Space, devised a plan to counteract Red jamming and restored communications to 75
percent of the prewar level.
A new consideration that emerged in GWG ’88 was that of preserving an imaging capa-
bility to monitor a cease-fire or compliance with terms of a peace treaty. While Blue
did in fact preserve assets for this purpose, the point was raised that it might be desir-
able for both sides to have such capability—lest confidence be lost and war resumed as
a result. During the “Blue-dominant” scenario, Blue was confident enough to consider
negotiating a cease-fire in space.
In its approach to the space war, Blue largely neglected the space assets of other na-
tions. In none of the three scenarios of GWG ’88 did either side feel completely com-
fortable with the quantity and quality of intelligence it was receiving, and Blue
especially suffered due to the loss of space intelligence collection assets. Occasionally,
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Blue civilian and military intelligence analysts differed regarding Red capabilities. And,
indeed, Red was closer to exhausting its assets than Blue realized. Although frustrating
to the players, these battles were probably close to what would have been an actual
situation.
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Conclusions
Summary
One of the definitions of the Global War Game was “a joint forum to test and refine
national strategies and doctrine in a crisis environment.” As research games, the first
two GWG series, 1979-1988, resulted in a number of changes in the way a potential war
between Blue/NATO and Red/Warsaw Pact was perceived. The following tables sum-
marize how effectively the “test and refine” aspect of game purpose influenced thinking
on some major issues.
BEFORE AFTER
Defend to avoid losing Attack to win
Concerns about survivability in D-Day
shoot-out at sea
Confidence in ability to defeat Red
Safety of SLOCs a major concern Aggressive use of SSNs relieves SLOC
pressure
Use SSNs in barrier to protect SLOCs SSNs attack to control Norwegian Sea
Red SSBNs secure in bastions Red SSBNs heavily attrited
Pessimism regarding survivability of CVs Moderate confidence in ability to use CVs
offensively
Keep naval surface ships out of eastern
Mediterranean
Use surface forces to control eastern
Mediterranean
Persian Gulf/Southwest Asia a major concern Considerably less so
Plan for early use of theater nuclear
weapons by Blue
No advantage to Blue from theater nuclear
use
Non-Central Front battles trivial and of no
concern to Red
Non-Central Front battles interactive and
heavy
TABLE 1
Shifts In Naval Thinking
First Global Series 1979–1983
General War
The 1988 Global War Game was the last global to focus on war between the two
Superpowers.
Some Concluding Thoughts on Major Issues
Aside from the “shifts” in military and naval thinking alluded to above, the game had
substantial influence on some major issues that deserve examination in greater depth.
One of the principal benefits of the game was that it provided both the opportunity
and a forum for people with similar concerns to work and interact with each other. Al-
though the number of participants was lower in the final game of the series (primarily
because it was a seminar planning-type evolution instead of an operational game), ap-
proximately ninety different government departments and agencies, educational and
research facilities, and various military commands participated. As noted above, there
was foreign participation as well, both on the military and civilian level. Certainly, no
other simulation, seminar, or other event existed that brought such a depth and
breadth of expertise to bear on the issue of potential superpower conflict. Clearly, the
issues raised and potential solutions to problems envisioned benefited from bringing
these people together. But the benefits extended beyond the game. Virtually all partic-
ipants left the game with the business cards of individuals they had met and worked
with in Newport, with whom they could consult and advise in their “real world” jobs.
It seems beyond question that the defense planning establishment benefited from asso-
ciations begun at Global.
One of the primary reasons for the existence of Global had been then CNO Admiral
Thomas B. Hayward’s concerns, expressed in 1978, that the navy did not have a clear
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BEFORE AFTER
Use nuclear weapons early or lose Reason for optimism in conventional
campaign
NATO fight Red as far forward as possible NATO stresses maneuver vs positional
defense
Blue concerned about Red 4th generation air Blue deep penetration air strikes for FOFA
Naval concern for SLOC protection Naval emphasis on power projection
Little prospect for USMC employment Extensive MAF/MEF operations
AFNORTH, AFCENT, AFSOUTH fighting
separate wars
Coordinated, integrated strategy in Europe
AFSOUTH concentrates on defense of
Turkish Straits
AFSOUTH exploits offensive opportunities
Blue forces in Pacific react to Red Blue takes offensive to sink/bottle up Red
TABLE 2
Shifts In Military Thinking
Second Global Series 1984–1988
Long War
perception of its role should war occur between the United States and the Soviet
Union. Consequently, one of the most important products of the Global War Game
Series was a most significant contribution to what came to be known as “The Maritime
Strategy.” That strategy might be summarized as follows:
• The war will be non-nuclear.
• A protracted war with sequential rollback operations would be planned.
• Offensive sea control operations were to be stressed.
• War termination leverage would be sought.
• Sea control was stressed to take advantage of U.S. economic mobilization.
It is evident from the contents of this paper that the GWG series contributed to all of
these points in the course of its games.
There was considerable criticism of the Maritime Strategy from a number of quarters.
Regardless of the accuracy of that criticism, however, the value of the game as a guide
to naval operations is not to be overlooked, both strategically and operationally. At the
strategic level, it became clear that, despite apparent risks, a forward, offensive employ-
ment of naval forces not only protected the SLOCs, but paid dividends in providing
Blue with options that were not attainable through passive defense. At the operational
level, among other examples, the folly of deserting the Eastern Mediterranean was a
lesson learned very early on. That being the case, study had to be given to how carrier
operations could be conducted, what tactics needed to be invented, what technologies
utilized or developed to facilitate such operations. Therefore, the impact of the game
on naval thinking went well beyond the Maritime Strategy per se.
Another over-arching issue that received much attention was what constituted victory
for each of the superpowers? Red was aware of its limitations and wanted a short war
followed by early negotiations. The VGK, however, was constantly frustrated by its in-
ability to bring about substantive talks with Blue. Further, lacking control of the sea
and the air, Red found it extremely difficult to force Blue to negotiate or to surrender.
Red had, generally, succeeded in attaining most of its military objectives, but with Blue
unwilling to ratify that success at the conference table, Red faced the protracted war
that it desperately wanted to avoid.
Blue, fighting a defensive war within a defensive alliance, usually expressed its principal
war aim as the restoration of the territorial status quo ante bellum. This seemed, in the
early games, to be a relatively modest goal. As the series progressed, however, Blue be-
gan to realize that achievement of that objective would probably have enormous reper-
cussions for Red and the Warsaw Pact. Huge losses to the Red Army, struggling
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economies, and agricultural disasters would challenge the political cohesion of the
Warsaw Pact countries, both internally and externally, and, quite possibly, the primacy
of the CPSU itself. Blue felt it needed a better military situation on the Central Front
as a prerequisite to negotiations, but realized that sustainability and alliance cohesion
problems could be fatal.
While nuclear weapons were not used in the game, their influence permeated the pro-
ceedings. Real world questions, such as the likelihood and feasibility of limited nuclear
war at sea and whether or not chemical use by Red signaled nuclear use were dis-
cussed. The game itself, however, tended to raise questions regarding nuclear use that
tended to be original.
In general, Red saw no reason to contemplate first use of nuclear weapons. It was be-
lieved that Blue retaliation for such use could negate the assumed conventional superi-
ority of the Red Army, and that further escalation would threaten the safety of the
homeland. However, the question of possible nuclear use was, for at least one General
Secretary of the CPSU, intimately connected to the issues of military success and war
termination. While previous games tended to show Red modifying military objectives
if NATO resistance took the offensive off its time-line, his belief was that, if the NATO
conventional defense was successful and the Central Front stabilized without the at-
tainment for the Red minimum military objective, the failure of the vaunted Red Army
would:
• Threaten total collapse of the Eastern/Central European security structure, the
degradation of which had precipitated hostilities in the first place and
• Leave Red in an intolerable negotiating position vs. Blue.
As far as this General Secretary was concerned, Blue long war strategy was not the is-
sue, the total Red security structure, internally and externally, would be threatened
with catastrophic collapse if Blue just stabilized the Central Front, let alone restored
the territorial status quo ante bellum. Thus the VGK considered the use of nuclear
weapons and asked the General Staff for a “survival strategy” utilizing them in circum-
stances that Blue did not anticipate.
At the time these games were conducted, it was assumed by the majority that a war in
Europe between the United States and the Soviet Union would see the use of tactical/
theater nuclear weapons in a fortnight, and that Blue defense on the Central Front re-
quired early use of them. A goal of this series was to test the concept of protracted,
conventional war, but players did have the option to go “off line” to discuss the ramifi-
cations of nuclear use. Excursions of this nature did take place, and Blue found the re-
sults unpalatable. Blue usually envisioned the use of ten to twenty weapons in the 20
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kt range to eliminate Red salients or to stem Red breakthroughs. The Red response was
based on the principal of “no first use but first decisive use” and involved retaliation in
the form of several hundred weapons across the entire front. Thus, although Blue did,
on occasion, see possible advantage in modest nuclear use, the probable Red response
was a most effective deterrent.
Thus, the games tended to indicate, in certain circumstances, the unexpected possibil-
ity that events could lead Red rather that Blue to contemplate the first use of nuclear
weapons.
Just inside the door of the Conolly Hall spaces formerly occupied by the Office of Na-
val Intelligence Detachment at the Naval War College stood a towering, cutout figure of
a Soviet military officer. This was the original “ten-foot tall” Russian, whose purpose
was to remind those who worked there of the dangers of “worst casing” the Red threat.
In spite of this, events of the late 1980s and early 1990s would appear to show that the
Global “Red Team” seriously overestimated the capabilities of the Warsaw Pact, partic-
ularly with regard to the seemingly endless parade of Red Strategic Echelons thrown
against NATO forces on the Central Front.
Be that as it may, the overall series result was significant. While the first Global series
indicated that nuclear escalation worked to neither side’s advantage, the second tended
to demonstrate that such escalation by NATO was not in fact necessary. Indeed, as
later events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union made clear, the lessons learned in
the Global War Games might have prevented nuclear catastrophe had war between the
two alliances actually occurred.
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AUGUST 1990
1 D-15 80% of Red submarines and surface combatants sortie
2 D-14
3 D-13
4 D-12 Red begins to mobilize air and ground forces
Red begins Spetsnaz operations in SWTVD/Med area
5 D-11
6 D-10 Blue marines arrive in Norway
7 D-9
8 D-8
9 D-7 Blue begins military mobilization
10 D-6
11 D-5
12 D-4
13 D-3
14 D-2 Red submarines mine anchorages at Augusta and Souda Bays
Suez Canal blocked by sinking of Red minelayer
15 D-1
16 D-Day Warsaw Pact offensive begins-concentration on NORTHAG
Red invades North Norway with 2 MRDs
Extensive and intense naval battles commence, worldwide
17 D+1 Red Spetsnaz attacks in Japan, Guam, and Hawaii
18 D+2 Red attacks on Adak, Shemya, and Amchitka
Red aircraft and SS-22s strike Chitose and Misawa
19 D+3
20 D+4 NATO counterattacks to northeast from Fulda
21 D+5 Red bombs Diego Garcia
22 D+6 NATO counterattack withdrawn after minimal success
23 D+7
24 D+8
25 D+9
26 D+10 Two CVBGs originally stationed off Cuba redeployed to UK
Red offensive reaches outskirts of Hamburg and Hanover
27 D+11 Two Polish armies invade Scheeswig-Holstein, cut off Denmark
Red invades Hokkaido
28 D+12 Warsaw Pact offensive in NORTHAG resumes
29 D+13 Red forces cross Elbe River, Bremerhaven captured
Warsaw Pact begins southern offensive toward Munich
30 D+14
31 D+15 Munich and Augsburg fall, Red presses on toward Stuttgart
North Korea invades South Korea
SEPTEMBER 1990
1 D+16
2 D+17
3 D+18
CHRONOLOGY: 1984 GLOBAL WAR GAME
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4 D+19 NATO stabilizes NORTHAG line at Weser River
Red advance on Stuttgart halted
Red Second Strategic Echelon Closes
5 D+20 Red opens strong attack on Frankfurt
Red reinforces Jutland, renews offensive into Denmark
6 D+21
7 D+22 NATO amphibious landing on western side of Jutland
Weser line holds in NORTHAG
Red drive on Frankfurt contained
8 D+23 Warsaw Pact suspends offensive to await reinforcements
TLAM C strikes by Blue against Murmansk area
9 D+24
10 D+25 Blue pulls SSNs out of Kara Sea and reduces those in Barents
11 D+26 NATO counterattack begins; French divisions attack toward Halle
NORTHAG attacks south of Hamburg toward Magdeburg
12 D+27 NATO airborne units capture Halle
13 D+28
14 D+29 French link-up with airborne in Halle
NATO northern pincer held by Red at Luneburg
Jutland beachhead stable
CENTAG attacking toward Brunswick
Red Third Strategic Echelon arriving
15 D+30 NATO offensives continue against heavy Red opposition
French cross IGB headed for Magdeburg and Leipzig
NORTHAG pincer swings south toward Celle
Red deploys 14 SSN/SSGN for anti-SLOC campaign
Blue SSNs foil Red amphibious attempt to flank Skibotn line
16 D+31
17 D+32 Massive Red attack damages LINCOLN and MIDWAY off Japan
Red begins withdrawal of Hokkaido invasion force
18 D+33 NATO northern and southern pincers meet at Celle
19 D+34
20 D+35 Red pressure causes withdrawal of all three NATO offensives
Red sorties 11 diesel SS against CVBGs operating in North Sea
21 D+36 Full closure of Third Strategic Echelon restores initiative to Red
22 D+37 Red offensives in progress toward Bremen, Frankfurt, Stuttgart
23 D+38 Red OSCAR SSGN launches only successful ASCM attack of war
24 D+39 RANGER heavily damaged by massive Red air attack off Japan
25 D+40 North Korean invasion stalled, Seoul retained by South Korea
26 D+41
27 D+42
28 D+43
29 D+44
30 D+45
OCTOBER 1990
1 D+46
2 D+47 NATO offensive commence in Thrace
3 D+48 End of GWG ’84
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NOVEMBER 1990
10 D-10 Blue notes indication of widespread Red/WP mobilization
Red issues demarche to Norway; offers French neutrality
11 D-9
12 D-8 WP forces move to “threat of war” readiness level
Congress votes “State of Emergency”; mobilization ordered
NATO declares “simple alert”
NATO “Rapid Reinforcement Plan” (RRP) implemented
13 D-7
14 D-6
15 D-5
16 D-4
17 D-3 Red/WP forces at state of “full combat readiness”
18 D-2
19 D-1 NATO declares “reinforced alert”
20 D-Day Red/WP commences multi-front offensive into FRG
NATO declares “general alert”
Extensive and intensive naval battles commence worldwide
Eisenhower torpedoed in Med, operational after 24 hrs.
21 D+1 France mobilizes, lead elements sent to FRG
Clemonceau sunk, FOCH damaged by Red sub in Med
22 D+2 Red SAG attacks Panama Canal; closed for one week
23 D+3 Red/WP commences attack through Austria toward Bavaria
Kennedy torpedoed in Med, OOA for six hours
Nimitz torpedoed, in Pacific, under tow
24 D+4 Austrian forces come under NATO command
Red surface ships in Indian Ocean eliminated
25 D+5 Nimitz hit by ASCM attack, under tow to Hawaii
26 D+6 Hamburg falls to Red
Polish offensive on Denmark held at Kiel Canal
AFNORTH authorized by DPC to attack Red homeland
27 D+7 Red achieves breakthrough in vicinity of Kassel
28 D+8 Blue III Corps counterattacks to seal breakthrough
Blue four-carrier CVBG enters Norwegian Sea
29 D+9 CVBGs launch strike on Kola
30 D+10 French 1st and 2nd armies defending WP drive on Munich
Italian battalion size units advance toward Innsbruck
DECEMBER 1990
1 D+11 Blue MAF successfully ashore at Esbjerg, Denmark
Coral Sea sunk by Red air to surface missile attack
Red/WP forces cross Kiel Canal
2 D+12
3 D+13
4 D+14 Independence torpedoed in Vestfjord, taken under tow
5 D+15 Independence torpedoed again, under tow, Trondheim
Greek and Turkish units stage limited attacks in Bulgaria
CHRONOLOGY: 1985, 1986, AND 1987 GLOBAL WAR GAMES
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6 D+16 Kitty Hawk to Osaka, damaged by SSGN/SNA strike
Lincoln to Yokosuka , damaged in same attack
7 D+17 Italians enter Innsbruck
8 D+18 End of GWG ’85
Red invades North Norway
9 D+19 Beginning of GWG ’86
10 D+20 Italian Alpini reach outskirts of Munich
11 D+21 Red attacks between Stuttgart and French border with 29 divisions
Ark Royal torpedoed, under tow for Bergen
12 D+22 Red crosses Rhine at Mannheim
Italian mechanized units in slow advance toward Munich
13 D+23
14 D+24 Red Second Strategic Echelon Closes
Greeks and Turks commence major offensive in Bulgaria
15 D+25
16 D+26 Red offensive breaks NATO defenses, crosses Weser
Italians fighting Red/Hungarian forces in Munich
Burgas falls to the Turks
Red attacks Japan with SS-12 missiles and aircraft
Kitty Hawk hit in dry dock, OOA for one year
17 D+27 Blue/NATO begin insertion of surface ships in Black Sea
PRC sends additional five divisions to border of Red
18 D+28
19 D+29 Red invades eastern Turkey
20 D+30 Forrestal torpedoed and sunk off Norfolk
21 D+31
22 D+32
23 D+33 Red Third Strategic Echelon Closes
24 D+34 Blue III and UK Corps destroyed
Greek/Turkish offensive stalls at Sofia and Varna
25 D+35 Red offensive penetrates into Benelux and south France
French armies come under NATO command
26 D+36
27 D+37 Blue air strike into Kola damages nuclear power plant
28 D+38
29 D+39 1st MAB takes Shikotan by heliborne assault
30 D+40 SACEUR opens five-phase offensive
Dikes opened east of Amsterdam to slow Red advance
I and II MAF commence attack toward Wittenberge
31 D+41
JANUARY 1991
1 D+42 End of GWG ’86
Red launches counter attack against Turks in Bulgaria
Iowa enters Black Sea
Iowa torpedoed, taken under tow
Red offensive reaches Skibotn line in North Norway
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2 D+43 Beginning of GWG ’87
Munich and Salzburg fall to Italians
3 D+44 Red begins limited anti-SLOC campaign
Eisenhower severely damaged in Pireaus by SS-12s
4 D+45
5 D+46 VGK authorizes use of chemical weapons by WTVD CDR
6 D+47
7 D+48
8 D+49 Red uses chemical weapons vs NATO units in Jutland
Red Fourth Strategic Echelon begins to arrive, piecemeal
9 D+50 Red uses chemical weapons vs CENTAG on Rhine
10 D+51 VGK, concerned about escalation, prohibits chem. use
11 D+52 Blue retaliates with chem. attack on two Czech airfields
12 D+53 SACEUR launches GOLDEN SWORD counteroffensive
13 D+54 Spetsnaz sinks ship in Panama lock, closes it three wks.
14 D+55
15 D+56 NATO forces break out of Jutland
Italians cross Danube
16 D+57 GOLDEN SWORD advancing 50 km/day
Red resumes chemical weapons use
Jutland breakout halted by heavy Red resistance
Italians come under AFCENT command
17 D+58 Fifth Strategic Echelon closes
18 D+59
19 D+60 Erzurum (Turkey) falls to Red
20 D+61 NATO forces cross IGB into GDR
Red forces cross into Turkey south of Burgas
21 D+62 Leipzig falls to NATO; Elbe River reached
Italians, AFCENT units link up at Ansbach
Operation ICE PICK conducted in North Norway
Multi-regiment air attack on CVBG in Vestfjord
DPRK invades South Korea
Operation PISTOL PETE, Blue invasion of Uturup
Red attacks Alaska with missiles from two SSGNs
22 D+63
23 D+64 End of GWG ’87

Partial List of Participating Organizations
Department of Commerce
Department of Defense
Department of Energy
Department of Justice
Department of Labor
Department of State
Department of Transportation
Department of the Treasury
Bureau of Mines
Bureau of Selective Service
Central Intelligence Agency
CNO Executive Panel
Defense Intelligence Agency
Federal Emergency Management Agency
General Accounting Office
Joint Chiefs of Staff
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
National Security Agency
National Security Council
World Bank
Applied Physics Laboratory
David Taylor Model Basin
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Naval Civil Engineering Laboratory
Naval Research Laboratory
Naval Underwater Systems Command
Sandia National Laboratory
Air University
Army School of Command and Staff
Army War College
National Defense University
Naval War College
Navy Postgraduate School
Also participating were about twenty Corporations and numerous military organiza-
tions representing joint and unified comands and all of the armed services and the
Coast Guard.
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Glossary
Abbreviations
A A/C aircraft
ACE NATO Allied Command Europe
ADM atomic demolition mines
Aegis Blue USN Integrated Antiair Warfare Weapons System
AFCE NATO Allied Forces Command Europe
AFCENT NATO Allied Forces Central Europe
AFNORTH NATO Allied Forces Northern Europe
AFSOUTH NATO Allied Forces Southern Europe
AG NATO army group
AI air intercept
Alpini Italian Light Infantry trained and equipped to
fight in the mountains
AMPHIBS slang expression for amphibious warfare ships
AOR area of responsibility
ASAT antisatellite weapon
ASCM air-to-surface cruise missile [or]
antiship cruise missile
ASUW antisurface warfare
ASW antisubmarine warfare
AWACS Blue Airborne Warning and Control System
B BAI battlefield air interdiction
BBBG Blue battleship battle group
Benelux Belgium Netherlands Luxembourg
Blue United States of America
Boomer slang expression for ballistic missile submarine
BW biological weapon(s)/warfare
C C3 command, control, and communications
C3I command, control, communications, and
intelligence
CAP combat air patrol
CAS close air support
CAST NATO Canadian Air-Sea Transportable Brigade
CENTAG NATO Central Army Group
CHOP change of operational control
CINCLANT Blue Commander-in-Chief Atlantic
CINCPAC Blue Commander-in-Chief Pacific
CINCSOUTH NATO Commander-in-Chief South
CIWS Close-in Weapons System
CJTF Blue Commander Joint Task Force
CNO Blue Chief of Naval Operations
COMMARFOREUR NATO Commander Marine Forces Europe
COMNON NATO Commander North Norway
COMSECONDFLT Blue Commander Second Fleet
COMSTRIKEFLTLANT NATO Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic
CONUS Continental United States
COSMOS 929 Red reconnaissance satellite
CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CVBF Blue aircraft carrier battle force
CVBG Blue aircraft carrier battle group
CW chemical weapon(s)/warfare
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D D-Day day on which war begins
DIW dead in the water
DMZ demilitarized zone
DOT Blue Department of Transportation
DPC NATO Defense Planning Committee
DPRK Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(North Korea)
E EASTLANT Eastern Atlantic Area
ENWGS Enhanced Naval Warfare Gaming System
Eskadra Red squadron (Russian)
ETA estimated time of arrival
ETR estimated time of repair
EW early warning [or] electronic warfare
F FEBA forward edge of battle area
FETVD Red Far Eastern Theater of Military Operations
Finnish Wedge that part of Finland north and west of the
juncture of the borders of Finland, Norway,
and the USSR
FLOT forward line of troops
FRG Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)
G GCI ground control intercept
GDR German Democratic Republic (East Germany)
GIN GAP ocean spaces between Greenland, Iceland,
and Norway
GIUK GAP ocean spaces between Greenland, Iceland,
and United Kingdom
GRU Red military intelligence directorate controlled
by the General Staff
H HFDF high frequency direction finding
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HUMINT intelligence obtained from human sources
I I and W indication and warning
ID infantry division
IGB inter-German border
INF Independent Nuclear Force (France)
J JCS Blue Joint Chiefs of Staff
K KIA killed in action
L LEO low earth orbit
LOC(s) line(s) of communication
LRA Red long-range aviation
M MAB Blue Marine Amphibious Brigade
MAC Blue Military Airlift Command
MAF Blue Marine Amphibious Force
MARDEZLANT Blue Maritime Defense Zone Atlantic
MCM mine countermeasures
MD Red military district
MERSHIP(s) slang expression for merchant ship(s)
MEF Blue Marine Expeditionary Force
MIDEASTFOR Blue USN Middle East Force
MODLOC Blue modified location—a geographic point
about which ships maneuver
MPS Blue maritime prepositioning ships
MRD Red Motorized Rifle Division
MVD Red Ministry of Internal Affairs
N NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCA Blue National Command Authority
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NGFS naval gunfire support
NORTHAG NATO Northern Army Group
NSC Blue National Security Council
NSWP Red Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact
NWACM Navy War Air Combat Model
NWC Naval War College
NWTVD Red Northwestern Theater of Military Operations
O OCA offensive counter air
OPLAN plan of operations
OTHR over-the-horizon radar
P PACAF Blue Pacific Air Forces (USAF)
PACOM Blue Pacific Command (headed by CINCPAC)
PLA People’s Liberation Army (PRC)
POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants
PRC People’s Republic of China
Q Q ROUTES protected shipping lanes swept for both
mines and submarines
R Rangers Blue Army unit trained for long-range reconnaissance
and special operations
RC-135 Blue electronic reconnaissance aircraft
Red Soviet Union
REFORGER NATO Return of Forces to Germany
REINFORCED ALERT NATO alliance mobilization step
ROK Republic of Korea (South Korea)
S SACEUR NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe
SACLANT NATO Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
SAF Red Soviet Air Forces
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SAG surface action group
SAM surface-to-air missile
SHF SATCOM super-high-frequency satellite communications
SIGINT signals intelligence
SIOP Blue single integrated operational plan for
nuclear war
SLOC(s) sea line(s) of communication
SNA Red Soviet Naval Aviation
SNI Red Soviet Naval Infantry
SOF Blue special operations forces
SOSUS Blue sound surveillance system
SOVINDRON Red Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron
SOVMEDRON Red Soviet Mediterranean Sea Squadron
SPETSNAZ Red special operations forces
USSR designation: troops of special designation
SQR-19 Blue passive long-range towed sonar array
SRF Red Soviet Rocket Forces
SUBACLANT NATO Submarine Allied Commander Atlantic
SWAPS southwestern approaches (to the
English Channel)
SWTVD Red Southwestern Theater of Military Operations
T TACAIR tactical aircraft operations
TACNUC tactical nuclear weapon
TACOPS theater and corps operations and
planning simulation
TASM Blue Tomahawk antiship missile
Thin line array Blue towed passive sonar system
TVD Red theater of military operations
U UHF SATCOM ultra-high-frequency satellite communications
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UK United Kingdom
USA Blue U.S. Army
USAF Blue U.S. Air Force
USCG Blue U.S. Coast Guard
USMC Blue U.S. Marine Corps
USN Blue U.S. Navy
V VACAPES Virginia Capes—just seaward of Norfolk
VGK Red Supreme High Command
W WESTLANT Western Atlantic
WMD weapons of mass destruction
WP Warsaw Pact
WTVD Red Western Theater of Military Operations
Platforms and Weapons
A A-6 Blue two-seat carrier-based bomber for
CAS, interdiction, and deep strike
AGI auxiliary vessel general intelligence purposes
Akula Red fleet submarine (SSN)
AOE fast combat support ship
AS-4 Red air-to-surface missile with a range of about
185nm (Kitchen)
AS-6 Red air-to-surface missile with a range of about
185nm (Kingfish)
B B-1 Blue long-range multirole strategic bomber
B-52 Blue long-range multirole strategic bomber
Backfire Red twin-jet medium bomber and maritime
reconnaissance and attack A/C (Tu-26)
Badger Red twin-jet medium bomber and maritime
reconnaissance and attack A/C (Tu-16)
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BB battleship
Bear Red four-turboprop long-range bomber and
maritime reconnaissance A/C (Tu-95)
Blinder Red twin-jet supersonic bomber and maritime
reconnaissance A/C (Tu-22)
BLKCON 5 Red aircraft carrier (CV) 67,000 tons
(Leonid Brezhnev)
C CA cruiser (all-gun armament)
CapTor Blue deep-water antisubmarine mine
(encapsulated Mk-46 torpedo)
CG guided missile cruiser
Charlie Red cruise missile submarine (SSGN)
CV aircraft carrier
CVN nuclear-powered aircraft carrier
D DD destroyer
DDG guided missile destroyer
E E-3 Blue airborne warning and control platform (AWACS)
Echo Red cruise missile submarine (SSGN)
F F-14 Blue twin-seat carrier-based multirole fighter
F-111 Blue twin-seat multirole attack aircraft
Fencer Red two-seat attack aircraft (Su-24)
FF frigate
FFG guided missile frigate
FFL light frigate
Flanker Red single-seat all-weather fighter with attack
capability (Su-27)
Flogger Red single-seat fighter (MiG-27)
Forger Red ship-based V/STOL aircraft (Yak-38)
Foxhound Red two-seat all-weather interceptor (MiG-31)
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Foxtrot Red submarine (SS)
FPB fast patrol boat
Fulcrum Red all-weather fighter with attack
capability (MiG-29)
H Harpoon Blue medium-range antiship cruise missile
HAWK Blue land-based medium-range
surface-to-air missile
I IL-38 Red intermediate-range shore-based
ASW/maritime patrol aircraft (MAY)
J Juliett Red cruise missile submarine (SSG)
K Kara Red cruiser (CG)
USSR designation: large antisubmarine ship
Kashin and
Mod Kashin
Red guided missile destroyer (DDG)
USSR designation: large antisubmarine ship
Kiev Red VSTOL aircraft carrier (CV)
USSR designation: tactical air-capable cruiser
Kilo Red submarine (SS)
Kirov Red battle cruiser
USSR designation: nuclear-powered missile cruiser
Koni Red frigate (FF)
USSR designation: escort ship
Kresta I Red cruiser (CG)
USSR designation: missile cruiser
Kresta II Red cruiser (CG)
USSR designation: large antisubmarine ship
Krivak I & II Red guided missile frigate (FFG)
USSR designation: escort ship
Kynda Red cruiser (CG)
USSR designation: missile cruiser
L LHA amphibious assault ship (general purpose)
LHD amphibious assault ship (multipurpose)
LSD landing ship dock
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M Mainstay Red early warning and control aircraft (IL-76)
MiG-21 Red single-seat fighter (Fishbed)
MK-57 Blue submarine or ship-laid moored mine
MPA Blue maritime patrol aircraft
N Nanuchka Red missile corvette
USSR designation: small missile ship
November Red submarine (SSN)
O Oscar Red cruise missile submarine (SSGN)
P P-3 Blue maritime patrol aircraft
R Ro/Ro merchant ship with vehicle roll-on, roll-off design
RPV remotely piloted vehicle
S SA-6 Red surface-to-air missile (Gainful)
Scud Red Army battlefield missile (SS-1)
Sierra Red submarine (SSN)
SL-7 Blue fast merchant ship
Slava Red cruiser (CG)
USSR designation: rocket cruiser
SM-1 Blue standard missile 1—shipboard surface-
to-air missile
SM1-ER-BTN Blue standard missile 1—extended-range
nuclear warhead
SM-2 Blue standard missile 2—shipboard surface-
to-air missile
Sovremenny Red destroyer (DD)
USSR designation: destroyer
Spetznaz Red special operations forces
USSR designation: troops of special designation
SR-71 Blue strategic reconnaissance aircraft
SS submarine (nonnuclear)
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SS-12 Red tactical surface-to-surface missile
(Scaleboard)
SS-22 Red tactical surface-to-surface missile
SSBN nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine
SSGN nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine
SSM surface-to-surface missile
SSN nuclear-powered attack submarine
SS-N-12 Red surface or subsurface launched antiship
missile (Sandbox)
SS-N-19 Red supersonic antiship cruise missile
SUBACLANT NATO Submarine Allied Commander Atlantic
Sverdlov Red cruiser (CA) USSR designation: cruiser
T T-AGOS Blue auxiliary ocean surveillance ship
(civilian manned)
TANGO Red submarine (SS)
TLAM(C) Blue Tomahawk land attack missile (conventional)
TLAM(N) Blue Tomahawk land attack missile (nuclear)
Tornado NATO twin-engine all-weather multipurpose
combat aircraft
U U-2 Blue high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft
Udaloy Red destroyer (DD)
USSR designation: large antisubmarine ship
Y Yankee Red ballistic missile submarine (SSBN)
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